Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SD - Marion - Breed - 9.0312 Vicious or Diseased Animals. | MARION, S.D., CITY ORDINANCES § 9.0312 (2002) |
In Marion, South Dakota, it is unlawful to keep, maintain or have in their possession or under their control any vicious animal, which includes Pit Bulls, Doberman Pincers, and Rottweilers. Police are authorized to impound any vicious dog or kill it without impounding it. A violation is a misdemeanor. |
Local Ordinance | |
| CA - Initiatives - Proposition 4 (trapping) | Proposition 4 (1998) | This state initiative measure was proposed in 1998 and prohibits trapping mammals classified as fur bearing (or non-game) with body gripping traps for recreation or commerce in fur. This includes, but is not limited to, steel-jawed leghold traps, padded-jaw leghold traps, conibear traps, and snares. Cage and box traps, nets, suitcase-type live beaver traps and common rat and mouse traps are not considered body-gripping traps. It passed with 57.5% of the vote. | Statute | |
| WI - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | W. S. A. 951.01 - 18; W.S.A. 944.18 | WI ST. 951.01 - 18; WI ST 944.18 | This section comprises the Wisconsin anti-cruelty section. Under the section, "animal" includes every living warm-blooded creature (except a human being), reptile, or amphibian. The section prohibits "mistreating animals," which is defined as treating any animal, whether belonging to the person or another, in a cruel manner. This section does not prohibit bona fide experiments carried on for scientific research or normal and accepted veterinary practices. This section also prohibits the instigation of dogfights, and has a unique provisions that prohibits the shooting of caged or staked animals. | Statute |
| Connecticut General Statutes 1902: Sections 2807-2816 | Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 2807 - 2816 (1902) | The 1902 General Statutes of Connecticut sections 2807-2816 cover the following topics: definition of an animal, powers of an agent from humane society, and funding of the humane society. | Statute | |
| City of Pierre v. Blackwell | 635 N.W.2d 581 (S.D. 2001) | 2001 SD 127 |
In this South Dakota case, the owner of a dog declared by an animal control officer to be "dangerous" pursuant to Pierre City Ordinance § 10-3-111 challenged the conviction on the basis that the ordinances themselves were unconstitutional and that his constitutional right to procedural due process has been violated. The court held that the ordinances themselves were constitutional, noting the broad authority municipalities have to regulate pet ownership as a legitimate exercise of police power. The court reversed and remanded for determination on the factual issue of the dog's dangerousness. Specifically, if the City opts for a civil hearing, absent exigent circumstances, the owner of a dog is entitled to a due process hearing on the issue of dangerousness. |
Case |
| ID - Lien - § 45-805. Liens for services on or caring for property | I.C. § 45-805 | ID ST § 45-805 | This Idaho law deals with liens livery or boarding or feed stable proprietors and others pasturing livestock who have a lien. If the liens are not paid within sixty days after the work is done, service rendered, or feed or pasturing supplied, the person in whose favor such special lien is created may proceed to sell the property at a licensed public livestock auction market, or if the lien is on equines, to sell the animals at a sale offered to the public, after giving ten days' notice to the owner or owners of the livestock and the state brand inspector. Requirements for proper notice are provided in the law. | Statute |
| UT - Impound - (Repealed) § 77-24-1.5. Safekeeping by officer pending disposition--Records required | U.C.A. 1953 § 77-24-1.5 (§§ 77-24-1 to 77-24-5. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 394, § 40, eff. July 1, 2013) | Sections 77-24-1 to 77-24-5. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 394, § 40, eff. July 1, 2013 (Formerly: this Utah statute, amended in 2011, states that each peace officer shall hold all "property" in safe custody until it is received into evidence or disposed of as provided in this chapter. He or she must also maintain a record that identifies it. Note that the provisions related to specifically to animal impoundment/euthanasia were removed.) | Statute | |
| Friedman v. Souther California Permanente Medical Group |
Amicus Curae brief arguing for veganism to be viewed as a religion in wrongful termination case. |
Pleading | ||
| State v. Avella | --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 2552529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2019) | The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge. | Case | |
| Brown v. Faircloth | 66 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1953) |
In this Florida case, the defendant appealed from an adverse judgment involving the sale of a bird dog. The complaint alleged that the defendant was a professional bird dog trainer and field trial handler and as such knew the qualifications necessary for a dog to have in order to compete successfully on the major field trial circuit. Plaintiff claimed that, in order to induce the plaintiff to purchase a bird dog then owned by the defendant, defendant falsely represented and warranted that the dog was of such quality and was, as is generally known in field trial parlance, a 'three-hour dog.' After plaintiff had the dog for a short time, the plaintiff found that the warranty as to soundness was not true but that the dog was infected with heart worms at the time of sale and was not a 'three-hour dog.' Thereupon the plaintiff sought to rescind the contract by returning the dog and demanding back the purchase price of which defendant refused. On appeal, defendant contended that the jury instructions failed to inform the jurors that where the sale of an animal for a particular purpose is involved, there can be no recovery for the breach of an implied warranty unless it is shown by the buyer that he or she made known to the seller the particular purpose for which the animal was being purchased and relied on the seller's skill and judgment. The Supreme Court noted that this case was not bottomed upon that theory, but upon the theory that the defendant expressly warranted the dog to be a 'three-hour dog.' This express warranty carried with it the implied warranties that the animal was sound physically, was finished in his training, and was capable of running three-hour races. In other words, the Court was of the opinion that the express warranties defined by the Court in the charge to the Jury embraced and included any defined, implied warranty. |
Case |