Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reams v. Irvin | 561 F.3d 1258 (C.A.11 (Ga.),2009) | 2009 WL 579222 (C.A.11 (Ga.)); 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1607 |
On Plaintiff’s civil rights § 1983 action against Defendant, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Agriculture, based on the impoundment of forty-six horses and three donkeys from Plaintiff’s property following an investigation into potential violations of the Georgia Humane Care for Equines Act (the “Act”), Plaintiff appealed the District Court’s decision to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity because Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of her equines, adequate notice of Plaintiff’s right to and procedure for requesting a hearing, and adequate post-deprivation process. The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the risk of erroneous deprivation in this case was minimal in light of the State’s compliance with the standards and procedures for inspection and impoundment prescribed by the Act, that the statutory notice of the right to contest the impoundment was reasonably calculated to provide Plaintiff with notice of her right to a hearing, and that the Act provided adequate power to review and to remedy violations of due process. |
Case | |
| Sentencia T-095, 2016 | Sentencia T-095/16 | In this decision, the court drew a line between the concept of animal welfare and the concept of animal rights. The court continues to see animal protection from a moral perspective when it states animals do not necessarily have rights, even though they should be treated with respect and should not be abused. The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary, created for the sole purpose of protection of fundamental rights) against ‘la Personería Local of Fontibón’, the local Mayor’s office of Fontibon, the District Secretary of Health, the Zoonosis Center and the Distril Secretary of the environment of Bogota. The Plaintiff argued that these governmental entities had violated his fundamental right to petition and the right to animal welfare of twenty five dogs, when the authorities ordered the confiscation the canines that were located in the District Ecological Park of the Wetland of Capellanía and who were cared for by volunteers. The Plaintiff argued that the Defendants did not respond to his request to provide funds to build a shelter and provide food and veterinary assistance of the dogs or funds to relocate them. The Plaintiff sought a response from governmental authorities on the petition and to provide the funds to save the animals, thereby avoiding the Zoonosis Center to assume their care, who would euthanize the sick animals that were not adopted after five days of being up for adoption. The lower court denied the protection of the fundamental right to petition, as it found that the authorities responded to the petition of the Plaintiff in a clear and timely matter by denying the request to fund the Plaintiff to relocate the dogs or build a shelter for them. In regards to the right to animal welfare, the lower court considered it was a legal rather than a constitutional issue, therefore the action of ‘tutela’ was not the appropriate mechanism as its purpose is to guarantee the protection of fundamental rights. The court held that there was a constitutional duty of animal protection that derives from the duty to protect the environment. However, this duty to guarantee the well-being of animals as sentient beings is not absolute and may be subject to exceptions. The court determines that the mandate to protect the environment, which includes sentient beings, does not translate into a right to animal welfare, and for that reason such duty is not enforceable through an action of tutela. The duty to protect animals presumes an obligation to care and prohibits maltreatment and cruelty against animals, unless these actions come from one of the limits stipulated in the constitution. The court affirmed the lower court decision to deny the protection to the right to petition and declared the inadmissibility of the action of tutela for the protection of animal welfare. | Case | ||
| Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church (Unpublished) | 2004 WL 423189 (Conn.Super.,2004) (only Westlaw citation available) |
In this unpublished Connecticut opinion, the defendant-church owned property and leased a portion of the premises to one of its employees, Pedro Salinas. The plaintiff was attacked by a dog, owned by Salinas, while lawfully on the defendant's premises. The plaintiff appealed a summary judgment ruling in favor of defendant. On appeal, the court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendant-church was a "harborer" of the dog under Connecticut law. Because Salinas and the church had no formal lease agreement, dispute existed as to the exact parameters of Salinas' exclusive control of the premises where his dog roamed. There also existed a material fact regarding the church's knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities because it had twice previously attacked a person. (Note the jury trial decision in favor of plaintiff was later overturned in Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church , --- A.2d ----, 94 Conn.App. 617, 2006 WL 797892 (Conn.App.)). |
Case | ||
| Bushnell v. Mott | 254 S.W.3d 451 (Tex.,2008) | 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 681(2008); 2008 WL 820680 |
In this Texas case, the plaintiff (Bushnell) brought an action against the defendant (Mott) for her injuries sustained when defendant's dogs attacked plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, and held that the owner of a dog not known to be vicious owes a duty to attempt to stop the dog from attacking a person after the attack has begun, and Mott's behavior after the attack had begun raises an issue of material fact whether Mott failed to exercise ordinary care over her dogs. |
Case | |
| PA - Veterinary - Chapter 14A. Veterinary Medicine Practice. | 63 P.S. § 485.1 - 35 | PA ST 63 P.S. § 485.1 - 35 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| Richard v. Hoban | 1970CarswellNB126 | 3 N.B.R. (2d) 81, 16 D.L.R. (3d) 679 |
The child plaintiff was attacked and bitten by a chained German Shepherd after she put her arm around the dog's neck to hug or play with it; she sustained scarring lacerations of her head, cheek and eyelid that required 5 days' hospitalization after plastic surgery. The trial judge earlier held that because the dog, had two months previously, bitten a young boy on the face and ear in an unprovoked attack, the owner had prior knowledge of the dog's propensity to bite children, yet he kept the dog regardless. The owner was thus strictly liable under the doctrine of scienter. The Court of Appeal reversed this holding, with two judges finding that the boy in the earlier attack had been injured accidentally by the dog's dew-claw, rather than being bitten, so that there was insufficient notice to the dog's owner of any vicious propensity; thus he was not strictly liable in scienter. |
Case | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Kempthorne | 2006 WL 2844232 | 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71137 |
Ten non-profit groups sued the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) alleging that the FWS had not adequately explained why the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Southern Rockies were not a significant area of lynx habitat under the Endangered Species Act, as the FWS had previously been ordered by the court to do. Additionally, the non-profit groups claimed that the FWS had violated Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act by passing regulations which made it easier for federal agencies to thin trees in lynx habitat under the Healthy Forest Initiative. The Court ordered the FWS to explain why the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Southern Rockies were not a significant area of lynx habitat, but found that the challenged regulations making it easier to thin trees in lynx habitat were permissible. |
Case | |
| US - Endangered Species - 50 CFR Part 17. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Mariana Fruit Bat (Pteropus mariannus m | 50 CFR Part 17, RIN 1018-AH55 |
This final rule downgrades the Mariana fruit bat from endangered to threatened throughout its range in the Mariana archipelago, which is subject to US jurisdiction. The reason for the down grade is the FWS initially made a mistake in the taxonomy of the Mariana fruit bat. When the FWS listed the bat as endangered on Guam in 1984, it believed that the bat was a species only endemic to Guam. Since that time, the FWS has discovered that the bat is endemic to the entire Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and the Territory of Guam, thus there is actually a larger number of bats with a wider distribution. Yet, threats to the Mariana fruit bat still remain, so its listing as threatened is still warranted. Additionally, it is more convenient for the FWS to update the listing of the Mariana fruit bat to threatened in the entire Mariana archipelago, than to keep the species in the Guam as endangered and hold the remainder of the archipelago as threatened. |
Administrative | ||
| Womack v. Von Rardon | 135 P.3d 542 (Wash. 2006) |
In this Washington case, a cat owner sued a minor and his parents after the minor set her cat on fire. While this Court found that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to Ms. Womack's private nuisance, tort outrage, and statutory waste claims, it held that the lower court incorrectly calculated the measure of damages. Noting that the Division 2 Appellate Court left open the question of emotional distress damages where a pet has been maliciously injured in Pickford v. Masion , 124 Wash.App. 257, 262-63, 98 P.3d 1232 (2004), this Court held that the general allegations include sufficient facts to find both malicious conduct toward Ms. Womack's pet and her resulting emotional distress. Thus, "[f]or the first time in Washington, we hold malicious injury to a pet can support a claim for, and be considered a factor in measuring a person's emotional distress damages." |
Case | ||
| SD - Hunting - 41-1-8. Interference with lawful hunting, trapping, or fishing prohibited--Violation as misdemeanor | S D C L § 41-1-8 to 10 | SD ST § 41-1-8 to 10 | This South Dakota law reflects the state's hunter harassment provision. The law prohibits a person from intentionally interfering with any person or group of persons lawfully engaged in the process of taking or attempting to take any game or fish. This includes actions specifically intended to harass and any activity intended to scare or disturb game with the specific intent of preventing their lawful taking. Violation is a Class 2 misdemeanor. | Statute |