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Displaying 81 - 90 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DC - Animal Control - Subchapter III. Release of Animals. | DC CODE § 8-1831.01 | DC ST § 8-1831.01 | This D.C. law states that no animal shall be released from custody of animal protection except for the purposes of adoption, redemption by the owner of the animal, or other suitable placement in the best interest of the animal. No animals shall be knowingly released from any entity charged with animal protection for the purposes of research, experimentation, testing, or medical instruction or demonstration. Violation is a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| US - Native American - RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act) | 42 USC 2000bb-1 | RFRA provides that the government may not substantially burden an individual's free exercise of religion unless it is in furtherance of a compelling government interest and it is done through the least restrictive means. | Statute | |
| Hines v. Pardue | --- F.Supp.3d -------, 2023 WL 5254673 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2023) | 2023 WL 5254673 (S.D.Tex., 2023) | Plaintiff and veterinarian Ronald S. Hines brings this action to challenge a Texas law that mandates a veterinarian conduct a physical examination of an animal before practicing veterinary medicine on the grounds that the law violates his First Amendment right to free speech. Plaintiff, who was unable to maintain a veterinary practice in person due to medical issues, began providing veterinary advice to animal owners via a website without first examining their animals. Plaintiff was disciplined by the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners for doing this, and was fined $500 and sentenced to a year of probation. Plaintiff then sued the members of the Board on two separate occasions, with the second appeal being remanded by the Fifth Circuit with instructions to determine whether the requirement for a physical examination before issuing veterinary advice regulates speech incidentally to the regulation of non-expressive professional conduct, or is a regulation of non-expressive conduct. Here, the district court first examined multiple instances of plaintiff providing veterinary advice to animal owners via the internet. Next, the court asserts that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims against the board. Lastly, the court examines plaintiff’s First Amendment argument. Plaintiff argues that his email exchanges with animal owners constitutes speech, and the court agrees that this is speech and that the Examination Requirement regulates this speech. However, the court finds that this regulation of plaintiff’s speech is content neutral, because the requirement for a physical examination of the animals before issuing advice applies neutrally to all forms of veterinary care and veterinary speech regardless of content. Therefore, the court held that defendants may enforce the Examination Requirement without violating plaintiff’s free speech rights. | Case |
| Ass'n des Éleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Bonta | 33 F.4th 1107 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Ass'n des Éleveurs de Cananards et D'oies du Quebec v. Bonta, 143 S. Ct. 2493, 216 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2023) | California prohibits the in-state sale of products that are “the result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird's liver beyond normal size.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25982. The law had a 7.5-year grace period before it went into effect. The law has two components: first, it bans the practice of force-feeding ducks and geese to produce foie gras; and second, the law banned the in-state sale of products that are "the result" of that practice. After nine years of litigation and in their third set of appeals before this Court, the parties ask the court here to decide whether California's sales ban is preempted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”) or violates the dormant Commerce Clause. As to the first issue of preemption, the plaintiff sellers contend that at least one USDA Policy Book defines foie gras as liver from poultry that has been "specially fed and fattened" and other USDA documents suggest this is done via forced-feeding. Thus, contend the sellers, it is impossible to produce and properly label foie gras, as is required by the PPIA, and then also comply with the California law. The court disagreed with the assertion, finding that the sellers can still force feed birds to make their products, but not sell those in California. Said the court, "The sales ban is neither a command to market non-force-fed products as foie gras nor to call force-fed products something different." Further, the sellers raise a new suggestion that the ban constitutes express preemption because force feeding operates as an "ingredient requirement." Essentially, they contend you cannot have foie gras without force-feeding birds. This was also rejected, as the court found nothing new that would reverse the precedent established in the prior decision by the court. Finally, the sellers appeal dismissal of their dormant Commerce Clause claim, arguing that the sales ban is impermissibly extraterritorial because force-feeding is only banned in California and therefore, only regulates out-of-state conduct. The court dismissed this, noting states are free to regulate commerce within their boundaries provided such regulation does not affect transactions from out of that state. Moreover, the sellers' argument that the ban is "unduly burdensome" for this reason also failed since there is not requirement that a state impose the "least burdensome" method for in-state commerce. The court held that the sales ban is neither preempted nor unconstitutional and that the specified transactions are out-of-state sales permitted by California law. | Case | |
| Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society | 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) | 478 U.S. 221 (1986) |
Congress had granted the Secretary the authority to determine whether a foreign nation's whaling in excess of quotas diminished the effectiveness of the IWC, and the Court found no reason to impose a mandatory obligation upon the Secretary to certify that every quota violation necessarily failed that standard. |
Case |
| Humane Society of the United States v. Jewell | 2014 WL 7237702 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2014) (Only the Westlaw cite is available) | The Humane Society of the United States sued to overturn the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's 2012 Final Rule to delist the Great Lakes gray wolves from the endangered species list. The US District Court called the 2012 Final Rule "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act and in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The District Court thus relisted the wolves and placed them back under the control of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. | Case | |
| Commercial Breeding of Companion Animals and Sale of Pets | Policy | |||
| CA - Fighting Animals - § 597b. Fighting animals or cockfighting; prohibition; penalties; aiding and abetting | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597b | CA PENAL § 597b | This statute forbids anyone from causing a fight between any animal or creature for amusement or gain, or allowing an animal fight to take place on her premises. It also makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to be present at an animal fight. | Statute |
| VT - Endangered wildlife - Chapter 124. Trade in Covered Animal Parts or Products | 10 V.S.A. § 5501 - 5508 | VT ST T. 10 § 5501 - 5508 | This Vermont chapter, enacted in 2022, relates to the trade in certain animal products. Under the law, a person shall not purchase, sell, offer for sale, or possess with intent to sell any item that the person knows or should know is a covered animal part or product. A covered animal part includes certain big cat species, elephants, giraffes, hippopotamuses, mammoths, mastodons, pangolins, endangered rays, rhinoceroses, sea turtles, endangered sharks, certain whales, and certain ape species. Exceptions exist for activities authorized under federal law, parts with "antique status" as defined, among others. For a first offense, a person shall be assessed an administrative penalty of not more than $1,000.00 nor less than $400.00. | Statute |
| Archer v. State | 309 So. 3d 287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) | 2020 WL 7409970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2020) | Defendant Tim Archer pleaded no contest to felony animal cruelty in Florida. Archer's dog Ponce apparently made a mess in Archer's house and, when Archer "disciplined" Ponce, the dog bit him, leading to Archer violently beating and stabbing the dog to death. Public outcry over mild punishment in the state for heinous acts of animal abuse led to "Ponce's Law," which enhanced penalties (although it did not retroactively apply to Archer). As a condition of Archer's plea agreement, both parties stipulated to a restriction on future ownership of animals as part of Archer's probation. On appeal here, Archer argues that the trial court erred in imposing these special conditions of probation. With regard to special condition 34 and 35, which prohibits him from owning any animal for the duration of his life and prohibits him from residing with anyone who owns a pet, Archer seeks clarification whether this prohibits him from residing with his ex-wife and children who own two cats, respectively. The court found that condition 35 would only be in effect for his three-year probationary term. Additionally, the court found condition 34 that imposes a lifetime ban on ownership exceeded the trial court's jurisdiction regardless of the open-ended language of Ponce's law. The animal restriction is not "a license to exceed the general rule that prohibits a court from imposing a probationary term beyond the statutorily permissible term, which in this case is five years." The case was remanded to the trial court to modify the conditions of probation to be coextensive with the probationary term. | Case |