Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Andrus v. Allard | 444 U.S. 51 (1979) |
The Court holds that the narrow exception in the BGEPA for "possession and transportation" of pre-existing eagles and eagle artifacts does not extend to sale of the those lawfully obtained artifacts. The legislative history and plain language of the statute is clear on Congress' intent to prohibit any commerce in eagles. This prohibition on commerce in eagle artifacts does not constitute an unconstitutional taking because the ability to sell the property is but one strand in the owner's bundle of property rights. The denial of one property right does not automatically equate a taking. For further discussion on the prohibition in commerce of pre-existing eagle artifacts, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
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| WI - Vehicle - 895.484. Civil liability exemption; entering a vehicle to render assistance | W. S. A. 895.484 | WI ST 895.484 | This Wisconsin law enacted in 2015 makes a person immune from civil liability for property damage or injury resulting from his or her forcible entry into a vehicle to rescue an animal or person. Immunity is provided only if certain conditions were met. The person must have a "good faith belief" that the person or domestic animal was in imminent danger of suffering bodily harm and used no more force than necessary to remove the person or animal. That person must have first determined the vehicle was locked and forcible entry was necessary, and that person must have dialed 911 or other emergency services prior to this action. In addition, the person must have waited with the person or animal until emergency services arrived or left information on the vehicle's windshield as described in the law. | Statute |
| Lawrence v. North Country Animal Control Center, Inc | 126 A.D.3d 1078, 5 N.Y.S.3d 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) | 2015 WL 919734 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) | Plaintiffs adopted a basset hound from animal control despite the fact that the dog had been turned over by a prior owner to be euthanized. The basset hound, who attacked the plaintiffs on three different occasions without injury, attacked plaintiffs' other dog. When one plaintiff tried to separate the dogs, the basset hound attacked him. Defendant removed the basset hound from the home that same day and refused to return the dog to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking to recover damages for injuries, asserting causes of action for, among other things, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, products liability and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal from the New York Supreme Court decision, the appellate court found that under the circumstances, issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiffs reasonably relied on defendants' misrepresentation and whether plaintiffs could have discovered the dog’s dangerous nature with due diligence. The appellate court also found that the contract clause at issue did not preclude plaintiffs from recovering for negligence because it did not “advise the signor that the waiver extended to claims that might arise from the defendant's own negligence.” The appellate court did, however, find that plaintiffs did not satisfy the “rigorous ... and difficult to satisfy requirements for a viable cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” The court also found that sanctions were not warranted. | Case |
| MA - Endangered Species - Chapter 131A. Massachusetts Endangered Species Act | M.G.L.A. 131A § 1 - 7 | MA ST 131A § 1 - 7 | This Massachusetts statute comprises the state's endangered species act. "Endangered species", any species of plant or animal in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range including those species listed under the federal ESA. The director shall conduct investigations and consult with the natural heritage and endangered species advisory committee in order to determine whether any species of plant or animal constitutes an endangered or threatened species or species of special concern. Habitat alteration permits are required under this act when any person undertakes a project that may alter a significant portion of habitat. | Statute |
| US - Elephant - Asian Elephant Conservation Act | 16 USC 4261 - 4266 | A U.S. federal law that reaffirms the endangered status of Asian elephants and allocates money toward conservation efforts. | Statute | |
| Larry BARD et al., Appellants, v. Reinhardt JAHNKE, Individually And Doing Business as Hemlock Valley Farms, Respondent, et al., Defendant. | 848 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y., 2006) | 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 03440, 6 N.Y.3d 592, 2006 WL 1148098 (N.Y.) |
The accident underlying this litigation occurred on a dairy farm owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff Larry Bard, a self-employed carpenter, arrived at the farm to meet defendant John Timer, another self-employed carpenter to repair of the dairy barn. While working, Bard was seriously injured by a bull. Bard, with his wife suing derivatively, commenced an action against both Jahnke and Timer to recover damages for his personal injuries, alleging causes of action sounding in strict liability and negligence. In affirming the Appellate Division's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment, this court found that Jahnke was not liable for Bard's injuries unless he knew or should have known of the bull's vicious or violent propensities. The Court noted that the record contained no such evidence. |
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| Rotunda v. Haynes | 33 Misc.3d 68 (App. Term 2011) | 933 N.Y.S.2d 803, 75 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 808, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 21360 | The plaintiff in this case filed suit against the defendant, a dog breeder, to recover medical fees after receiving a dog that had a “severe genetic heart defect.” The dog was purchased by a third party and given to plaintiff as a gift. The court in this case held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law or the Uniform Commercial Code. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law because the dog was not actually purchased by plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the Uniform Commercial Code because plaintiff was unable to establish “privity with the defendant or personal injuries arising from the alleged defect,” which are required in order to recover damages. The judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| ID - Dog, property - Chapter 28. Dogs. | I.C. § 25-2807 | ID ST § 25-2807 | This Idaho statute states that dogs are considered property. It further provides that no entity of state or local government may by ordinance or regulation prevent the owner of any dog from protecting it from loss by the use of an electronic locating collar. | Statute |
| CA - Horse slaughter - § 598d. Sale of horsemeat for human consumption | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 598d | CA PENAL § 598d | This statute prohibits the sale of horsemeat for human consumption. No restaurant, cafe, or other public eating place may offer horsemeat for sale for human consumption. A first time violation is a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Ladnier v. Norwood | 781 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1986). |
Plaintiff horse owner sought review of a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which found in favor of defendants, veterinarian and insurer, in an action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's horse. The court affirmed the judgment that found defendants, veterinarian and insurer, not negligent in the death of a horse belonging to plaintiff horse owner because they met the statutorily required standard of care. Defendants did not breach a duty to warn because the risk of a fatal reaction to the drug they gave to the horse was common and was considered by equine specialists to be insubstantial. |
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