Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NM - Dangerous Animal - Chapter 77. Animals and Livestock. | NMSA 1978, § 77-1-10 | NM ST § 77-1-10 | This New Mexico statute provides that it is unlawful for any person to keep any animal known to be vicious and liable to attack or injure human beings unless such animal is securely kept to prevent injury to any person. It is also unlawful to keep any unvaccinated dog or cat or any animal with any symptom of rabies or to fail or to refuse to destroy vicious animals or unvaccinated dogs or cats with symptoms of rabies. | Statute | |
| MD - Hunting - Title 10. Wildlife. | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-422 | MD NAT RES § 10-422 | This law reflects Maryland's hunter harassment provision. While on private land that is owned by another person or in a hunting area on land managed by the Department, a person may not intentionally interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife or harass, drive, or disturb any game animal intentionally for the purpose of disrupting a lawful hunt. A Natural Resources officer or other police officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has violated the section may order the person to leave the area or arrest that person if he or she refuses to leave. | Statute | |
| Tilson v. Russo | 30 A.D.3d 856 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2006), | 2006 WL 1703632 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.), 818 N.Y.S.2d 311 |
In this New York case, plaintiff, an experienced recreational horse rider, was bitten by a horse she intended to use to practice her techniques at defendant's stable. The rider then brought a negligence action against owners of horse that bit her on the shoulder. In affirming the lower court's granting of summary judgment, the appellate court found that rider's injury occurred in the context of her participation in the recreational sporting activity of horseback riding, for purposes of primary assumption of the risk principles. She was aware of the inherent risks in sporting events involving horses, had an appreciation of the nature of the risks, and voluntarily assumed those risks. |
Case | |
| Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels | 555 N.W.2d 689 (Iowa, 1996) | 61 A.L.R.5th 883 (1996) |
During a stay at defendant kennel, the kennel owner's dog tore off plaintiff's dog's left front leg and shoulder blade. Plaintiff's petition sought damages to compensate for the injuries and suffering the dog incurred and the loss of aesthetic intrinsic value of the dog. In upholding the district court's denial of damages for emotional injury and mental suffering, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's argument for damages based on the intrinsic value of a pet for the negligent injury to the dog. |
Case | |
| American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign v. Vilsack | 133 F. Supp. 3d 200 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 5726880 (D.D.C., 2015) | The American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign (Plaintiffs) brought this action against the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) to prevent the implementation of the new Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan (WHT) that Modoc County helped develop. Plaintiffs brought six claims against defendants, all under the Administrative Procedures Act. In Counts I, II, and III, plaintiffs alleged that the boundary clarification was arbitrary and capricious because it violated the Wild Horses Act, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and in Counts IV, V, and VI, they claimed that the adjustment to the "appropriate management level" (AML) range was arbitrary and capricious because it was contrary to the same three statutes. Because the Forest Service reasonably concluded that the disputed territory was never formally incorporated into the Devil's Garden WHT, and that any references to one contiguous territory were the result of administrative error, the Court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of the law for the Forest Service to act to correct the boundary in the 2013 Environmental Assessment and the 2013 Management Plan. Thus, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III. And because the Forest Service articulated a rational basis for its decision to adjust the AML range for the Devil's Garden WHT that was not counter to record evidence or otherwise contrary to the law, the Court found that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Counts IV, V, and VI. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, and because they sought the same relief as defendants, the intervenor-defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied as moot. | Case | |
| MT - Bite - Chapter 1. Availability of Remedies--Liability. | MCA 27-1-715 | MT ST 27-1-715 | This Montana statute provides that the owner of any dog which shall without provocation bite any person while such person is on or in a public place or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of such dog, located within an incorporated city or town shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. | Statute | |
| US - Pets and Housing - Subpart C. Pet Ownership for the Elderly or Persons with Disabilities | 24 C.F.R. § 5.300 to .327 |
This subpart implements section 227 of the Housing and Urban Rural Recovery Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 1701r-1) as it pertains to projects for the elderly or persons with disabilities under: (1) the housing programs administered by the Assistant Secretary for Housing - Federal Housing Commissioner; (2) projects assisted under the programs contained in chapter VIII of this title 24; and (3) the public housing program. The rule specifically states that it does not apply to assistance or service animals. The rule states that, except as otherwise provided, no project owner that manages a project for the elderly or disabled may restrict or discriminate against any person by reason of the person's ownership or presence of a common household pet in the person's dwelling unit. A "common household pet," is defined as "[a] domesticated animal, such as a dog, cat, bird, rodent (including a rabbit), fish, or turtle, that is traditionally kept in the home for pleasure rather than for commercial purposes" (excluding reptiles with exception of turtles). Notice of the allowance must be provided to tenants and tenants must be given the ability to access to pet rules. The project owner must establish reasonable rules to govern the keeping of pets.
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Administrative | ||
| IL - Pet Shops - Chapter 225. Professions and Occupations. | 225 I.L.C.S. 605/1 - 22 | IL ST CH 225 § 605/1 - 22 | This section comprises Illinois' Animal Welfare Act. The Act is primarily aimed at regulating commercial pet dealers, such as kennels, breeders, and retail pet shops. The provisions include restrictions on the age at which both dogs and cats can be separated from their mothers (8 weeks). | Statute | |
| People v. Cumper | 83 Mich. App. 490 (Mich. 1978) |
Defendants were convicted of being spectators at a fight or baiting between dogs and appealed, charging that the "spectator" portion of the statute was impermissibly vague and unconstitutionally overbroad. The court found that the statute was constitutional because it punished attendance as a spectator at an event legitimately prohibited by law and defendants had fair notice of the conduct proscribed. The defendants also claimed that there was insufficient evidence however, the court found ample evidence upon which the jury rendered their decision. |
Case | ||
| U.S. v. Stenberg | 803 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1986), superceded by statute in U.S. v. Atkinson, 966 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1992) |
These three cases arose out of an undercover investigation by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) into the illegal taking and sale of wildlife in interstate commerce, where defendants were engaged in the guiding and hunting business wherein customers would pay for illegal big game hunts. The court denied defendants' defense of outrageous government conduct and entrapment. It also held that the Lacey Act clearly notifies individuals that participation in prohibited transactions involving wildlife with a market value greater than $350 subjects them to felony prosecutions, thus defeating defendants' challenge of vagueness to the statute. Notably, the court reversed convictions on the fact that the provision of guiding services or providing a hunting permit does not constitute the sale of wildlife for purposes of the Lacey Act (this was amended in 1988 to include guide services, which overturned this decision. See U.S. v. Atkinson, 966 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1992). |
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