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Displaying 81 - 90 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AR - Ordinances - § 14-54-1102. Dogs running astray. | A.C.A. § 14-54-1102 | AR ST § 14-54-1102 | This Arkansas statute provides that municipal corporations have the power to prevent the running at large of dogs and the injuries and annoyances associated with them. Further, this statute allows municipalities to authorize the destruction or impoundment of dogs if found in violation of ordinance. However, prior to destroying the dog, the municipality shall give the dog's owner at least five (5) days' notice of the date of the proposed destruction of the dog by certified mail if the dog carries the owner's address. | Statute | |
| US - Slaughter - Humane Slaughter of Livestock Regulations | 9 C.F.R. 313.1 - 313.90 | These regulations outline the requirements for the humane treatment of livestock prior to and during slaughter. Included are the requirements for pens, holding, and transportation areas, and the special circumstances for transporting and holding "downed" (nonambulatory) livestock. The regulations emphasize the minimization of "excitement and discomfort" to the livestock prior to transportation or slaughter. Of special note are the requirements for humane methods of slaughter, including the use of carbon dioxide gas, captive bolt "stunners" and projectiles, gunshot, and electrical current. | Administrative | ||
| Vickers v. Egbert | 359 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (Fla. 2005) |
A commercial fisherman brought a claim against the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission alleging substantive due process violations. The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission instituted licensing requirements and restrictions on lobster trapping certificates in order to alleviate an overpopulation of lobster traps. The court held in favor of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, reasoning fishing was not a fundamental right. |
Case | ||
| Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior | 397 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) | This case centers on the Trump Administration's new interpretation of incidental takings under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA). In December 2017, the Principal Deputy Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) issued a memorandum that countered almost 50 years of the agency’s interpretation of “takings” and “killings” under the MBTA (the "Jorjani Opinion"). According to the DOI in that opinion, the MBTA does not prohibit incidental takes or kills because the statute applies only to activities specifically aimed at birds. Environmental interest groups and various states brought three now-consolidated actions to vacate the memorandum and subsequent guidance issued in reliance on the memorandum. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In essence, the question before the court is whether DOI’s interpretation of the MBTA must be set aside as contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or upheld as a valid exercise of agency authority. The court first observed that, from the early 1970s until 2017, the DOI interpreted the MBTA to prohibit incidental takes and kills, imposing liability for activities and hazards that led to the deaths of protected birds, irrespective of whether the activities targeted birds or were intended to take or kill birds. To conserve migratory birds and ensure compliance with the MBTA’s prohibition on “incidental take,” the DOI's Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) used a range of strategies: sending companies notice of the risks their facilities and equipment posed to migratory birds; issuing industry guidance; informally negotiating remediation efforts; and issuing permits authorizing takes. In fact, the court noted that the agency prioritized a cooperative approach with industry over enforcement actions. In 2015, the DOI formalized this approach by undergoing a rulemaking process regulating incidental take. In early 2017, the DOI's Solicitor then issued a memorandum that reaffirmed the long-standing interpretation that the MBTA prohibited incidental take that became known as the "Tomkins Opinion." Once presidential administrations changed and Tomkins departed, the new Principal Deputy Solicitor issued a new memorandum that stated any agency comments, recommendations, or actions not be based on the principle that the MBTA prohibited incidental take (the Jorjani Opinion). This triggered the instant lawsuits by conservation organizations and several states. On July 31, 2019, the lower court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated standing and denied the DOI's motion to dismiss. On appeal here, this court first noted that both parties agree with longstanding precedent that the MBTA's misdemeanor provision creates strict liability. In contrast, the Jorjani Opinion contends that the criminal penalty provisions under the MBTA is limited to only acts directed at birds and those activities whose purpose is to "render an animal subject to human control" like hunting or capturing. In reviewing the Jorjani Opinion under the lessened deference standard afforded by administrative law, this court found the DOI overstated the any conflicts in interpretation of the MBTA among circuit courts (a "dramatized representation"). In addition, the court found the Jorjani Opinion "is a recent and sudden departure from long-held agency positions backed by over forty years of consistent enforcement practices." The court found the Jorjani Opinion was an unpersuasive interpretation of the MBTA's unambiguous prohibition on the killing of birds and is contrary to the plain language of the law itself. Such an interpretation runs contrary to legislative history, decades of enforcement practices by the DOI, and caselaw. Because the agency's action was held unlawful under the APA, the court found the only appropriate remedy was vacatur. Thus, Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment were granted, and Interior’s motion was denied. | Case | ||
| Washington v. Olatoye | 173 A.D.3d 467, 103 N.Y.S.3d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) | 2019 WL 2425735 (N.Y. App. Div. June 11, 2019) | This New York case involves an appeal by a public housing tenant after his petition to declare his dog an assistance animal was denied and he was placed on probation with instructions to his dog from the premises. The denial stems from an incident where Petitioner's English Bulldog "Onyx" allegedly bit a NYCHA employee when the employee was delivering a hotplate to petitioner's apartment when petitioner was not home. After the incident, NYCHA notified petitioner that it would seek to terminate his tenancy for non-desirability and breach of its rules and regulations. Petitioner suffered from mental illness as well as a traumatic brain injury and was in the process of trying to register Onyx as an assistance animal, which was validated by a letter from the psychiatric support center where he received services. At a hearing, the NYCHA hearing officer sustained the charges against petitioner, required him to remove the dog from his apartment immediately and placed him on probation for one year. It did not address petitioner's request for an assistance animal as a reasonable accommodation and ignored the mental health records submitted into evidence. On appeal, this court first noted that housing providers are required to allow a person who proves their burden of showing that an animal assists them with aspects of their disability to keep an assistance animal. Here, the hearing officer engaged in no such analysis and relied on the "direct threat" exemption to the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Because there was no initial record that addressed petitioner's reasonable accommodation request, the appellate court was left with an insufficient record that precluded adequate review. Thus, the petition was held in abeyance and this court remanded the proceeding to NYCHA for a determination, on the existing record, in accordance with this decision. | Case | |
| CA - Dog, dangerous - § 31625. Seizure and impoundment pending hearing | West's Ann.Cal.Food & Agric.Code § 31625 | CA FOOD & AG § 31625 | This California statute allows an animal control officer or law enforcement officer to seize and impound the dog pending hearing if there is probable cause to believe the dog poses an immediate threat to public safety. The owner or keeper of the dog shall be liable to the city or county where the dog is impounded for the costs and expenses of keeping the dog, if the dog is later adjudicated potentially dangerous or vicious. | Statute | |
| EU - Fur - Regulation (EC) No 1523/2007 (dog and cat fur ban) | Regulation (EC) No 1523/2007 | Statute | |||
| U.S. v. Apollo Energies, Inc. | 611 F.3d 679 (C.A.10 (Kan.), 2010) | 2010 WL 2600502 (C.A.10 (Kan.)) |
Appellants, Apollo Energies, Inc. and Dale Walker, were charged with violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act after an agent with the USFWS discovered dead migratory birds lodged in each appellant's "heater-treater," a piece of equipment used in the course of appellants' Kansas oil drilling businesses, on several occasions. At trial, both Apollo and Walker were convicted of misdemeanor violations for "taking" or "possessing" migratory birds. On appeal, Apollo and Walker contested that (1) the MBTA is not a strict liability crime or, (2) if it is a strict liability crime, the MBTA is unconstitutional as applied to their conduct. Bound by a previous holding that found misdemeanor violations of the MBTA are strict liability crimes, the court concluded that the MBTA includes no mens rea requirement. As to Appellants' second contention challenging the constitutionality of the Act, the court concluded that while the Act is not unconstitutionally vague, "the MBTA requires a defendant to proximately cause the statute's violation for the statute to pass constitutional muster. |
Case | |
| CA - Housing - Pet Friendly Housing Act of 2017 | West's Ann. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 50466 | CA HLTH & S § 50466 | The California Department of Housing and Community Development requires each housing development to authorize a resident of the housing development to own or maintain one or more common household pets within a resident's dwelling unit. | Statute | |
| People v. Gordon | 85 N.Y.S.3d 725, (N.Y.Crim.Ct. Oct. 4, 2018) | 61 Misc.3d 966, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 28306, 2018 WL 4837574 (N.Y.Crim.Ct. Oct. 4, 2018) | This New York case reflects Defendant's motion to dismiss the "accusatory instrument" in the interests of justice (essentially asking the complaint to be dismissed) for violating Agricultural and Markets Law (AML) § 353, Overdriving, Torturing and Injuring Animals or Failure to Provide Proper Sustenance for Animals. Defendant's primary argument is that she is not the owner of the dog nor is she responsible for care of the dog. The dog belongs to her "abusive and estranged" husband. The husband left the dog in the care of their daughter, who lives on the second floor above defendant. When the husband left for Florida, he placed the dog in the backyard attached to his and defendant's ground floor apartment. The dog did not have proper food, water, or shelter, and slowly began to starve resulting in emaciation. While defendant asserts she has been a victim of domestic violence who has no criminal record, the People counter that defendant was aware of the dog's presence at her residence and allowed the dog to needlessly suffer. This court noted that defendant's motion is time-barred and must be denied. Further, despite the time bar, defendant did not meet her burden to dismiss in the interests of justice. The court noted that, even viewing animals as property, failure to provide sustenance of the dog caused it to suffer needlessly. In fact, the court quoted from in Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery (in which denied a writ of habeas corpus for two chimpanzees) where the court said "there is not doubt that [a chimpanzee] is not merely a thing." This buttressed the court's decision with regard to the dog here because "he Court finds that their protection from abuse and neglect are very important considerations in the present case." Defendant's motion to dismiss in the interest of justice was denied. | Case |