Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chiapas |
Chiapas is the only state in Mexico that has yet to establish animal cruelty as a criminal offense. Chiapas has instead enacted the Wildlife Protection Law, which primarily emphasizes the protection and responsible use of "fauna" to ensure the welfare of both wild and domestic animals. |
Policy | ||||||||
| CA - Dangerous - California Dangerous Dog Statutes | West's Ann. Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 31601 - 31683; West's Ann. Cal. Civ. Code § 3342 - 3342.5; West's Ann. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 121685; West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 398 - 399.5 | CA FOOD & AG § 31601 - 31683; CA CIVIL § 3342 - 3342.5; CA HLTH & S § 121685;CA PENAL § 398 - 399.5 | This is the California statute for the rules and regulations regarding dangerous and/or vicious dogs. It defines what constitutes a dangerous and/or vicious dog, what is to be done with said dog(s), and provides a model provision for municipalities to follow. The other set of provisions contains the relevant dog bite law. California has strict liability for dog bites such that liability is imposed regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. | Statute | ||||||
| EU - Farming - Council Directive 2007/43/EC laying down minimum rules for the protection of chickens kept for meat production | 2007/43/EC |
Community measures regulate the management of holdings that rear chickens for meat production in order to improve animal welfare, particularly for chickens kept on intensive farms. |
Statute | |||||||
| Zuckerman v. Coastal Camps, Inc. | 716 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.Me., 2010) | 2010 WL 2301145 (D.Me.) |
This case arose after twelve-year old Samantha Zuckerman sustained injuries when she fell the pony she was riding during a horseback riding lesson at Camp Laurel in Mount Vernon, Maine. Samantha alleged that her instructors improperly saddled the pony, which caused her saddle to slip. In appealing the Magistrate's recommended decision, Camp Laurel again claims that it is immune from liability under Maine Equine Activities Act because a slipping saddle is a risk inherent to the sport of horseback riding. Camp Laurel contends that the faulty tack exception is limited to situations where the tack cracks, breaks, or frays and does not include an “improperly tightened girth” or an “inappropriate pony” or “faulty horse.” This Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge that the record raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning the “faulty” tack exception. The Court found that the negligence here was tied to an exception to the liability shield - faulty tack. |
Case | ||||||
| Excerpt Criminal Code of the State of Coahuila - Mexico | CÓDIGO PENAL DE COAHUILA DE ZARAGOZA | Excerpt of Coahuila's Criminal Code concerning title ten "of the crimes against animals that affect the right to a life free from violence." The criminal code of the state of Coahuila establishes the duty to respect all vertebrate non-human animals that are not considered a "pest" according to the law. It establishes penalties ranging from one to three years plus monetary fines in addition to the confiscation of all animals under the care of the person found guilty of committing animal cruelty crimes These acts include: mistreating a working animal by the use of instruments that cause unnecessary pain and suffering; practicing animal vivisection for purposes that are not scientifically necessary to preserve human life or health; and mutilating any part of the body of a living animal or perform surgery on it, without providing anesthesia. Under the Criminal Code, activities such as zoophilia and animal fighting in public or private settings are also prohibited. Veterinarians, caretakers, and people involved in commercial activities involving animals may, in addition to the penalties established in this code, be subject to suspension or disqualification for a period of one to five years from employment, position, profession, trade, authorization, license, commercialization, or any circumstance under which the crime was committed. | Statute | |||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 7 Núm 3 |
|
Policy | ||||||||
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne | 2008 WL 1902703 (N.D.Cal. 2008) |
Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) seeks to compel Defendants to perform their mandatory duty under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to publish a final listing determination for the polar bear. Plaintiffs have filed a summary judgment motion seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment to this effect. The action began back in 2005 when CBD petitioned to list the polar bear as endangered under the ESA. Plaintiffs' action arises from Defendants' failure to issue a final listing determination and critical habitat designation by January 9, 2008-within one year of publication of the proposed rule-as required by the ESA (16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)). Since Defendants missed this non-discretionary deadline, and there was no dispute of material fact, summary judgment was granted by the court. |
Case | |||||||
| AZ - Wildlife - Taking and Handling of Wildlife. Article 1. General Regulations | A. R. S. § 17-301 to 320 | AZ ST § 17-301 to 320 | The following statutes comprise Arizona's wildlife code. Among the provisions include methods of taking wildlife, hunting restrictions, the state's hunter interference laws, and laws specific to mountain lions, bears, and jaguars. | Statute | ||||||
| Michigan Compiled Laws 1838: Chapter 8: Section 22 | Mich. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, § 22 (1838) | The Michigan law concerning the treatment of animals from 1838. The law states the punishment for the crime, and factors for determining if the crime has occurred. | Statute | |||||||
| State v. Charles | 878 S.E.2d 166, review denied, 891 S.E.2d 299 (N.C. 2023) | 285 N.C.App. 494, 2022-NCCOA-628 (N.C.App., 2022) | Defendant Cheito Charles appealed from judgments entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second-degree arson and felonious cruelty to animals. The incident stemmed from a house fire in the summer of 2020 where the defendant set fire to his sister's boyfriend's house while the boyfriend's puppy was still inside. At trial, the defendant contended that there was no evidence that he knew the existence of the puppy. However, the trial court instructed the jury that, in order to convict Defendant of felonious cruelty to animals, the jury need only conclude that Defendant maliciously and “intentionally start[ed] a house fire which proximately result[ed] in the injury or death to the animal.” There was no need to prove that Defendant was aware of the puppy in the home. Ultimately, Defendant was convicted of second-degree arson and felonious cruelty to animals. On appeal here, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent regarding the animal cruelty charge. This court rebuffed this argument, finding that there was no error with instruction since the jury only needed to conclude that Defendant maliciously set the fire that proximately caused the puppy's death. This same reasoning also supported the sufficiency of the evidence claim. The court dispensed with Defendant's final argument as to the sufficiency of the indictment. As a result, the appellate court found no error with Defendant's trial. | Case |