Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Liberation (Vic) Inc v Gasser | (1991) 1 VR 51 | (1990) Aust Torts Reports 81-027 |
Animal Liberation were injuncted from publishing words claiming animal cruelty in a circus or demonstrating against that circus. They were also found guilty of nuisance resulting from their demonstration outside that circus. On appeal, the injunctions were overturned although the finding of nuisance was upheld. |
Case | |
| US - Marine Mammals, Endangered - Establishment of Species of Concern List, Addition of Species to Species of Concern List, Desc | 2004 WL 791908 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 04-8593 |
NMFS establishes a species of concern list, places 45 species on this list, describes the factors it will consider when identifying species of concern, and revises the candidate species list. NMFS also solicits information and comments concerning the status of, research and stewardship opportunities for, and the factors for identifying species of concern. |
Administrative | |
| Beckett v. Warren | 921 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio, 2010) | 2010 WL 46003 (Ohio), 124 Ohio St.3d 256 (2010) |
On a certified conflict from the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided here whether a plaintiff pursuing a claim for bodily injuries caused by a dog must elect either a statutory remedy under R.C. 955.28 or a remedy at common law for negligence. The Supreme Court found that the defense's conflict case, Rodenberger v. Wadsworth, 1983 WL 7005, did not turn on the issue of whether both claims could be pursued simultaneously, but rather whether the statutory cause of action abrogated the common law cause of action (which it held did not). In looking at the plain language of R.C. 955.28, the Court found that the statute itself does not preclude a simultaneous common law action for damages for bodily injuries caused by a dog. Under both theories of recovery, compensatory damages remain the same so there is no issue of double recovery. Thus, a plaintiff may, in the same case, pursue a claim for a dog bite injury under both R.C. 955.28 and common law negligence. |
Case | |
| Bartlett v. State | 929 So.2d 1125, (Fla.App. 4 Dist.,2006) | 2006 WL 1409122 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.,2006), 31 Fla. L. Weekly D1449 |
In this Florida case, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for felony cruelty to animals after the defendant shot an opossum "countless" times with a BB gun after the animal had left defendant's home. As a result, the animal had to be euthanized. The court wrote separately to observe that the felony cruelty section (828.12) as written creates a potential tension between conduct criminalized by the statute and the lawful pursuit of hunting. The commission of an act that causes a "cruel death" in Section 828.12 applies to even the unintended consequence of a lawful act like hunting. |
Case | |
| People v. Miller | 159 A.D.3d 1608 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) | 72 N.Y.S.3d 750, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 02109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) | In this New York case, defendant appeals his conviction for burglary in the second degree, petit larceny, and criminal contempt in the first degree. The incident occurred when defendant went back over to his girlfriend's house after he called her to ask permission to visit the dogs. The complainant declined, saying she had plans for an outing with the dogs that day. Witnesses later observed defendant banging on the complainant's door and subsequently opening a window and climbing in her residence. After forcing entry, defendant took the dogs and complainant called 911. Subsequently, defendant led police on a high speed chase, and, after being arrested, defendant claimed the dogs were licensed to him. The appellate court viewed all the evidence of the elements for each crime and rejected defendant's contention that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Thus, the judgment was affirmed. Notably, two judges dissented on this appeal, finding that defendant "had at least a good faith basis for claiming an ownership interest the dogs." The dissent found the dogs may have been jointly owned and that, prior to his arrest, "defendant simply intended to take the dogs for a walk and then return them." | Case | |
| Moser v. Pennsylvania Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | Slip Copy, 2012 WL 4932046 (E.D. Penn.) |
After the defendants confiscated mare without a warrant and required that the plaintiff surrender another mare and a few other animals in order to avoid prosecution, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for violating the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Civil Rights Act and Pennsylvania statutory and common law. However, the plaintiffs lost when the district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment on all counts. |
Case | ||
| Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos v. New York City Police Dept | 152 A.D.3d 113, 55 N.Y.S.3d 31 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) | 2017 WL 2429221 (N.Y. App. Div. June 6, 2017) | Kaporos is a customary Jewish ritual which entails grasping a live chicken and swinging the bird three times overhead while saying a prayer. Upon completion of the prayer, the chicken's throat is slit and its meat is donated. The practice takes place outdoors, on public streets in Brooklyn. The Plaintiffs include the Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos and individual Plaintiffs who reside, work or travel, within Brooklyn neighborhoods. The Defendants included City defendants such as the New York City Police Department and non-City defendants such as individual Orthodox Jewish rabbis. The Plaintiffs alleged that Kaporos is a health hazard and cruel to animals. Plaintiffs requested the remedy of mandamus to compel the City Defendants to enforce certain laws related to preserving public health and preventing animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of the proceedings against the City defendants. The Court reasoned that none of the laws or regulations that the Plaintiffs relied on precluded the City Defendants from deciding whether or not to engage in Kaporos. Also, the Plaintiffs did not have a “clear legal right” to dictate which laws are enforced, how, or against whom. The Court stated that determining which laws and regulations might be properly enforced against the non-City defendants without infringing upon their free exercise of religion could not be dictated by the court through mandamus. | Case | |
| NJ - Veterinary - Chapter 16. Veterinary Medicine, Surgery and Dentistry. | NJSA 45:16-1 to 45:16-18 | NJ ST 45:16-1 to 45:16-18 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| Ruiz v. Franklin County Animal Control | 732 S.E.2d 393 (Table), 2012 WL 4510934 (N.C.App.) (unpublished) |
This North Carolina case is an appeal from a denial of summary judgment in favor of Franklin County Animal Control. Defendants argue that the trial court erred by declining to enter summary judgment in their favor on the basis of governmental immunity. The appellate court agreed, reversed the trial court's decision, and remanded for an entry of summary judgment for defendants. The court found that there is no dispute in the record that Franklin County Animal Control and Stallings, in his official capacity as an Animal Control Officer, were performing a governmental function in impounding and euthanizing plaintiff's dog. Further, plaintiff failed to allege in her complaint that defendants waived governmental immunity, subjecting her action to dismissal. |
Case | ||
| MD - Endangered Species - Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-2A-01 - 09 | MD NAT RES § 10-2A-01 - 09 | These Maryland statutes comprise the Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act. Under the Act, any species designated under the federal Endangered Species Act is deemed an endangered species as are other species designated by the state secretary based on habitat and population factors. Violators of the Act shall be fined not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both and equipment used in the taking of designated species may be seized. | Statute |