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Displaying 101 - 110 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Mountain Lions - Chapter 10. Mountain Lions | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4800 - 4810 | CA FISH & G § 4800 - 4810 | California statutes make mountain lions specially protected mammals. These sections make it unlawful to take, injure, possess, transport, import, or sell any mountain lion or any part or product thereof. Specific exceptions to these prohibitions include instances where a mountain lion is perceived to be an imminent threat to public health or safety or when it is perceived by to be an imminent threat to the survival of any threatened, endangered, candidate, or fully protected sheep species. | Statute |
| SD - Hunting - 41-1-8. Interference with lawful hunting, trapping, or fishing prohibited--Violation as misdemeanor | S D C L § 41-1-8 to 10 | SD ST § 41-1-8 to 10 | This South Dakota law reflects the state's hunter harassment provision. The law prohibits a person from intentionally interfering with any person or group of persons lawfully engaged in the process of taking or attempting to take any game or fish. This includes actions specifically intended to harass and any activity intended to scare or disturb game with the specific intent of preventing their lawful taking. Violation is a Class 2 misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Bohan v. Ritzo | 679 A.2d 597 (N.H.,1996) | 141 N.H. 210 (N.H.,1996) |
In this New Hampshire case, a bicyclist brought suit against a dog owner under the state's strict liability statute for injuries he sustained when he fell from his bike after the owners' dog ran toward him. The jury awarded him $190,000 at trial. On appeal, this court found that the bicyclist's allegations were sufficient to sustain the jury's finding even though there was no evidence that the dog actually bit the plaintiff or made any physical contact. The Court held that there is nothing in the plain language of RSA 466:19 that would limit the statute's application actual bites or other direct physical contact. Instead, the statute makes dog owners strictly liable to “[a]ny person to whom ... damage may be occasioned by a dog not owned or kept by him.” RSA 466:19. |
Case |
| Cantore v. Costantine | --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2023 WL 7560690 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2023) | No. 2022-00077, 622356/19, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 05708 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., Nov. 15, 2023) | This is an appeal of a personal injury case brought by plaintiff, the mother of the injured child, against the owners of a dog that caused the injury and the owners of the restaurant where the injury occurred. The injury took place at a dog-friendly restaurant both parties were dining at, where the dog owned by defendants bit a three-year-old infant. Plaintiff alleges that the restaurant owners knew of the dog’s vicious propensities but allowed it on the premises, and are liable along with the owners of the dog for the injuries sustained by her child. Defendant restaurant owners contend that they did not know of the dog’s vicious propensities, and that their restaurant requires that dogs be leashed and the dog was leashed at the time of the bite. Plaintiff argues that, under the Hewitt case, a standard negligence analysis should be used rather than an analysis based on knowledge of vicious propensities. Plaintiffs also argue defendant restaurant owners owed a duty of care to their customers, which was breached by allowing a dangerous dog on the premises. The lower court denied defendants motion for summary judgment because there were unresolved issues of fact as to the restaurant defendants’ duty to their patrons and the foreseeability of the injury. This appeal followed. On appeal, the court reversed the order of the lower court because defendants established that they did not have any knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog and that they exercised reasonable care through their signage and policies to protect restaurant patrons from the risk of harm that allowing animals on the premises poses. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is granted. | Case |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE WEST BENGAL ANIMAL SLAUGHTER CONTROL ACT, 1950 | 22 of 1950 | The law, specific to the state of West Bengal, regulates the slaughter of bulls, bullocks, cows, calves, male and female buffaloes, buffalo calves and castrated buffaloes. Persons may not slaughter these animals without a certificate stating that the animal is over fourteen years of age and unfit for work or breeding, or that the animal has become permanently incapacitated from work or breeding due to age, injury, deformity or incurable disease. Animals under this Act may be slaughtered only in specific places. | Statute | |
| Re The International Fund for Animal Welfare (Australia) Pty Ltd and Ors and Minister for Environment and Heritage | (2006) 42 AAR 262 | [2006] AATA 94 |
Zoos in New South Wales and Victoria sought to import five Asian elephants. After an initial hearing, further evidence was sought in relation to the condition and nature of the facilities at the zoos. The Tribunal decided that the importation of the elephants should be in accordance with a permit issued under s 303CG of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). |
Case |
| CITY OF TOLEDO, Appellant, v. Paul TELLINGS, Appellee. |
This is the City of Toldeo's Appellant Brief filed in the Supreme Court case of Toledo v. Tellings (871 N.E.2d 1152 (2007)). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the state and the city have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens against unsafe conditions caused by pit bulls. |
Pleading | ||
| MI - Cruelty - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. The Michigan Penal Code. | M.C.L.A. 750.50b | MI ST 750.50b | This is the felony animal cruelty law in Michigan. Under the law, a person is guilty of killing or torturing animals if they: (a) knowingly kill, torture, mutilate, maim, or disfigure an animal; (b) commit a reckless act knowing or having reason to know that the act will cause an animal to be killed, tortured, mutilated, maimed, or disfigured; (c) knowingly administer poison to an animal, or knowingly expose an animal to any poisonous substance, with the intent that the substance be taken or swallowed by the animal; or (d) violate or threaten to violate subdivision (a) or (c) with the intent to cause mental suffering or distress to a person or to exert control over a person. Whether the offense becomes a first, second, or third degree felony depends on listed factors, including whether the animal is a companion animal (as defined in the law). A first degree felony conviction results in imprisonment up to 10 years, a fine of not more than $5,000, and/or community service for not more than 500 hours. As a part of the sentence, the court may order the defendant to pay the costs of the prosecution and the costs of the care, housing, and veterinary medical care for the animal victim, and the court may order the defendant to not own or possess an animal for ANY period of time including permanent relinquishment. Lawful killing of animals including fishing, hunting, pest control, and scientific research are excluded. | Statute |
| OK - Cruelty - Animal Facilities Protection Act/Consolidated Cruelty Laws | 21 Okl. St. Ann. 1680 - 1700; 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 886 | OK ST T. 21 1680 - 1700; OK ST T. 21 § 886 | These Oklahoma statutes comprise the Animal Protection Act. The main thrust of the act is the prohibition of animal cruelty and animal fighting. Included in the provisions are the definitions (including the statutory definition of "animal") and the prohibited acts related to animal facilities. The statute further provides that no one shall intentionally damage the enterprise conducted at an animal facility (including releasing animals there with the intent to deprive the owner of such facility). Violation incurs a felony with a fine of up to $5,000 or imprisonment up to seven years or both. | Statute |
| Dillon v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Correction | 211 N.E.3d 746 (Ohio App. 10 Dist., 2023) | 2023-Ohio-942 | Plaintiff-Appellant, Anna Dillon, a certified “senior dog handler” through a rehabilitation program for inmates in Ohio, was attacked by a dog named Roosevelt, a German Shepherd/Husky mix owned by an Ohio Reformatory for Woman (ORW) corrections officer. Dillon had previously interacted with Roosevelt without incident on multiple occasions, but in March 2018, Roosevelt attacked her, causing 16 puncture wounds. On March 19, 2018, while attempting to put on Roosevelt's leash and collar, he displayed signs of anxiety and suddenly attacked Ms. Dillon, biting her multiple times. After the incident, Roosevelt was removed from the program. In August 2018, Ms. Dillon requested records pertaining to Roosevelt but was unable to obtain his handler folder. The dog’s handler folder included the dog’s training history, breed, eating habits, type of collar, preferences, personality, demeanor, and incidents of aggression, and was retained by the handler assigned to that dog. Ms. Dillon filed a civil action against ODRC in 2020, alleging negligence and spoliation of evidence. The trial court found in favor of ODRC in a decision issued in September 2021. Ms. Dillon appealed that decision, asserting several assignments of error. In her first and second assignments of error, Ms. Dillon argues that the trial court's findings in favor of ODRC on her negligence claim were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court evaluated whether there was sufficient evidence to support the determination that Roosevelt was not a vicious dog prior to the incident. The court referred to Ohio's statutory definition of a vicious dog, which states that it is a dog that has killed or caused serious injury to a person without provocation. The court found that none of Roosevelt's previous behaviors, such as mouthing, baring teeth, or lunging, met the definition of serious injury as defined by the statute. The trial court concludes that Ms. Dillon failed to prove that Roosevelt met either standard before the incident. The court noted that no evidence or testimony showed that Roosevelt had attacked or seriously injured anyone before March 2018 and Ms. Dillon's reliance on the case of Pickett, which dealt with a traditional negligence claim - a claim that she had abandoned in this case - was not relevant. In her second assignment of error, Ms. Dillon challenged the trial court's finding regarding the negligent keeping of Roosevelt, but since the first assignment of error has been resolved, the second assignment is also overruled. The trial court did not make any findings regarding ODRC's knowledge or negligent keeping of Roosevelt because it found him not to be a vicious dog. As to the spoliation of evidence claim, Ms. Dillon alleged that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) willfully destroyed evidence, specifically the handler folder of a dog named Roosevelt, to disrupt her case. The court outlined the elements of intentional spoliation of evidence, which include pending litigation, knowledge of litigation by the defendant, willful destruction of evidence, disruption of the plaintiff's case, and damages caused by the defendant's actions. The court found that Ms. Dillon failed to prove the willful destruction of the handler folder or that her case was disrupted by its disposal. It was determined that the inmate-secretaries involved in the program managed the handler folders, and there was no evidence that ODRC employees reviewed or accessed them. A failure to follow records retention schedules is separate from a spoliation claim. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not provide evidence to support her claim of willful destruction or disruption of her case and that the trial court's findings were supported by credible evidence. The judgment was affirmed. | Case |