Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Schneider | 2004 WL 2191322 (Ca. App. 3 Dist.) | 2004 WL 2191322 (Ca. App. 3 Dist.) |
Defendant's dogs escaped from Defendant's yard and attacked and killed a six-year-old boy. The trial court convicted Defendant of owning a mischievous animal that causes death and involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's conviction for owning a mischievous animal that causes death due to erroneous jury instructions. |
Case |
| VA - Breeder - § 3.2-6500. Definitions (definitions for commercial breeder) | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6500 | VA ST § 3.2-6500 | Provides most recent definitions for terms used throughout the rest of the statute, including but not limited to private and public animal shelters, commercial breeder, shelter, pet shop, and kennel. | Statute |
| Argentina, Ley 27233, 2015 | Ley 27233 | This law declared animal and plant health of national interest. Ley 27233 established that the all persons including legal persons that are participants in the agro-food chain (production, obtention, transportation and industrialization of products, by-products, and derivatives of silvo-agricultural and fishing origin), have the responsibility to watch and respond to the health, innocuousness, hygiene, and quality of agricultural production, in accordance with the current regulations. Article 2 declared of public order the national regulations by which the development of actions aim for the preservation of animal health, plant protection, and the hygienic-sanitary condition of food of agricultural origin. This responsibility extends to those who produce, divide, conserve, deposit, concentrate, transport, commercialize, sell, import or export animals, vegetables, food, raw materials, food additives, reproductive material, animal feed and raw materials, fishery products and other products of animal and/or vegetable origin that act individually, jointly or successively, in the agro-food chain. | Statute | |
| KY - Louisville/Jefferson County - Title IX: General Regulations (Chapter 91: Animals) | Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government Code of Ordinances § 91.098 MUTILATION OF ANIMALS |
In Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky, no person shall crop a dog’s ears or tail, except a veterinarian. Additionally, no person shall mutilate any animal whether dead or alive; however, this provision does not apply to accepted livestock practices concerning humane slaughter at licensed stockyards, slaughterhouses and meat packing establishments or on the premises of agricultural uses. Penalties are also included for violating these provisions. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Rosche v. Wayne Feed Div. Continental Grain Co. | 447 N.W.2d 94 (1989) | 152 Wis.2d 78 (1989) |
Pig breeder sought damages from feed manufacturer after pigs got sick, died, or became sterile after eating feed. The Court of Appeals held that jury should have been instructed that basic measure of damages for dead and injured livestock was based on market value of affected animals and did not include separate award for unborn litters. Failure to give proper instruction was prejudicial error that required a new trial on the issue of damages. |
Case |
| Saenz v. DOI (vacated by U.S. v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001)) | (no West citation. Docket No. 00-2166) |
(This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized. The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts. For discussion of Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion . |
Case | |
| SC - Wildlife - § 50-1-270. Liability for gross destruction or injury to wildlife, | Code 1976 § 50-1-270 | SC ST § 50-1-270 | This South Carolina statute provides that any person or public or private entity is liable to the State for the unlawful gross destruction of or injury to wildlife, aquatic life, endangered or threatened species, or the lands or waters owned by the State. For a deliberate or grossly negligent act, the State must be awarded damages of three times the value of the resource affected, plus costs, including attorney's fees. This section does not apply to ordinary agricultural practices. | Statute |
| Colombia, Ley 1638, 2013 | Ley 1638 de 2013 | Ley 1638, prohibits the use of wild animals, native or exotic as part of shows in circuses in the entire country. To accomplish this goal, Ley 1638 gave circuses a two-year deadline to make the transition and re-purpose their shows without the use of wild animals. After the two year-period, national and local authorities would not be able to issue any licenses allowing the use of wild animals for this kind of shows. This law does not include the use of domestic animals. | Statute | |
| Altman v. City of High Point | 330 F.3d 194 C.A.4 (N.C. 2003) |
This case arises out of several shooting incidents in the City of High Point, North Carolina. In each incident, a High Point animal control officer shot and killed one or more dogs that were running at large in the city. Plaintiffs, the owners of the animals, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers' actions violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals concluded that the dogs at issue in this case do qualify as property protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the officers seized that property. However, because in each instance the seizure involved was reasonable, it concluded that the officers did not violate the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. |
Case | |
| Pray v. Whiteskunk | 801 N.W.2d 451 (S.D., 2011) | 2011 S.D. 43; 2011 WL 3207821 (S.D.) |
In this South Dakota case, the plaintiff suffered a broken knee after Defendant's Rottweiler brook loose from its owner and ran toward the street, causing plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the dog owner and the city, specifically alleging the the city knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. On appeal of the granting of summary judgment for the city, this court found that plaintiff failed to establish that the action taken by the city caused the harm to Pray or exposed her to greater risks, thereby leaving her in a worse position than she was in before the city took action. While this Court found that the city had actual knowledge of the dog's dangerousness, this alone is insufficient. |
Case |