Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. United States Dep't of Agric. & Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv. | 918 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2019) | 2019 WL 1212181 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2019) | The plaintiffs, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, sought documents from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”), the entity within the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) that administers the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”). The USDA took a large amount of documents off of its website relating to AWA compliance. The USDA claimed that the removal was for the purpose of removing certain personal information and although they did not say that the removal was temporary, the agency described the removal as provisional which suggests that it is temporary in nature. The plaintiffs filed suit asking for declaratory and injunctive relief and invoking a provision known as FOIA’s reading room provision (5 U.S.C. section 552(a)(2)). The provision requires that agencies make available for public inspection in an electronic format five categories of documents. The plaintiffs allege that the agency removed (1) research facility annual reports; (2) inspection reports; (3) lists of entities licensed under the AWA; and (4) regulatory correspondence and enforcement records that had not yet received final adjudication. Category 4 and the portion of category 2 consisting of animal inventories were dismissed and not discussed in this case. Categories 1-3 appeared to be reposted by the agency which is why the district court dismissed them as moot. The appeal centers on the reposted records and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims by the district court. Ultimately the Court held that for the reposted records featuring new redactions, the complaint was most plausibly read as requesting that USDA repost all information that those records contained before their takedown. The Court stated that the district court should proceed to the merits on remand. As to “voluntary cessation,” the Court affirmed the mootness dismissal as to the research reports but remanded for further explanation as to the inspection reports and the entity lists. If the agency unambiguously commits to continued posting of those documents, plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed as moot, without discovery, even if USDA continues to regard its postings as voluntary. | Case | |
| MD - Vehicles, unattended animals - § 21-1101. Unattended vehicle requirements | MD Code, Transportation, § 21-1101 | This Maryland law relates to unattended vehicles (i.e., a person must not leave a running motor vehicle unattended). When a cat or dog is left in the unattended vehicle of an on-duty law enforcement officer or an animal control officer, the provisions of that subsection do not apply to the law enforcement officer or the animal control officer. | Statute | ||
| Dart v Singer | [2010] QCA 75 |
The applicants pleaded guilty to a number of charges under the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) following the seizure of 113 live dogs, one cat, 488 rats, 73 mice, 12 guinea pigs and 11 birds from their premises due to unsanitary and inappropriate living conditions. The applicants claimed that RSPCA officers were acting ultra vires and that a stay preventing the RSCPA from parting with the animals should be effected. The applicants' argument failed. |
Case | ||
| Spencer Creek Pollution Control Ass'n v. Organic Fertilizer Co. | 505 P.2d 919 (1973) | 264 Or. 557 (1973) |
This is a nuisance case involving the operation of a cattle feed lot. Plaintiff sued to enjoin feed lot operators from interfering with use and enjoyment of plaintiffs' property asked for damages. The circuit court rendered judgment and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court held that decree limiting defendants to having no more than 600 head of cattle on its feed lot at one time was reasonable. |
Case | |
| RI - Cats - Chapter 22. Cat Identification Program and Chapter 24. Permit Program for Cats | Gen.Laws 1956, § 4-22-1 - 10; § 4-24-1 - 13 | RI ST § 4-22-1 - 10; § 4-24-1 - 13 | These Rhode Island section is entitled the "Cat Identification Program." Under this law, cats are required to display some form of identification (tag, tattoo, etc.) in an effort to reduce the feral/stray cat problem. The law reduces the retention period for cats impounded without some form of identification. | Statute | |
| FL - Wildlife - Chapter 68A-1. General: Ownership, Short Title, Severability and Definitions | Fla. Admin. Code r. 68A-1.001 - 1.004 | 68 FL ADC 68A-1.001 to 1.004 | This chapter of the Administrative Code provides the definitions for the remaining chapters of the Code, and includes a declaration of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission's authority to regulate all wild animal life within the state. | Administrative | |
| MT - Lost Property - RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF FINDERS GENERALLY | MCA 70-5-101 to 70-5-107 | MT ST 70-5-101 to 70-5-107 | This section comprises Montana's lost property provisions. | Statute | |
| Young v. California Fish and Game Commission | 24 Cal. App. 5th 1178 (Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied (July 20, 2018), review denied (Sept. 26, 2018) | 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366 (Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied (July 20, 2018), review denied (Sept. 26, 2018) | Kele Young operated a wildlife preserve called Magic Jungle. Young received her first permit from the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (the Department) in 1990 which was renewed each year thereafter. On August 8, 2013, Young filed her restricted species permit renewal application. On the application, Young stated that she was exempt from payment of the permit fee, application fee, and the inspection fee. Young’s permit was set to expire on November 9, 2013. The Department notified Young on July 14, 2014 that her renewal application was incomplete because the fee had not been paid. The Department agreed to waive the $56.14 permit fee and the $56.65 application fee, but the Department stated that she still had to pay the $227.91 inspection fee. Young was given 30 days to pay the fee. The Department ultimately denied Young’s renewal application. Young appealed to the Commission. The Commission found for the Department. Young then sought a writ of mandate to require the Department to perform its duty to determine whether justified reasons existed to grant or deny Young’s request for a waiver of certain restricted species permitting fees. The trial court denied Young’s writ and this appeal followed. Young failed to support many of her arguments by reference to the record or legal authority, therefore, the only issues that were reviewed were whether the Wildlife Agencies could refuse to waive the inspection fee without consideration of the justified reasons or whether it was in the best interests of the public to waive the fee and if reversal was warranted due to the trial court failing to issue a statement of decision. The Court of Appeals found that no statement of decision was required by the trial court because a statement of decision is only required as to issues of fact and the trial court stated that it was only deciding issues of law and that there was no dispute as to the facts. As for the inspection fee, the Court found that the regulations specifically provided for a waiver of the permit fee but did not contain any other language that would allow for a waiver of the inspection fee. The permit fee was separate from the inspection fee and nothing in the regulations entitled her to a waiver of the inspection fee nor granted the Department the authority to waive such fee. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition for writ of mandate. | Case | |
| State Animal Anti-Cruelty Laws |
This map contains links to the animal anti-cruelty laws for all 50 states. Each state's set of laws contains a collection of relevant cruelty laws, including dogfighting, intentional cruelty, neglect/abandonment, and bestiality. |
State map | |||
| Brinton v. Codoni | Not Reported in P.3d, 2009 WL 297006 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2009) |
This unpublished Washington case stems from an attack on plaintiff's dog by a neighbor's dog. Plaintiff sued for damages, alleging negligence and nuisance. The trial court ruled on partial summary judgment that the plaintiff's damages were limited, as a matter of law, to the dog's fair market value. The plaintiff argued that she was entitled to damages based on the dog's intrinsic value (i.e., utility and service and not sentimental attachment) and her emotional distress. On appeal, this court held that since the plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing that her dog had no fair market value, the trial court properly limited damages to that value. Further, because the plaintiff's nuisance claims were grounded in negligence, she was not entitled to damages beyond those awarded for her negligence claim. |
Case |