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Displaying 41 - 50 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MI - Constitutional Provisions - Protection of Natural Resources | M. C. L. A. Const. Art. 4, § 52 | MI CONST Art. 4, § 52 | This section declares the protection, conservation, and development of the state's natural resources to be of paramount public concern and the legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction. | Statute | |||||||
| Knaust v. Digesualdo | 589 Fed.Appx. 698 (5th Cir. 2014) | Appellant operated a USDA-licensed exotic animal business in Texas. In February 2010, a United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service agent visited the business on a routine inspection and cited Appellant for several USDA regulation violations. After several subsequent inspections, several other violations were discovered and Appellant was presented with a Notice of Intent to Confiscate Animals. The next day, the animals were confiscated. Using Bivens, Appellant argued the agents violated her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights by (1) seizing her property without providing a method for challenging the seizure and (2) not allowing sufficient time to cure the cited violations prior to seizing her property. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision because the Appellant failed to assert factual allegations showing how each defendant, by his or her own individual acts, violated her constitutional rights. | Case | ||||||||
| US - Critical Habitat - Statements by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service Regarding the Designation of Critical Habitat | 2004 WL 2232024 (F.R.) | 69 FR 59996-01 |
This excerpt is from the Designation of Critical Habitat for the Klamath River and Columbia River Populations of Bull Trout, 69 FR 59996-01, 2004 WL 2232024 (F.R.). It apparently expresses the opinion of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service that the current process for designating critical habitat does little for the conservation of listed species. |
Administrative | |||||||
| Johnson v. Wander | 592 So. 2d. 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) |
Petitioner pet owner alleged that respondent veterinarian took her dog to be spayed, and left the animal on heating pads, which resulted in serious burns, so petitioner filed a claim for damages on the basis of gross negligence, damage to property, and emotional distress. The trial court entered partial summary judgments on the claims for punitive damages and emotional distress and, on a subsequent motion, transferred the case to the county court as a claim for less than the circuit court jurisdictional amount. The appellate court held that there remained a jury question on the issues of gross negligence and physical and mental pain and suffering as claimed by petitioner. |
Case | ||||||||
| IN RE: MICHEAL McCALL AND KATHY McCALL | 52 Agric. Dec. 986 (1993) | 1993 WL 459890 (U.S.D.A.) | This opinion held that the USDA may impose sanctions even if respondent dealer is not licensed. Respondents were operators of kennel facilities in Washington, Kansas, and in nearby Reynolds, Nebraska. In 1991 and 1992, Respondents each applied for dealer's licenses under the Act and both were denied. The Judicial Officer affirmed that part of the Order by Judge Bernstein (ALJ) assessing civil penalties of $7,500, and ordering Respondents to cease and desist from engaging in any activity for which a license is required without being licensed, and failing to maintain their facilities in accordance with the regulations and standards involving housing, shelter, veterinary care, records, sanitation, cleaning, food, and water. However, the Judicial Officer increased from 1 year to 10 years the period in which Respondents are disqualified from becoming licensed under the Act and regulations. | Case | |||||||
| US - AWA - Part 2. Regulations. Subparts A to I | 9 C.F.R. § 2.1 to .134 | This set of the regulations sets out the requirements and process for licensing and registration of dealers, exhibitors and research facilities. | Administrative | ||||||||
| Dillon v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Correction | 211 N.E.3d 746 (Ohio App. 10 Dist., 2023) | 2023-Ohio-942 | Plaintiff-Appellant, Anna Dillon, a certified “senior dog handler” through a rehabilitation program for inmates in Ohio, was attacked by a dog named Roosevelt, a German Shepherd/Husky mix owned by an Ohio Reformatory for Woman (ORW) corrections officer. Dillon had previously interacted with Roosevelt without incident on multiple occasions, but in March 2018, Roosevelt attacked her, causing 16 puncture wounds. On March 19, 2018, while attempting to put on Roosevelt's leash and collar, he displayed signs of anxiety and suddenly attacked Ms. Dillon, biting her multiple times. After the incident, Roosevelt was removed from the program. In August 2018, Ms. Dillon requested records pertaining to Roosevelt but was unable to obtain his handler folder. The dog’s handler folder included the dog’s training history, breed, eating habits, type of collar, preferences, personality, demeanor, and incidents of aggression, and was retained by the handler assigned to that dog. Ms. Dillon filed a civil action against ODRC in 2020, alleging negligence and spoliation of evidence. The trial court found in favor of ODRC in a decision issued in September 2021. Ms. Dillon appealed that decision, asserting several assignments of error. In her first and second assignments of error, Ms. Dillon argues that the trial court's findings in favor of ODRC on her negligence claim were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court evaluated whether there was sufficient evidence to support the determination that Roosevelt was not a vicious dog prior to the incident. The court referred to Ohio's statutory definition of a vicious dog, which states that it is a dog that has killed or caused serious injury to a person without provocation. The court found that none of Roosevelt's previous behaviors, such as mouthing, baring teeth, or lunging, met the definition of serious injury as defined by the statute. The trial court concludes that Ms. Dillon failed to prove that Roosevelt met either standard before the incident. The court noted that no evidence or testimony showed that Roosevelt had attacked or seriously injured anyone before March 2018 and Ms. Dillon's reliance on the case of Pickett, which dealt with a traditional negligence claim - a claim that she had abandoned in this case - was not relevant. In her second assignment of error, Ms. Dillon challenged the trial court's finding regarding the negligent keeping of Roosevelt, but since the first assignment of error has been resolved, the second assignment is also overruled. The trial court did not make any findings regarding ODRC's knowledge or negligent keeping of Roosevelt because it found him not to be a vicious dog. As to the spoliation of evidence claim, Ms. Dillon alleged that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) willfully destroyed evidence, specifically the handler folder of a dog named Roosevelt, to disrupt her case. The court outlined the elements of intentional spoliation of evidence, which include pending litigation, knowledge of litigation by the defendant, willful destruction of evidence, disruption of the plaintiff's case, and damages caused by the defendant's actions. The court found that Ms. Dillon failed to prove the willful destruction of the handler folder or that her case was disrupted by its disposal. It was determined that the inmate-secretaries involved in the program managed the handler folders, and there was no evidence that ODRC employees reviewed or accessed them. A failure to follow records retention schedules is separate from a spoliation claim. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not provide evidence to support her claim of willful destruction or disruption of her case and that the trial court's findings were supported by credible evidence. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | |||||||
| NE - Dangerous - ARTICLE 6. DOGS AND CATS. (B) DANGEROUS DOGS. | Neb. Rev. St. § 54-617 to 54-624 | NE ST § 54-617 to 54-624 | These Nebraska statutes outline the state's dangerous dog laws. Among the provisions include a requirement that the dog must be restrained when not in a secure enclosure on the owner's property. There is also a requirement that owners must post warning signs on the property notifying people that a dangerous dog is present. If a dangerous dog bites a person, the owner can be found guilty of a Class IV misdemeanor and the dog will be destroyed. | Statute | |||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 10 Núm 4 |
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Policy | |||||||||
| KY - Exotic Animals - Chapter 65. General Provisions Applicable to Counties, Cities | KRS § 65.877 | KY ST § 65.877 | This Kentucky statue authorizes counties and cities to regulate or prohibit the holding of inherently dangerous wildlife. For example, the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources has identified some of the following animals as being dangerous: African buffalo, Hippopotamus, Hyenas, Old world badger, Lions, jaguars, leopards, or tigers, Clouded leopard, Cheetah, Elephants, Rhinoceroses, Gorillas, Baboons, drills, or mandrills, Crocodiles, Alligators or caimans, certain snakes, Gila monsters or beaded lizards, Komodo dragon, Wolverine, Bears, Wolf, mountain lion. | Statute |