Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohan v. Ritzo | 679 A.2d 597 (N.H.,1996) | 141 N.H. 210 (N.H.,1996) |
In this New Hampshire case, a bicyclist brought suit against a dog owner under the state's strict liability statute for injuries he sustained when he fell from his bike after the owners' dog ran toward him. The jury awarded him $190,000 at trial. On appeal, this court found that the bicyclist's allegations were sufficient to sustain the jury's finding even though there was no evidence that the dog actually bit the plaintiff or made any physical contact. The Court held that there is nothing in the plain language of RSA 466:19 that would limit the statute's application actual bites or other direct physical contact. Instead, the statute makes dog owners strictly liable to “[a]ny person to whom ... damage may be occasioned by a dog not owned or kept by him.” RSA 466:19. |
Case | |
| NE - Livestock - Article 23. Domesticated Cervine Animal Act | Neb. Rev. St. § 54-2301 to 54- 2324 | NE ST § 54-2301 to 54- 2324 | This set of laws comprises Nebraska's Domesticated Cervine Animal Act. Under the act, it is unlawful for any person to own, possess, buy, sell, or barter any domesticated cervine animal in this state unless such animal is individually identified and kept at a premises for which a domesticated cervine animal facility permit has been issued by the department. A municipal, state, or federal zoo, park, refuge, or wildlife area, a bona fide circus or animal exhibit, or any private, nonprofit zoological society is not required to obtain a permit in order to own, possess, buy, sell, or barter a domesticated cervine animal, but such facilities are still governed by the provisions of the act regarding the testing, control, and eradication of cervidae diseases including chronic wasting disease. | Statute | |
| Huff v. Dyer | 297 Ga.App. 761, 678 S.E.2d 206 (Ga.App.,2009) | 2009 WL 1299046 (Ga.App.), 09 FCDR 1707 |
In this Georgia case, the plaintiff was injured from being bitten by defendants' dog who was chained to the bed of their pickup truck while the defendants were inside an adjacent restaurant. The plaintiff sued defendants, claiming that they failed to warn her of their dog's dangerous propensities and that they committed negligence per se by violating the state's strict liability statute (OCGA § 51-2-7) and the Hall County Animal Control Ordinance. A jury found in favor of the defendants. The court found that the evidence was therefore more than sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that defendants' dog was “under restraint” for purposes of the ordinance. Further, there was no evidence that the owners had knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity. Affirmed. |
Case | |
| KY - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 437. Offenses Against Public Peace | KRS § 437.410 - 429 | KY ST § 437.410 - 429 | This chapter concerns the protection of animal enterprise facilities in Kentucky. Prohibited acts include exercising control over a facility or its property without consent of the owner, disruption or destruction of property of a facility, entering a facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act, and entering a facility with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise and then remaining on the grounds knowing that entry is forbidden. Any person who violates any provision of KRS 437.410 to 437.420 shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not less than 6 months but not more than 1 year, or both, for each violation. | Statute | |
| Stevens v. Hollywood Towers and Condominium Ass'n | 836 F.Supp.2d 800 (N.D. Ill. 2011) | Plaintiffs brought the instant suit contending that their Condo Board's refusal to accommodate the need for an emotional support animal forced them to sell their condo. The Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. After finding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to unrestricted access for their dog despite a no pet waiver and after needing more facts to determine whether Defendants restrictions on Plaintiffs’ access to the building were reasonable, the District Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under the Federal Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). The District Court also found Plaintiffs' interference or intimidation allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. However, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim because Plaintiffs had not contended that Defendants unreasonably used their own property to interfere in Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their home, but rather, contended that Defendants made rules that interfered with the Plaintiff's ability to use the common areas of the property as they wished. Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was also dismissed because Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that Defendants' conduct was extreme or outrageous. Finally, the constructive eviction claim was dismissed because more than a year had past between the owners’ accommodation request and the sale of their condominium. In sum, Counts I, II, and III went forward, but the remainder of the complaint was dismissed. Additionally, Defendant Sudler Building Services was dismissed from the complaint. | Case | ||
| Com. v. Erickson | 905 N.E.2d 127 (Mass.App.Ct.,2009) | 74 Mass.App.Ct. 172 (Mass.App.Ct.,2009) |
In this Massachusetts case, the defendant was found guilty of six counts of animal cruelty involving one dog and five cats after a bench trial. On appeal, defendant challenged the warrantless entry into her apartment and argued that the judge erred when he failed to grant her motion to suppress the evidence gathered in the search. The Court of Appeals found no error where the search was justified under the "emergency exception" to the warrant requirement. The court found that the officer was justified to enter where the smell emanating from the apartment led him to believe that someone might be dead inside. The court was not persuaded by defendant's argument that, once the officer saw the dog feces covering the apartment that was the source of the smell, it was then objectively unreasonable for him to conclude the smell was caused by a dead body. "The argument ignores the reality that there were in fact dead bodies in the apartment, not merely dog feces, to say nothing of the additional odor caused by the blood, cat urine, and cat feces that were also found." |
Case | |
| MN - Dangerous - Minnesota Dangerous Dog Definitions, Dog Bites, & Rabies Treatments | M. S. A. § 35.67 - 35.69; M.S.A. § 346.51; M.S.A. § 347.50 | MN ST § 35.67 - 35.69; MN ST § 346.51; MN ST § 347.50 | This Minnesota set of laws outlines the procedure for a town establishing a rabies proclamation and prevents the running at large of unmuzzled dogs in such localities. It also provides that an owner or custodian of a dog which does not have an appropriate antirabies vaccination and which bites or otherwise exposes a person to rabies virus may be penalized under section 346.53.& The statute also defines "dangerous dog" and "potentially dangerous dog." | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Taylor | 585 F.Supp. 393 (D.C. Me. 1984) |
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Maine section 7613 (related to the importation of fish bait species) places an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. While the court noted there is nothing in either the statute or its legislative history which expresses the clear intent of Congress that the Lacey Act Amendments are meant to insulate state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause, it found that the somewhat unique characteristics associated with Maine's wild fish population, the substantial uncertainties surrounding the effects these organisms have on fish and the unpredictable consequences attending the introduction of exotic species into Maine's wild fish population (including the introduction of fish parasites into the native population), the state clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the importation of live bait fish. |
Case | ||
| HI - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Chapter 711) | H R S § 711-1100 to 1110.5 | HI ST § 711-1100 to 1110.5 | Under this set of Hawaii laws, a person commits the misdemeanor offense of cruelty to animals if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly overdrives, overloads, tortures, torments, cruelly beats or starves any animal, deprives a pet animal of necessary sustenance, mutilates, poisons, or kills without need any animal other than insects, vermin, or other pests, or engages in animal fighting enterprises. Dog fighting constitutes a felony where the person owns or trains the dog to fight. The section has enhanced penalties for cruelty to guide or service animals or interference with their duties. | Statute | |
| OH - Exotic Pets - 901:1-17-12 Non-domestic animals | Ohio Admin. Code § 901:1-17-12 | OH ADC 901:1-17-12 | Under this Ohio regulation, no non-domestic animal shall be imported into the state of Ohio unless accompanied by a permit issued prior to entry and certificate of veterinary inspection, is free of evidence of any contagious or infectious diseases or parasites harmful to humans or animals, and is in full compliance with all state and federal agencies rules and regulations. The specific disease requirements listed in the remainder of the rule concern only animals such as Cervidae (deer, moose, etc.), Bovidae (antelope, wild cattle, etc.), Suidae (sporting and feral swine), Tayassuidae (peccarie), and Psittacine birds. | Administrative |