Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RI - Dangerous Dog - § 4-13.1-9. Penalties for violation--Licensing ordinances and fees | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13.1-9 | RI ST § 4-13.1-9 | This Rhode Island statute provides that a vicious dog may be confiscated by a dog officer and destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner after the expiration of a five day waiting period if an owner does not secure liability insurance, have his or her dog properly identified, or properly enclose/restrain the dog. If any dog declared vicious under Sec. 4-13.1-11, when unprovoked, kills, wounds, or worries or assists in killing or wounding any described animal, the owner shall pay a five hundred fifty dollar fine. The dog officer is empowered to confiscate the dog. The statute further provides that municipalities may enact vicious dog licensing ordinances and provide for impoundment of dogs that violate such ordinances. It also outlines other actions owners of vicious dogs must take, including the posting of vicious dog signs and the maintenance of proper insurance. | Statute | |
| MI - Emergency - 333.20925. Emergency transport of police dog | M.C.L.A. 333.20925 | This law, effective in March of 2019, states that the provisions of the Emergency Medical Services Act does not prohibit an ambulance from providing emergency transport of a police dog that is injured in the line of duty to a veterinary clinic or similar facility, if the police dog is in need of emergency medical treatment and there are no individuals who require transport or emergency assistance at that time. | Statute | ||
| NC - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Article 47) | N.C.G.S.A.§ 14-360 to 14-369; § 19A-1 - 70; § 114-8.7; § 160A-182, § 14-177; § 153A-127 | NC ST § 14-360 to 14-369; § 19A-1 - 70; § 114-8.7; § 160A-182, § 14-177; § 153A-127 | This section comprises the relevant North Carolina animal cruelty statutes. The anti-cruelty statute provides that if any person shall maliciously kill, or cause or procure to be killed, any animal by intentional deprivation of necessary sustenance, that person shall be guilty of a Class H felony. If any person shall maliciously torture, mutilate, maim, cruelly beat, disfigure, poison, or kill, or cause or procure to be tortured, mutilated, maimed, cruelly beaten, disfigured, poisoned, or killed any animal, every such offender shall for every such offense be guilty of a Class H felony. This section also makes promoting or conducting a cock fight a misdemeanor and promoting or conducting a dogfight a felony. Other prohibited acts include abandoning an animal, conveying any animal in a cruel manner, and restraining a dog in a cruel manner. This section also includes the civil remedy provisions. | Statute | |
| Xu v. Chen | 2008 CarswellBC 1693 | 2008 BCPC 234 |
The Claimant's six-month old sheltie puppy, "Diamond,” suffered a serious limb injury outside the front yard of the family home. Claimant seeks to recover the veterinarian costs she incurred to treat the dog's injury against Defendants, the owners of the other dog that allegedly attacked claimant’s dog. The court found that there was evidence that Defendant was previously contacted by Animal Control as well as a neighbor about an incident where Angus lunged at another dog. The Claimant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that Angus had manifested a propensity to cause the type of harm occasioned that night. Claimant was 25% liable for the incident where she left Diamond in an unfenced yard that gave other dogs access. The court denied Xu’s claim of $5500 for future medical costs for the care of Diamond because there was no evidence what these would be and the dog was currently living with another family. |
Case | |
| MD - Spay/neuter - § 2-1602. Spay/Neuter Fund | MD Code, Agriculture, § 2-16021 - 1605 | This Maryland law establishes a spay/neuter fund to finance local governments and animal welfare organizations for programs to facilitate the spay and neutering of dogs and cats in the state. In addition, as of 2014, each county and organization that receives funding shall quarterly report: (1) the number of cats and dogs taken in; (2) the number of cats and dogs disposed of, broken down by method of disposal, including euthanasia; and (3) any other relevant data the Department requires. | Statute | ||
| State v. Branstetter | 29 P.3d 1121 (Or. 2001) | 332 Or. 389 (Or. 2001) |
In a state prosecution for animal neglect, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the animals to a humane agency. An appeal by the owner of the animals was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that the statutes controlling appealable judgments allowed the animal owner to appeal the forfeiture of the animals. |
Case | |
| US - Migratory Bird - Migratory Bird Permits; Regulations for Double-Crested Cormorant Management | 2003 WL 22295159 | FR Doc. 03-25500 |
Increasing populations of the double-crested cormorant have caused biological and socioeconomic resource conflicts. In November 2001, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service or we) completed a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) on double-crested cormorant management. In March 2003, a proposed rule was published to establish regulations to implement the DEIS proposed action, Alternative D. In August 2003, the notice of availability for a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was published, followed by a 30- day comment period. This final rule sets forth regulations for implementing the FEIS preferred alternative, Alternative D (establishment of a public resource depredation order and revision of the aquaculture depredation order). It also provides responses to comments we received during the 60-day public comment period on the proposed rule. The Record of Decision (ROD) is also published here. |
Administrative | |
| NY - Dangerous animal - § 209-cc. Notification of presence of wild animals and dangerous dogs | McKinney's General Municipal Law § 209-cc | NY GEN MUN § 209-cc | New York state law requires anyone in possession of dangerous dogs and dangerous wild animals (which include non-human primates, non-domesticated dogs and cats, bears, venomous, constrictors and python snakes, and certain crocodiles) to report the presence of that animal to the clerk of the city, town, or village in which the animal resides. The report must be filed by April 1st every year and must list all of the physical locations where the animal may be kept. The clerk must then notify all local police, fire, and emergency medical service departments of the presence of that animal. Any person who fails to report the presence may be fined up to $250 dollars for the first offense and $1,000 dollars for each subsequent offense. Zoos and other U.S. Department of Agriculture-licensed exhibitors are exempt from the reporting requirement. | Statute | |
| Western Watersheds Project v. USDA APHIS Wildlife Services | 320 F.Supp.3d 1137 (D. Idaho June 22, 2018) | 2018 WL 3097016 (D. Idaho June 22, 2018) | This action considers motions for summary judgment by both parties. At issue here is a plan by a branch of the USDA called Wildlife Services (WS), which is responsible for killing or removing predators and other animals that prey on wild game animals, threaten agricultural interests, or pose a danger to humans. The decision to kill the animals comes from requests from individuals or other state and federal agencies rather than a decision by WS. For this case, the facts center on an expanded operation to kill game animals and protected species in Idaho (mainly coyotes and ravens) known as PDM. As part of this process, WS prepared and circulated a draft Environmental Assessment (EA) to other federal agencies, stakeholders, and the public seeking comment to the expanded plan. However, instead of taking the criticisms and suggestions from the EA and then undertaking a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), WS instead rejected most responses and labeled them as unconvincing or invalid. This led plaintiff to file suit against WS, arguing that the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by not preparing the EIS after comments to the EA. For example, the BLM, the Forest Service, and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG), found that the EA was not an "objective analysis" and instead sounded "like a pre-decisional defense of lethal methods." These agencies warned WS that the predator control methods were "likely to be futile over the long-term" and did not consider cascading effects on both cyclic and non-cyclic prey populations. In analyzing the factors, this court found that WS failed to consider "several federal agencies with long experience and expertise in managing game animals and protected species" when proposing to expand the expanded PDM program. There was a lack of crucial data to support WS' assumptions in its modeling that was exacerbated by use of unreliable data, according to the court. In addition, the court found that WS failed to "explain away scientific challenges to the effectiveness of predator removal." Not only was the court troubled by the lack of reliable data used by WS, but the WS’ “unconvincing responses” to agencies that had substantial experience managing wildlife and land-use concerns demonstrated to the court that the PDM is controversial and the environmental impacts were uncertain. This in and of itself necessitated an EIS under NEPA. The court held that the lack of reliable data, the unconvincing responses from WS, combine to trigger three intensity factors that combine to require WS to prepare an EIS. The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted and the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied (the motion by plaintiff to supplement the administrative record was deemed moot). | Case | |
| MI - Hunting/Recreational Trespass - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M.C.L.A. 324.73101 - 73302 | These sections describe the Department of Natural Resources ability to enforce and prosecute persons who enter upon the land of another, who remove or destroy signs or posters or enclose someone else's land without permission. These sections also describe the potential liability of landowners. | Statute |