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Displaying 6631 - 6638 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MD - Service animal - § 9-957. Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program | MD Code, State Government, § 9-957 | This 2017 law establishes the Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program. A purpose of the Program is to refer eligible veterans who inquire about participation in the Program to one or more nonprofit training entities. The Department shall select at least one qualified nonprofit training entity to implement a training protocol that will teach each Program participant methodologies, strategies, and techniques for partnering with service dogs or support dogs. This entity will also help select and facilitate training of service or support dogs. The Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program Fund is also established to fund the Program. | Statute | ||
| RI - Assistance Animals - Consolidated Assistance Animal Laws | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-4, § 4-13-16.1, § 39-2-13, § 31-18-14 - 16.1, § 34-37-4, § 40-9.1-1 - 1.7; 42-87-3; § 34-37.1-6 | RI ST § 4-13-4, § 4-13-16.1, § 39-2-13, § 31-18-14 - 16.1, § 34-37-4, § 40-9.1-1 - 1.7; 42-87-3; § 34-37.1-6 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance/service animal laws. | Statute | |
| MT - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 30. Protection of Farm Animals and Research Facilities | MCA 81-30-101 to 81-30- 105 | MT ST 81-30-101 to 81-30- 105 | This chapter comprises Montana's Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act." Unlawful acts include exercising control over a facility without consent, damaging or destroying the property of an animal facility, entering an animal facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act, entering an animal facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera, or other means with the intent to commit criminal defamation, and entering an animal facility if the person knows entry is forbidden. A person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of 81-30-103 may bring against the person who caused the damage an action in the district court to recover an amount equal to three times all actual and consequential damages; and court costs and reasonable attorney fees. | Statute | |
| Janota-Bzowska v. Lewis | 1997CarswellBC1957 | 96 B.C.A.C. 70, 155 W.A.C. 70, 43 B.C.L.R. (3d) 352, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2053 |
The respondent Janota-Bzowska was an invited guest at the home of the appellant Lewises, where another guest (appellant Holtzman) had tied his Labrador dog outside; the dog lunged at the respondent, causing her to fall and break her finger. A trial court earlier found both dog-owner and home-owners liable to Janota-Bzowska under the doctrines of scienter (strict liabilty) and negligence. On appeal, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the dog had a propensity to lunge at people, or that the owner knew of such propensity, although the dog was known to chase deer. However, this was not sufficient to allow recovery under scienter. On the issue of negligence, the court also held that the dog's behaviour being 'unexpected and out of character' showed no suggestion of a risk for which the owner had failed to take reasonable precautions, so there was no negligence shown. |
Case | |
| State v. Kelso | 689 P.2d 1307 (1984) | 70 Or.App. 393 (1984) |
Appeal from a district court decision relating to mental state requirements of an animal owner. The Court of Appeals reversed a district court finding which required a higher mental state than negligence in violation of a statute which provides that the owner or custodian of an animal or livestock shall not "permit" animal to run at large. The Court of Appeals found that the offense does not require a culpable mental state. |
Case | |
| UT - Wildlife Possession - R657-3. Collection, Importation, Transportation, and Possession of Animals. | UT ADC R657-3 | U.A.C. R657-3 | This set of Utah rules concerns the collection, importation, and possession of zoological animals under circumstances described in the rules. Commonly kept domestic animals such as alpacas, donkeys, cats, dogs and hybrid dogs, gerbils, goats, hamsters, and many others are not governed by these rules. A person shall obtain a certificate of registration before collecting, importing, transporting, or possessing any species of animal or its parts classified as prohibited or controlled. A person may not release to the wild or release into any public or private waters any zoological animal, including fish, without first obtaining authorization from the division. Certain species are prohibited for collection, importation, and possession. These species include bighorn sheep, bears, coyotes, gray wolves, wild cats, skunks, lemurs, great apes, and those species listed in Appendix I or II of CITES, among others listed in R657-3-24. | Administrative | |
| Hill v. Missouri Department of Conservation | 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo.2018) | 2018 WL 3235854 (Mo.2018) | This case concerns the regulatory authority of the Missouri Conservation Commission ("Commission"), which has authority over the control, management, restoration, conservation, and regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry and all wildlife resources of the state. The respondents in this case operate different selective breeding and private hunting facilities that rely on captive bred deer and elk (“cervids”). Respondent Hill co-owns the Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch which is a large hunting preserve and white-tailed deer breeding operation. Respondent Broadway owns a hunting preserve which offers three-day guided hunts of a variety of animals, including elk. Broadway also has a deer breeding operation. Respondent Grace owns a breeding facility for white-tailed deer, sika, and red deer. The respondents cannot operate their hunting preserves and captive breeding facilities without permits from the Missouri Department of Conservation, which all respondents have. Cervids can be infected with a fatal neurodegenerative disease known as chronic wasting disease (CWD). The first detection of the disease in Missouri was at Heartland Wildlife Ranches, which was eventually purchased by Respondent Broadway and renamed Winter Quarters Wildlife Ranch. Due to this, the Missouri Conservation Commission set up surveillance within 25 miles of the facility. From 2010 to 2013 the Commission found 10 free-ranging deer infected with CWD out of the 14,000 tested in the surveillance zone. Over the next three years the Commission detected CWD in 14 free-ranging deer, several of which were found near closed or currently operating captive cervid facilities. Attempting to eradicate CWD, the Commission proposed a series of regulatory amendments that were to take effect in January of 2015. The amendments were aimed at the captive cervid industry. The regulations relevant to this case banned the importation of cervids, imposed more rigorous fencing requirements, and imposed more rigorous recordkeeping and veterinary inspection requirements. Respondents brought an action suing the Appellants (the Missouri Conservation Commission) to prevent these regulations from going into effect. At trial, the circuit court declared that the regulations were invalid and enjoined the Commission from enforcing them. On appeal, the Commission raised three arguments. First, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred because Respondents’ cervids are “game” and “wildlife resources of the state” and, therefore, can be regulated by the Commission under the Missouri Constitution. Second, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred because the Commission’s authority to promulgate the regulations does not implicate or infringe on the Respondents’ rights to farm. Third, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred by enjoining the Commission’s enforcement of the new regulations against all people in Missouri, rather than only against the Respondents. The Respondents contend that captive cervids are not wildlife or game even though they are wild by nature because they are too domesticated and, therefore, akin to livestock. The Court rejects this contention and looks at the plain meaning of the terms “game” and “wildlife” and concludes that both terms plainly include all species that are wild by nature. The terms are not ambiguous. The Court points out that it would be unreasonable to hold that the Commission has constitutional authority to regulate individual cervids that are born free and still free-roaming but take away that authority when an individual cervid is considered domesticated. “The Court will not give a law a construction which would render it unreasonable when it is susceptible to a reasonable one.” Furthermore, historically, the term “game” was broad enough to embrace all kinds of deer whether tame or wild. Captive cervids are therefore considered “game” and “wildlife” and the Commission has authority under the Missouri Constitution to regulate Respondents’ captive cervids. Respondent’ second contention is that they own the captive cervids and, therefore, the cervids are not resources of the state. The Court rejects this contention. The Commission has always regulated deer and elk owned by private parties. The Court holds that the phrase “resources of the state” unambiguously refers to resources within the entire geographical boundaries of the state. Therefore, Respondents’ cervids are considered resources of the state. The Court agrees with the Commission’s second contention that the regulations did not infringe on Respondents’ right to farm. Respondents failed to show that they are engaged in farming and ranching practices and, therefore, cannot invoke the guarantee of the Missouri Constitution. The Court did not reach the Commission’s third contention. Ultimately the Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Respondents and entered judgment in favor of Appellants on both counts. | Case | |
| Park Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago | 872 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2017) | 2017 WL 4173707 (7th Cir. Sept. 21, 2017) | Local pet stores and breeders brought an action against the validity of a city ordinance limiting the sources from which they may obtain dogs, cats, and rabbits for resale. They stake their claim on the grounds that the ordinance goes beyond Chicago’s home-rule powers under the Illinois Constitution and violates the implied limits on the state power imposed by the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Petitioners appeal the district court’s dismissal of case for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Illinois Constitution allows Chicago to regulate animal control and welfare concurrently with the state so long as no state statute specifically limits the municipality. Further, the court reject the argument that the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit for failure to state a claim. | Case |