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Displaying 121 - 130 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IA - Impoundment - 351.37. Dogs running at large--impoundment--disposition | I. C. A. § 351.37 | IA ST § 351.37 | This Iowa statute provides that a dog shall be impounded by a local board of health or law enforcement official if the dog is running at large and the dog is not wearing a valid rabies vaccination tag. The statute requires that written notice be sent to the owner (if the owner's name can be reasonably determined from a tag or other source) who then has seven days to redeem the dog before it is euthanized. | Statute | |
| US - Endangered Species - Part 402 - Interagency Cooperation | 69 FR 4557 | 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 to .34 | These ESA (Endangered Species Act) regulations outline the rules for joint or interagency actions under the Act. Specifically, the regulations state that each federal agency shall confer with the Service (USFWS) on any action which is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any proposed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of proposed critical habitat; confer on the coordination of biological assessments and consultations; and confer regarding Fire Plan Project rules, among other things. | Administrative | |
| CA - Horse tack - § 597k. Bristle bur, tack bur, etc.; use on animals | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597k | CA PENAL § 597k | This section makes it a misdemeanor to use a bristle bur, tack bur, or similar device, to be used on a horse or any other animal. A violation is punishable with imprisonment and/or imprisonment. | Statute | |
| Commonwealth v. Epifania | 951 N.E.2d 723 (Mass.App.Ct.,2011) | 80 Mass.App.Ct. 71 (2011), 2011 WL 3435385 |
Defendant appealed his conviction of arson for setting fire to a dwelling house, and wilfully and maliciously killing the animal of another person. The Appeals Court held that testimony that the cat belonged to the victim was sufficient to support a conviction of wilfully and maliciously killing the animal of another person. |
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| SAMUEL ZIMMERMAN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE | 57 Agric. Dec. 869 (1998) | 1998 WL 1806372 (U.S.D.A.) | Agency's choice of sanction is not to be overturned unless it is unwarranted by law, unjustified by facts, or represents abuse of discretion; sanction is not rendered invalid in particular case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases. | Case | |
| Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Nat'l Institutes of Health | Slip Copy, No. 21-CV-00121-LKG, 2022 WL 17619232 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2022) | Plaintiff animal welfare advocates sued the National Institute of Health (NIH) for failing to transfer all chimpanzees housed at the Alamogordo Primate Facility to a retirement sanctuary known as “Chimp Haven." According to plaintiffs, transfer is required under the federal Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance and Protection Act (“CHIMP Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 283m, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In 2015, NIH officially announced that it would cease biomedical research on chimpanzees and establish a working group to transfer all 288 surplus chimpanzees owned by NIH to Chimp Haven. In 2019, the NIH announced that not all chimpanzees would be transferred to Chimp Haven because 44 of those individuals were too frail for transfer due to medical conditions. After cross-motions for summary judgment, this court considers whether transfer is legally required. On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the plain language of the CHIMP Act requires the transfer of all chimps and the court owes no deference to agency interpretation. In contrast, the Government argues that the decision is consistent with the CHIMP Act because the plain language of the act only requires that surplus chimpanzees offered by NIH be "accepted" into CHIMP Haven. The court found that the plain and unambiguous language, and use of the word "shall," in the CHIMP Act requires the NIH to transfer ALL chimpanzees to the federal sanctuary system. In addition, the legislative history of the CHIMP Act reinforces that reading of the statute. While the court recognized NIH's concern toward the frailest chimpanzees, the proper avenue is within the legislative branch. Notably, the court was unsure as to the proper remedy in this particular matter (e.g., whether a remand or vacatur is more appropriate). As a result, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment was granted and the Government's cross motion was denied as was the motion to dismiss. The court directed the parties to file a joint status report report with views on the relief Plaintiff seeks and how the matter should proceed in light of the instant opinion. | Case | ||
| MO - Lien, care and board - Chapter 430. Liens for Keeping, Training and Breeding Animals | V. A. M. S. 430.150 - 220 | MO ST 430.150 - 220 | This chapter of Missouri laws concerns liens for the keeping, training, and breeding of animals. Section 430.150 states that every person who keeps, boards or trains any horse, mule or other animal has a lien on such animal, and on any vehicle, harness or equipment that came with the animal, for the amount due. No owner or claimant has the right to take any such property out of the custody of the person having such lien, except with the lienholder's consent or on the payment of such debt. Section 430.160 outlines the procedure for enforcement of the lien, which includes where to file a claim and the notice requirements. | Statute | |
| US - Lacey Act - Chapter 53. Control of Illegally Taken Fish and Wildlife. | 16 USC 3371 - 3378 | The Lacey Act provides that it is unlawful for any person to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of the United States or in violation of any Indian tribal law whether in interstate or foreign commerce. All plants or animals taken in violation of the Act are subject to forfeiture as well as all vessels, vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment used in the process. | Statute | ||
| AL - Leash - When dogs permitted in areas; liability of owners of dogs at large in areas (wildlife management areas) | Ala. Code 1975 § 9-11-305 - 307 | AL ST § 9-11-305 to 307 | This Alabama statute provides that no dog shall be permitted except on leash within any wildlife management area except in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources. The owner of any dog at large within any wildlife management area shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| State v. Mita | 245 P.3d 458 (Hawai', 2010) | 2010 WL 5483427 (Hawai', 2010), 124 Hawai'i 385 (2010) |
Defendant, an owner of two dogs, both boxers, was charged with animal nuisance in violation of Revised Ordinances of Honolulu section 7-2.3. Mita’s counsel objected to the oral charge at trial, arguing "that the arraignment is [not] specific enough to put the defendant specifically on notice of what part of the . . . ordinance she’s being charged with." The district court denied Mita’s motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced her to pay a $50 fine. Mita appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the district court. On certiorari, the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals and remanded the case, finding that the definition of animal nuisance in section 7-2.2 does not create an additional essential element of the offense; and, second, the definition of "animal nuisance" is consistent with its commonly understood meaning. |
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