Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Herbert | 549 U.S. 1245 (2007) | 450 F.3d 1082 (S.Ct. 2007) |
Motion of Western Wildlife Conservancy, et al., for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied. |
Case |
| Campbell v. Supervalu | 2007 WL 891682 (N.D.Ind.) | North District Court of Indiana dismissed a claim that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. While a past court decision held that FMIA preempted state attempts to regulate meat inspection, this case was distinguishable because the suit focused on an alleged act of negligence that fell outside inspection of meat and because the state is not placing additional or different requirements then those set by FMIA. | Case | |
| Panattieri v. City of New York | 53 Misc. 3d 865, 37 N.Y.S.3d 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) | 2016 WL 4691555, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 26283 |
Ceasar, a mixed breed dog, was seized by police after he killed another dog and injured the other dogs’ owner. Petitioners, Kristina & Douglas Panattieri, owned Ceasar and demanded his return to their custody. They also challenged the determination by Respondent, Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), to execute Ceasar pursuant to the New York City Health Code (24 RCNY) § 161.07. The Petitioners argued that Ceasar’s execution would be unconstitutional under the City Code because it was preempted by the state statute, Agriculture & Markets Law § 123.The Supreme Court, New York County, denied their petition and held that the New York City Health Code was not preempted by the state statute. The Court reasoned that the Agriculture and Markets Law § 107(5), which governed licensing, identification, and control of dogs, expressly allowed municipalities to enact their own Codes governing dangerous dogs. However the City Codes were to incorporate standards that were as or more protective of public health and safety than those set forth in the state statute. The New York City Code met the requirement and was therefore not preempted by state law. |
Case |
| HI - Facility dog - [§ 621-30]. Use of a facility dog | H R S § 621-30 | HI ST § 621-30 | This Hawaii law enacted in 2016 states that a court may permit the use of a facility dog in a judicial proceeding involving the testimony of a vulnerable witness (as defined) if the court determines that there is a compelling necessity for the use of a facility dog to facilitate the testimony of the vulnerable witness. Prior to use, the moving party must establish that the dog is credentialed; the dog is adequately insured; and that there is a relationship between the witness and the facility dog. | Statute |
| Woudenberg v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 794 F.3d 595 (6th Cir., 2015) | 2015 WL 4503212 (6th Cir., 2015) | According to Department of Agriculture regulations promulgated under the federal Animal Welfare Act (with certain exceptions not applicable here), persons who were in the business of buying and selling dogs and cats (i.e. class B dealers) may not obtain dogs or cats from an individual donor “who did not breed and raise them on his or her premises.” Another provision required a dealer in such a case to “obtain [ ] a certification that the animals were born and raised on that person's premises.” The question in this case was whether there was a violation when the dealer obtained the required certification, but the certification was false. The regulatory language was clear that a dealer violated the law by obtaining a dog or cat from an individual donor who did not breed or raise it on the donor's premises and it was still a violation even when the dealer in good faith obtained certifications that the animals had been so bred and raised. The certification requirement was an enforcement mechanism for the prohibition, not an exception. The Department of Agriculture therefore properly entered a cease-and-desist order against the petitioner. | Case |
| FL - Ordinances - Interpretation of Dog Ordinances under Dangerous Dogs | West's F. S. A. § 767.07 | FL ST § 767.07 | This Florida statute provides that the statutory section relating to state regulation of dangerous dogs is supplemental to all other state laws affecting dogs and shall not be construed to modify those laws or to prevent municipalities from prohibiting, licensing, or regulating the running at large of dogs within their respective limits by law or ordinance. | Statute |
| Missouri v. Holland | 40 S.Ct. 382 (1920) | 252 U.S. 416 (1920) |
This was a bill in equity brought by the State of Missouri to prevent a game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, and the regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance of the same. The ground of the bill is that the statute is an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. While the court recognized the states' province to act in traditional matters of fish and game, the migratory nature of wild birds makes them the proper subject of treaty. As noted by the Court, "[t]he subject matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein." The Court found the treaty was a proper exercise of constitutional authority where a national interest was implicated (i.e., "the protectors of our forests and our crops") and could only be protected by national action in concert with another power. |
Case |
| HAGEN v. LAURSEN | 263 P.2d 489 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1953) | 121 Cal.App.2d 379 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1953) |
Two Irish setters knocked down a neighbor while playing outside. Previously no one had seen them run into anyone while playing. They were not shown to have been more boisterous than dogs usually are. There was no evidence that these dogs were vicious. The court found that there was no foreseeable risk of harm and therefore no duty upon which to base a claim of negligence. |
Case |
| Riley v. Bd. of Commissioners of Tippecanoe Cty. | Slip Copy, 2016 WL 90770, 2016 WL 90770 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2016) (unpublished) | The plaintiff filed suit based on violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA) after he was denied entrance into the Tippecanoe County Courthouse with his service dog. Initially, defendant's claims were dismissed because the Court did not adequately allege that his dog was a service dog. Defendant then filed an amended complaint with plausible allegations that his dog is a service dog. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, stating that the plaintiff had not established that his dog was a service dog according to the definition listed under rules promulgated under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that the plaintiff’s dog was a service dog under the definition because the dog was “individually trained to, among other things, provide [plaintiff] with balance support and assistance during episodes of PTSD.” As a result, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case was denied. | Case | |
| CT - Transport, poultry - § 53-249. Cruelty to poultry | C. G. S. A. § 53-249 | CT ST § 53-249 | This statute makes it illegal to transport poultry in any manner that is not sanitary, warm, and ventilated. Poultry must receive "reasonable care" to "prevent unnecessary suffering." Violation of this provision is a class D misdemeanor. | Statute |