Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd | (2008) 244 ALR 161 | (2008) 165 FCR 510; (2008) 99 ALD 534; [2008] FCA 3 |
The applicant, an incorporated public interest organisation, sought an injunction to restrain the respondent Japanese company which owned several ocean vessels engaged in, and likely to further engage in, whaling activities in waters claimed by Australia. It was found that the applicant had standing to bring the injunction and the respondent engaged in activities prohibited by the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). Orders were entered against against the respondent even though it had no assets in Australia and the likelihood of being able to enforce judgment was very low. |
Case |
| Sentencia 00017-2010-PI/TC, 2011 - Peru | 00017-2010-PI/TC | El Colegio de Abogados de Lima Norte interpuso esta demanda contra el Congreso de la República de Perú en relación con varias leyes que promovían el desarrollo de espectáculos públicos no deportivos, como las corridas de toros y las peleas de gallos. El Colegio de Abogados alegó que la legislación era inconstitucional, ya que contradecía el derecho a la igualdad así como varios principios fiscales al gravar los espectáculos no deportivos pero no los deportivos. Además, alegó que, mediante estas prácticas, el Estado desatendía su deber de garantizar la participación en el patrimonio cultural nacional de Perú. El Congreso argumentó que la reclamación carecía de fundamento, ya que no se había discriminado a nadie por factores demográficos. El tribunal sostuvo que la reclamación era infundada, ya que, en última instancia, las corridas de toros son una manifestación cultural regulada y la Constitución peruana permite a los legisladores hacer uso de su discrecionalidad para imponer tributos. | Case | |
| CA - Service Animal - § 600.2. Allowing dog to injure or kill guide, signal or service dog; punishment; restitution | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 600.2 | CA PENAL § 600.2 | It is unlawful for any person to permit any dog he or she owns or controls to injure or kill any service dog while the service dog is in discharge of its duties. A violation is an infraction punishable by a fine if the injury is caused by the person's failure to exercise ordinary care. A violation is a misdemeanor if the injury is caused by reckless disregard in the exercise of control over his or her dog. A violation in this case shall be punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. Upon conviction, the defendant shall make restitution, including veterinary bills and replacement costs. | Statute |
| Webb v. Amtower | 2008 WL 713728 (KS,2008 (not reported)) | 178 P.3d 80 (KS,2008 (table only)) |
The court applied the forum's traditional lex loci conflict-of-laws rule to determine what jurisdiction's law governed for both damages and recovery of possession. The "place of injury" for the tort/damages issue was Kansas since that's where the contract was signed. The court remanded the case to determine the law of the place where the dog was found to determine the right-to-possession since that was a personal property issue. |
Case |
| EU - Research - Council Directive 86/609/EEC regarding the protection of animals used for experimental and other scientific purp | Council Directive 86/609/EEC |
The European Union has established a framework to protect animals used for experimental or scientific purposes by ensuring that they are adequately cared for and that no unnecessary pain or suffering is inflicted. |
Statute | |
| Anne Arundel County v. Reeves | 252 A.3d 921 (Md., 2021) | 474 Md. 46 (Md., 2021) | This Maryland case examines the scope of compensatory damages available forf the tortious injury or death of a pet under Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 11-110, a law that allow pet owner to recover damages for the tort-based death or injury of their pet up to a capped level. The incident giving rise to this case occurred when Anne Arundel County Police Officer Rodney Price shot Micheal Reeves' dog in the front yard of Mr. Reeves' home. Officer Price was going door-to-door inquiring with residents after a recent spate of burglaries. Mr. Reeves' dog Vern burst from the front storm door and put his paw on the officer's forearm. While Officer Price stepped back and pushed the dog away, he testified that he did not vocalize any commands to the dog at that time, and, instead, decided to shoot the dog. Testimony by a veterinary pathologist at trial revealed that, if the dog were going for the officer's face as Price testified, this would have been improbable based on the dog's size as compared to the officer. Further, there was no dirt on that area of the officer's arm/chest nor any marks from the dog's paws. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Mr. Reeves for $10,000 for the trespass to chattel claim, and $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages for the gross negligence claim. The circuit court then reduced the gross negligence damages to $200,000 pursuant to the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). CJP § 5-301 et seq. The circuit court also reduced the trespass to chattel damages to $7,500 pursuant to the then-applicable damages cap in CJP § 11-110.1. The Court of Special Appeals held in an unreported divided decision that the statute did not bar recovery of noneconomic damages. On appeal here, this court now holds that CJP § 11-110 limits the recovery for compensatory damages to the amount specified by that statute and does not allow for recovery of noneconomic compensatory damages. And while the court found there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Officer Price was grossly negligent, it also held that Mr. Reeves could not recover these damages due to Maryland's single recovery rule. As a matter of first impression, this court found CJP § 11-110's plain language evinces an intent to exclude those things not expressed in the statute. In other words, because the legislature defined the specific types of compensatory damages it allows, it intended to exclude other forms of damages like noneconomic damages. Further, the court found the plaintiff's reading of the statute "illogical" because economic damages would be capped, but yet noneconomic damages would not be. Thus, it would be up to the General Assembly to expressly provide for noneconomic damages in amendments to the statute. The court ultimately concluded that the statute defines and caps the recovery of compensatory damages in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet and the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The dissent noted the majority decision created a "double anomaly" in Maryland law by capping damages for victims of a tortfeasor who kills their dog but allowing a fraudster who intentionally tricks a family into selling a painting of their dog unlimited damages. Further, the dissent argued the majority ignored both judicial and ethical trends regarding pets in society and disregards the legislative debate when the statute was re-enacted showing an intent to include higher damages amounts. | Case |
| Missouri Pet Breeders Association v. County of Cook | 106 F. Supp. 3d 908 (N.D. Ill. 2015) | 2015 WL 2448332 (N.D. Ill., 2015) | Cook County passed an ordinance that required a “pet shop operator” to only sell animals obtained from a breeder that (among other requirements) held a USDA class “A” license and owned or possessed no more than 5 female dogs, cats, or rabbits capable of reproduction in any 12-month period. Plaintiffs, a professional pet organization and three Cook County pet shops and their owners, sued Cook County government officials, alleging that the ordinance violated the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Defendants moved to dismiss the action. After concluding that plaintiffs had standing to pursue all of their claims, with the exception of the Foreign Commerce Claim, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all claims, but gave Plaintiffs a chance to cure their complaint's defects by amendment. | Case |
| Womack v. Von Rardon | 135 P.3d 542 (Wash. 2006) |
In this Washington case, a cat owner sued a minor and his parents after the minor set her cat on fire. While this Court found that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to Ms. Womack's private nuisance, tort outrage, and statutory waste claims, it held that the lower court incorrectly calculated the measure of damages. Noting that the Division 2 Appellate Court left open the question of emotional distress damages where a pet has been maliciously injured in Pickford v. Masion , 124 Wash.App. 257, 262-63, 98 P.3d 1232 (2004), this Court held that the general allegations include sufficient facts to find both malicious conduct toward Ms. Womack's pet and her resulting emotional distress. Thus, "[f]or the first time in Washington, we hold malicious injury to a pet can support a claim for, and be considered a factor in measuring a person's emotional distress damages." |
Case | |
| DE - Police Dog - § 9816. Emergency care of police dogs | 16 Del.C. § 9816 | DE ST TI 16 § 9816 | This 2023 Delaware law states that a paramedic or other EMS provider may provide emergency medical services to an injured police dog at the scene of an emergency that has resulted in the police dog's injury. They may also transport the police dog to a designated veterinary facility and provide emergency medical services to the police dog during transport to the facility, if the paramedic or EMS provider deem it necessary for the police dog's survival. | Statute |
| Leigh v. State | 58 So. 3d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) | 36 Fla. L. Weekly D778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) | Philip Leigh (Defendant) appeals from an order summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic. Defendant claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to appear in a leg restraint and for failing to object to the presence of a dog. Apparently, the dog became disruptive on more than one occasion and was visible to the judge and jury. The Florida appellate court reversed and remanded, with a provision that the trial court could attach portions of the record that would refute the possibility that defense counsel’s failure to object to the dog’s presence indicated ineffective assistance of counsel. Since there was apparently no evidence of the dog’s presence in the record at all, the trial court was presumably obligated to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter. | Case |