Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nelson v. Lewis | 344 N.E.2d 268 (Ill.App. 1976) | 36 Ill.App.3d 130 (1976) |
Toddler accidentally stepped on the tail of the owner's dog, and the dog responded by scratching her eye, causing permanent damage to the tear duct. The toddler sought damages under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, para. 366 (1973), arguing that her unintentional act did not constitute provocation. The court held that provocation under the statute referred to both intentional or unintentional acts. Because the dog was provoked by the unintentional act, he did not react viciously. |
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| Sentencia C-115/06 | Sentencia C-115/06 | In this opportunity, the Court held that bullfighting represents a cultural manifestation and artistic expression of human beings that the legal system must protect. Therefore, bullfighting could not be considered a violent act in terms of article 12 of the Constitution because the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment presumes an act to be violent when it is against a human being. In turn, bullfighting cannot be considered a violent act because here, there is no treatment that is incompatible with human dignity. | Case | |||||||||
| Hendrickson v. Grider | 70 N.E.3d 604 (2016), appeal not allowed, 2017-Ohio-7843 | 2016-Ohio-8474, 2016 WL 7626329, 2016-Ohio-8474 (2016) |
A car accident occurred and Plaintiffs, Jo Ellen Hendrickson and her husband were injured when her vehicle hit two horses that were on the roadway. Defendant Randall D. Grider owned the horses and Defendant Gartner owned the lot where Grider kept the horses. Defendant Cope is Gartner's son-in-law and acted as an intermediary between Gartner and Grider. The Hendrickson’s filed a complaint against Grider, Cope, and Gartner and alleged that they were owners and/or keepers of horses under statute R.C. Chapter 951 and that they negligently allowed the horses to escape. Hendrickson sought damages for her injuries and a loss of consortium claim on her husbands’ behalf. The Common Pleas Court, granted summary judgment for the Defendants. The Hendrickson’s appealed. The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District affirmed the Common Pleas Court. The Court of Appeals reasoned that: (1) neither defendant was “keeper” of horses within the meaning of the statute which governed liability for horses running at large on public roads; (2) even if the lot owner breached their duty by allowing the owner of the horses to keep the horses on her property before fencing was installed, such breach was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries; and (3) the lot owner could not have reasonably foreseen that the horses would escape from a fenced-in lot and injure the motorist and, thus, she could not be held liable in negligence for the motorist's resulting injuries. |
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| New York Pet Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York | 143 F.Supp.3d 50 (E.D. New York,2015) | 2015 WL 7017388 (E.D. New York,2015) |
(Aff'd on appeal to 2nd Circuit: New York Pet Welfare Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 850 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs, a non-profit group trade association of pet stores ("NYPWA"), dog and cat breeders and dealers, veterinarians, and pet owners, brought this action against New York City, the city council, and council members, alleging that defendants have adopted laws that violate the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as New York law that governs veterinary medicine, the treatment of animals, and equal protection. The challenged law relate to the sale of dogs and cats in the city that require pet stores to obtain pets from Class A USDA licensees in good standing and that the pet stores spay and neuter the pets before selling them. In rejecting NYPWA's federal preemption claim, the court found that the AWA specifically contemplates local regulation in § 2143(a)(8) and previous cases have found no conflict even where the local legislation bans what is otherwise allowed under the AWA. The court also found no conflict with state law (N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 753–d) or other laws concerning veterinary licensing, pet shops, and animal cruelty. In dismissing plaintiff's Equal Protection argument, the court was not persuaded that pet stores and shelters/rescues are "similarly situated" to support the claim. Additionally, the court found a rational basis to support any differential treatment. NYPWA also alleged that the Pet Shop Laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause, arguing that the laws impermissibly regulate extraterritorially and favor local interests. The court found that even if plaintiff's factual allegations were true, the law was not economic protectionism, but an attempt to curb problems with homeless animals and euthanasia. Finally, the court found not due process violations (substantive or procedural) where there is no interference with a constitutionally protected right. NYPWA's motion to dismiss the claims is granted and the motion for preliminary injunction was denied. |
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| US - Endangered - Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segments | 1996 WL 46339 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 96-2639 | The Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service (Services) have adopted a policy to clarify their interpretation of the phrase "distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife" for the purposes of listing, delisting, and reclassifying species under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (61 U.S.C. 1531 et. seq.) (Act). | Administrative | ||||||||
| IN - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | I.C. 3-11-9-5; 9-21-17-21; 16-32-3-1 - 5; 16-32-3.5-1 - 11; 22-9-6-5; 22-9-5-9.5; 22-9-5-20; 22-9-7-1 - 15; 35-31.5-2-295; 35-46-3-11.5 | These statutes comprise Indiana's assistance animal/guide dog laws. | Statute | |||||||||
| CO - Fur - § 12b. Prohibited methods of taking wildlife (Constitutional Provision) | CO CONST Art. 18, § 12b | C. R. S. A. Const. Art. 18, § 12b | This Colorado constitutional provision provides that it is unlawful to take wildlife with any leghold trap, any instant kill body-gripping design trap, or by poison or snare in the state of Colorado subject to the listed exceptions. | Statute | ||||||||
| Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources | 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005) |
A paper manufacturing company sprayed pesticides on their tree grove, but accidentally over sprayed killing some of plaintiff's commercial bees. The commercial beekeeper sued the paper manufacturing company and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the paper company. The Supreme Court of Minnesota ultimately reversed the grants of summary judgment on the commercial beekeeper's negligence claims and affirmed dismissal of the nuisance claims. |
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| Sinclair v. Okata | 874 F. Supp. 1051 (D.Alaska,1994) |
Defendants are able to present a genuine question of fact regarding whether they were on notice of their dog's vicious propensity given their characterization of the four prior biting incidents as "behavioral responses common to all dogs." Defendants' expert concluded that each time, Anchor's responses were "natural" or instinctive. Plaintiffs offer no evidence, through expert testimony or otherwise, to refute the opinion of defendants' expert. |
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| Derecho Animal Volume 2 Núm 4 |
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Policy |