Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Hale | 545 U.S. 1112 (2005) | 125 S.Ct. 2914 (2005) |
This opinion vacates and remands U.S. v. Hale, 2004 WL 2367994. |
Case | |
| In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health | 527 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.D.C., 2007) | 2007 WL 4329474 (D.D.C.) |
This FOIA case was brought against the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") by In Defense of Animals (“IDA”) seeking information related to approximately 260 chimpanzees located as the Alamogordo Primate Facility (“APF”) in New Mexico. Before the court now is NIH's Motion for Partial Reconsideration as to the release of records. This Court rejected NIH’s arguments that the records are not “agency records” because they belong to NIH's contractor, Charles River Laboratories, Inc. (“CRL”), a publicly held animal research company. Also, the Court was equally unconvinced that the information requested here is “essentially a blueprint of the APF facility,” and that release of such information presents a security risk to the facility. This Order was Superseded by In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health , 543 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.D.C., 2008). |
Case | |
| AUTO 1928 de 2022 | AUTO 1928 de 2022 | In Colombia, municipalities are not allowed to prohibit bullfighting. It is a power reserved for Congress. Bogota attempted to regulate the practice through ordinance 767 in 2020. Since the city was not allowed to prohibit bullfights, it regulated them by prohibiting the use of sharp objects and killing of the bulls in the ring. In addition, they required that 30% of the publicity of the event be focused on educating the public on the suffering of bulls. It imposed a 20% tax and decreased the number of annual bullfights allowed from 8 to 4. During this time, no bids were sent to use "Plaza Santamaria" (Bogota's bullfighting stadium) because owners and sponsors of this practice did not agree with such requirements. Thus, Plaza Santamaria did not hold any bullfights since 2020. In December 2022, the Constitutional Court ordered the city to refrain from taking any action conducing to the violation of decision T-296 of 2013 and ordered the opening of Plaza Santamaria “to allow bullfights to take place in the usual conditions as an expression of cultural diversity and social pluralism,” effectively ordering the city to do what’s necessary for the comeback of bullfighting to the capital. | Case | ||
| Riverbrook v. Fabode | 963 N.W.2d 415 (2020), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 981 N.W.2d 468 (Mich. 2022) | 333 Mich. App. 645, 2020 WL 5580152 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2020) | This Michigan case centers on the adequacy of the evidence supporting a request for an assistance animal. Antony Fabode lived in a mobile home on property that was leased to his sister by Riverbrook. In the spring of 2018, Antony obtained a puppy, King, which he claims is a Labrador Retriever mix, but was suspected by Riverbrook as being a banned pit bull type dog. Riverbrook consequently notified Antony's sister of the violation and ordered the dog removed from the premises. To that order, Antony first responded to Riverbrook with a certificate claiming that King was an emotional support animal (ESA) and, after that was rejected as insufficient, came back with a letter by limited license professional counselor, Anne Venet. After again denying the request, Riverbrook sought to enforce the consent judgment with an order of eviction. The district court granted the motion and ordered Antony's removal. Antony sought a stay of eviction on the grounds that he and his sister were authorized to possess King as an ESA. At the district court hearing, Venet testified in support of her letter explaining that she determined Antonuy's need for an ESA after a brief phone call. The court then declined to permit questioning by Riverbrook into the credibility of the determination that Antony was disabled and needed King as a therapeutic aid. Ultimately, the district court denied the writ for eviction. The circuit court affirmed that ruling based on the FHA and the caselaw that supports an unobtrusive line of questioning. The crux of this appeals centers on whether the lower court's order denying Riverbrook's writ of eviction was erroneous after the court disallowed Riverbrook's attorney from questioning the reliability of the evidence of disability and need for an assistance animal. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that "the district and circuit courts avoided their gatekeeper role under MRE 702 despite Riverbrook's repeated objections to the reliability and admissibility of the Fabodes’ evidence." This hampered Riverbrook's ability to discover whether the information presented was reliable and supported Antony's disability-related request and whether Riverbrook refused to make a reasonable accommodation for a tenant based on disability or handicap. The circuit court order was vacated the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. | Case | |
| US - Livestock - To Amend Labeling Regulations under the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the Poultry Products Inspection Act | Submitted by Animal Welfare Institute | The Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) submits this petition for rulemaking in compliance with United Stated Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulation 9 C.F.R. § 392 and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. AWI respectfully requests USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) to amend labeling regulations under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) to require independent third-party certification for the approval of animal welfare and environmental stewardship claims on meat and poultry products. This action is necessary to 1) prevent the misleading and deceptive use of animal welfare and environmental stewardship claims, 2) provide for consistency and transparency in the label approval process, 3) meet consumer expectations for the label approval process, and 4) protect from financial harm those farmers making legitimate use of these value-added claims. Read the Federal Meat Inspection Act regulation in effect at the time the AWI petitioned. | Administrative | ||
| AK - Zoo - § 09.65.180. Civil liability of zoos | AS § 09.65.180 | AK ST § 09.65.180 | The Alaska law provides that, except as provided in (b), a person who owns or operates a zoo is strictly liable for injury to a person or property if the injury is caused by an animal owned by or in the custody of the zoo. | Statute | |
| In re Estate of Howard Brand, Late of Essex Junction, Vermont |
This Vermont case considers the effectiveness of a clause in a testator’s will that directs his executor to destroy any animals that he owns at the time of his death. The testator, Howard Brand, was believed to have owned four horses and one mule at the time of his death. An unincorporated association entitled, “The Coalition to Save Brand’s Horses” was formed in response to this unusual post-mortem request, and sought to intervene in the lawsuit. In a clear case of first impression in Vermont, the Chittenden County Court held that the clause as set forth in Brand’s last codicil mandating the destruction of his animals is void as contrary to public policy. |
Pleading | |||
| U.S. v. Santillan | 243 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) |
Santillan was prosecuted under the Lacey Act for bringing ten baby parrots across the border from Tijuana. His appeal raises, among other issues, a significant question about the mens rea needed under the Lacey Act. The court held that the Lacey Act does not require knowledge of the particular law violated by the possession or predicate act, as long as the defendant knows of its unlawfulness. |
Case | ||
| Drinkhouse v. Van Ness | 260 P. 869 (1935) | 202 Cal. 359 (1935) |
Plaintiffs sued defendants to recover value of a horse that was wrongfully taken from them. The Court held that evidence was admissible to establish the value of the horse at the time of the wrongful taking to fix the damages amount. The peculiar value of the horse as a sire was established by evidence as to the horse’s racing history and to its progeny’s character and racing ability. Owners were entitled to recover damages for the reasonable value of the horse’s use during the period they were wrongfully deprived of it. |
Case | |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - JHARKHAND BOVINE ANIMAL PROHIBITION OF SLAUGHTER ACT, 2005 | 11 of 2005 | The Act, specific to the state of Jharkhand, prohibits the slaughter of bovine animals including cows, calves, heifers, bulls and bullocks. Persons may not transport bovine animals from the state to other states for slaughter, or export any bovine animals for slaughter. Persons may not sell, purchase or possess the flesh of bovine animals. The Act provides for the setting up of institutions for the maintenance and care of uneconomic cows by the government or local authorities. Violations of the Act would lead to imprisonment and fines. | Statute |