Results
Displaying 21 - 30 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NY - Police dog - § 122-c. Transport of police work dogs injured in the line of duty | McKinney's General Municipal Law § 122-c | NY GEN MUN § 122-c | This New York law from 2015 states that an emergency medical service paramedic or emergency medical service technician may transport any police work dog injured in the line of duty to a veterinary clinic or similar such facility provided, however, that there are no persons requiring medical attention or transport at such time. | Statute |
| MN - Initiatives - Amendment 2 (right to hunt) | Amendment 2 (1998) | This ballot measure asked whether the Minnesota Constitution should be amended to affirm that hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good. The measure was passed in 1998 by 77.2% of voters. | Statute | |
| WV - Dangerous - § 20-2-16. Dogs chasing deer | W. Va. Code, § 20-2-16 | WV ST § 20-2-16 | This West Virginia statute states that, except as provided in § 20-2-5j enacted in 2020, no person may permit or use his or her dog to hunt or chase deer. A natural resources police officer shall take into possession any dog known to have unlawfully hunted or chased deer. If the owner of the dog can be determined, the dog shall be returned to the owner. If the owner of the dog cannot be determined, the natural resources police officer shall deliver the dog to the appropriate county humane officer or facility consistent with the provisions of this code. | Statute |
| Hair v. Quail Corners Animal Hospital |
Standard veterinary malpractice case for a show dog. Includes Interrogatories. Veterinarian negligently treated show dog after she was shot by a hunter. In addition, another vet then left a needle inside the dog. Vets failed to take the needle out, causing the dog's death. |
Pleading | ||
| Hopson v. DPP | [1997] C.O.D. 229 |
The owner of a bird of prey had kept it in a wire aviary for at least six weeks, during which it had injured itself by repeatedly flying into the wire mesh. Having been convicted on these facts of an offence of cruelly ill-treating the bird contrary to the first limb of s 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911, he appealed, contending that under that limb, unlike the second limb, he should only have been convicted if he was guilty of a positive act of deliberate cruelty. Dismissing the appeal, the Divisional Court held that a person could be guilty of cruel ill-treatment of an animal he was responsible for by allowing it to remain in a situation where it was continuing to injure itself, even if he did not desire to bring about the harm. |
Case | |
| California Veterinary Medical Ass'n v. City of West Hollywood | 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318 (2007) | 152 Cal. App. 4th 536; 2007 WL 1793052 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.), 152 Cal.App.4th 536 | This California case centers on an anti-cat declawing ordinance passed by the city of West Hollywood in 2003. On cross-motions for summary judgment the trial court concluded West Hollywood's anti-declawing ordinance was preempted by section 460 and entered judgment in favor of the CVMA, declaring the ordinance invalid and enjoining further enforcement. On appeal, however, this Court reversed, finding section 460 of the veterinary code does not preempt the ordinance. Although section 460 prohibits local legislation imposing separate and additional licensing requirements or other qualifications on individuals holding state licenses issued by agencies of the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA), it does not preclude otherwise valid local regulation of the manner in which a business or profession is performed. | Case |
| NH - Divorce - 458:16-a Property Settlement. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 458:16-a | NH ST § 458:16-a | This New Hampshire statute defines "property" for purposes of the state's marriage dissolution (divorce) procedure. In August of 2019, a new provision was added to this law related to animals (Subsection II-a). This subsection states that "[t]angible property shall include animals. In such cases, the property settlement shall address the care and ownership of the parties' animals, taking into consideration the animals' wellbeing." | Statute |
| Rowley v. City of New Bedford | 333 F.Supp.3d 30 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018) | 2018 WL 4600647 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018) | This opinion concerns the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts' motion to dismiss plaintiff Rowley's (formerly plaintiff "Friends of Ruth & Emily, Inc.") citizen suit for injunction under the federal Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that two Asian Elephants, Ruth and Emily, were mistreated by the Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford by chaining their legs, housing them in inadequate facilities, failing to provide proper socialization, and failing to provide adequate veterinary care, which gives rise to a "taking" under Section 9 of the ESA. Rowley claims that she is a member of the zoological society there and visits the elephants on a "near daily basis," resulting in “an aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual relationship with Ruth and Emily over the years.” The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked both parties to brief on the issue of standing for the instant action. The court first noted that the ESA expressly authorizes citizen suits for injunctive relief. To survive a motion to dismiss, Rowley must, through facts, clearly demonstrate standing, and then the court must analyze those facts under a multi-pronged approach. To begin, the court distinguished cases that established the proper "animal nexus" for injury in fact with those that did not meet that finding. Here, Rowley's complaint established injury in fact because she lives in New Bedford, is a member of the Zoo's Zoological Society, and observes the elephants on a near daily basis. Rowley alleges that the maltreatment of Ruth and Emily injures this ability because she observes their ongoing suffering while in substandard captivity. The court was not persuaded by New Bedford's claim that Rowley has not established injury in fact because she has no specialized training in wildlife or animal welfare. In fact, this claim ignored precedent from this very circuit that "aesthetic injury" can be established by viewing animals in inhumane conditions. In addition, the court rejected New Bedford's "nonexistent requirement into the injury in fact analysis" that Rowley must have observed or will observe Asian elephants in their native habitats. As a result, the court found Rowley properly established injury in fact. As to the next requirement of causation, the court found that Rowley sufficiently alleged that the Zoo's actions caused the harm complained of for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. Finally, as to redressability, the court found that Rowley's request for a declaratory judgment as to the Zoo's treatment of Ruth and Emily, and an injunction prohibiting the Zoo from euthanizing the elephants met this prong. New Bedford's contention that Rowley's further suggestion of moving the elephants to a sanctuary in Tennessee impaired her redressability argument because Rowley did not propose how the cost of relocation would be funded was also rejected. At this stage, the court does not need to determine whether this solution is necessary or feasible. The District Court ultimately held that Rowley demonstrated sufficient standing to pursue her claims. Hence, New Bedford's motion to dismiss was denied. | Case |
| Cruelty, Police Shooting Pets, Domestic Violence and Hoarding | Policy | |||
| VA - Dangerous - § 3.2-6553. Compensation for livestock and poultry killed by dogs | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6553 | VA ST § 3.2-6553 | This Virginia statute states that any person who has any livestock or poultry killed or injured by any dog not his or her own shall be entitled to receive the fair market value of such livestock or poultry not to exceed $750 per animal or $10 per fowl, provided that the claimant has furnished evidence, the animal control officer was notified within seventy-two hours after discovery of the damage, and the claimant has exhausted other legal remedies. However, local jurisdictions may by ordinance waive the last two requirements provided that the ordinance adopted requires that the animal control officer has conducted an investigation and that his investigation supports the claim. | Statute |