Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Martinez v. State | 48 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. App. 2001). |
A jury may infer a culpable mental state ("intentionally and knowingly") from the circumstances surrounding the offense of cruelty to animals. |
Case | |
| Hyland v. Borras | 719 A.2d 662 (N.J.Super.A.D., 1998) |
Plaintiff Heather Hyland brought this action for damages after defendants' dog, an American bulldog, trespassed onto plaintiff's property and attacked her ten year old shih tzu, causing serious injuries to the dog. Defendants appeal the award of "repair costs" ($2,500) in excess of the dog's market value or "replacement cost" ($500). In upholding the award, the court distinguished companion animals from other personal property, finding that market value fails to take into account the owner's relationship to the animal. |
Case | |
| Goldberger v. State Farm Fire and Casaulty Company | --- P.3d ----, 2019 WL 3792803 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2019) | Joel and Kim Goldberger owned residential rental property in Flagstaff that was insured by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company under a rental dwelling policy. The Goldbergers filed a claim asserting that their tenant allowed feral cats to access the property and cause approximately $75,000 in “accidental damage.” State farm subsequently denied the claim asserting that feral cats are domestic animals and therefore the damage was not covered under the policy. The Goldbergers filed suit alleging breach of contract and insurance bad faith. State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. State Farm claimed that the policy stated that accidental losses caused by “birds, vermin, rodents, insects, or domestic animals” were not covered by the policy. The superior court granted State Farm’s motion and this appeal followed. The Goldbergers argued that the superior court erred in dismissing their complaint due to the fact that the term “domestic animals” is reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations and must be construed against State Farm. State Farm argued that the exclusion in the policy was only susceptible to one reasonable interpretation. The Court stated that there were two interpretations to the term “domestic animal.” The first definition is a species-based definition that says that domestic animals are animals belonging to a broader class of animals that have been domesticated at some point in history. The second definition is an individualized definition that says that domestic animals are animals that are kept by a person for any of various purposes, including as pets. The Court ultimately decided that the individualized definition makes more sense in terms of the insurance policy itself as well as case law. In making this determination, the court noted the "nonsensical" outcome that would arise for exotic or nontraditional pets were a species-based definition adopted. Domestic animals encompass animals that are subject to the care, custody, and control of a person. On the facts alleged in the complaint alone, the Court could not say that the tenant was keeping the feral cats in such a manner that the exclusion would preclude coverage. The court therefore resolved all reasonable inferences in the Goldberger’s favor and presumed that the cats were feral. Because the feral cats that caused the damage are not domestic animals under all reasonable interpretations of the facts alleged in the complaint, the court erred in granting the insurer's motion to dismiss. The Court reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the Goldberger’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. | Case | |
| IL - Divorce - Act 5. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act | 750 I.L.C.S. 5/452; 750 ILCS 5/501 - 503 | IL ST CH 750 § 5/452 | Effective January 1, 2018, the Illinois Legislature amended several provisions under Act 5, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Under the Joint Simplified Dissolution Procedure, the amendments added the following requirement to the conditions that must be present to do a simplified dissolution: (k) The parties have executed a written agreement allocating ownership of and responsibility for any companion animals owned by the parties. As used in this Section, “companion animal” does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act." Under Part V, "Property, Support and Attorney Fees," three sections were amended. Section 5/501 deals with temporary relief and amendments in 2018 added subsection (f): "Companion animals. Either party may petition or move for the temporary allocation of sole or joint possession of and responsibility for a companion animal jointly owned by the parties. In issuing an order under this subsection, the court shall take into consideration the well-being of the companion animal." In Section 5/502 on amicable settlement agreements between parties, the following provision was added to subsection (a): "The parties may also enter into an agreement allocating the sole or joint ownership of or responsibility for a companion animal. As used in this Section, “companion animal” does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act. Any agreement pursuant to this Section must be in writing, except for good cause shown with the approval of the court, before proceeding to an oral prove up." Finally, under § 503 on "Disposition of property and debts," amendments added this subsection: "(n) If the court finds that a companion animal of the parties is a marital asset, it shall allocate the sole or joint ownership of and responsibility for a companion animal of the parties. In issuing an order under this subsection, the court shall take into consideration the well-being of the companion animal. As used in this Section, “companion animal” does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act." | Statute |
| US v. Richards | 2014 WL 2694225 |
*1 The First Amendment restrains government to “make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. |
Case | |
| MS - Wildlife, Bounty - Chapter 5. Health, Safety and Public Welfare. In General. | Miss. Code Ann. § 19-5-51 | MS ST § 19-5-51 | This Mississippi law provides that any board of supervisors may, by appropriate resolution offer a bounty not to exceed $5.00 for each nutria, beaver or bobcat destroyed, where the board determines that nutria, beaver or bobcats are in such quantities that the preservation of trees is at issue. The The Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks will issue a $5 bounty upon the presentation of the tail of any beaver. | Statute |
| McConnell v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. | 530 P.2d 127 (Okl. 1974) | 1974 OK 156 (1974) |
In this Oklahoma case, defendant gas company left the plaintiff's yard gate open through which the plaintiff's dog escaped and was then hit by a car. In finding that the gate being left open was the proximate cause of the injury, the court held that the allegations in plaintiffs' amended petition, stated a cause of action and that the trial court erred in sustaining defendant's general demurrer to the petition. |
Case |
| Janush v. Charities Housing Development Corp. | 169 F.Supp.2d 1133 (N.D. Ca., 2000) |
Tenant brought action under the Federal Fair Housing Act alleging that her landlord failed to reasonably accommodate her mental disability by refusing to allow her to keep companion animals in her rental unit. Tenant put forth evidence establishing that the animals lessened the effects of her mental disability by providing companionship. The housing authority argued that only service dogs are a reasonable accommodation. The court rejected the housing authority's argument, holding that animals other than service animal can be a reasonable accommodation for a disability. Also, the court noted that whether an accommodation is reasonable is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring an analysis of the burdens imposed on the housing authority and the benefits to the disabled person. |
Case | |
| People v. Olary | 160 N.W.2d 348 (Mich. 1968) | 10 Mich. App. 640 (Mich. 1968) |
Defendant argued that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of cruelty to animals. Specifically, he pointed out that there was no direct testimony with regard to the cause of the injuries to his cows. The court disagreed and held that inattention to the condition of the animals was sufficient to constitute the offense of cruelty to animals. |
Case |
| UK - Wildlife - The Humane Trapping Standards Regulations 2019 | 2019 No. 22 | These Regulations amend the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 in order to implement requirements contained in the agreement on international humane trapping standards concluded between the European Community, the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation. They introduce a prohibition on using or setting in position any trap or snare for the purpose of killing or taking the Stoat or the European Beaver. The prohibitions in section 11(2)(a) and (b) (as revised) (relating to using or setting in position a trap or snare) do not apply in relation to any animal specified in Schedule 6ZA where the use or setting of the trap is under and in accordance with a Government issued license. | Statute |