Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry | 476 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2007) |
The issue on appeal was whether Texas' prohibition of horsemeat for human consumption was preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) or was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The court held that the statute was not preempted or in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. |
Case | |
| NY - Police dog - § 122-c. Transport of police work dogs injured in the line of duty | McKinney's General Municipal Law § 122-c | NY GEN MUN § 122-c | This New York law from 2015 states that an emergency medical service paramedic or emergency medical service technician may transport any police work dog injured in the line of duty to a veterinary clinic or similar such facility provided, however, that there are no persons requiring medical attention or transport at such time. | Statute |
| MN - Initiatives - Amendment 2 (right to hunt) | Amendment 2 (1998) | This ballot measure asked whether the Minnesota Constitution should be amended to affirm that hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good. The measure was passed in 1998 by 77.2% of voters. | Statute | |
| WV - Dangerous - § 20-2-16. Dogs chasing deer | W. Va. Code, § 20-2-16 | WV ST § 20-2-16 | This West Virginia statute states that, except as provided in § 20-2-5j enacted in 2020, no person may permit or use his or her dog to hunt or chase deer. A natural resources police officer shall take into possession any dog known to have unlawfully hunted or chased deer. If the owner of the dog can be determined, the dog shall be returned to the owner. If the owner of the dog cannot be determined, the natural resources police officer shall deliver the dog to the appropriate county humane officer or facility consistent with the provisions of this code. | Statute |
| CT - Leash - Control of dogs in proximity to guide dogs. | C. G. S. A. § 22-364b | CT ST § 22-364b | This Connecticut law provides that the owner or keeper of a dog shall restrain and control such dog on a leash when such dog is not on the property of its owner or keeper and is in proximity to a person with a disability accompanied by a service animal, provided such service animal is readily identifiable as a service animal, is in the direct custody of such person and is licensed. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall have committed an infraction. If an owner or keeper of a dog violates the provisions of this section and, as a result of such violation, such dog attacks and injures the service animal, such owner or keeper shall be liable for any damage done, including veterinary care, replacement of the service animal, and attorney fees. | Statute |
| UK - Welfare - Protection of Animals (Anaesthetics) Act 1964 | 1964 c. 39 |
For historical purposes only. Law has been repealed and/or replaced. An Act to amend the Protection of Animals (Anaesthetics) Act 1954. |
Statute | |
| Hanrahan v. Hometown America, LLC | 90 So.3d 915 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) | 2012 WL 2327814 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) |
While walking his dog one evening, the plaintiff's husband was attacked by fire ants. In an attempt to remove the ants off his person, the plaintiff's husband collapsed in the shower. Two days later, he died. As a representative for her husband's estate and in her own capacity, the plaintiff filed a negligence suit against her landlord. After the trial court granted the landlord's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed. Affirming the lower court's decision, the appeals court reasoned that since the landlord did not harbor, possess, or introduce the fire ants onto the premises, the landlord owed no duty to the plaintiff. |
Case |
| Wilkins v. Daniels | Slip Copy, 2012 WL 6644465 (S.D.Ohio, 2012) |
Various owners of exotic and wild animals filed a lawsuit in order to obtain a temporary restraining order and a permanent/preliminary injunction against the Ohio Department of Agriculture and its Director, David Daniels. The owners of the exotic and wild animals argued the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, which the Ohio Department of Agriculture and its Director were trying to enforce, was unconstitutional. The district court denied the owners’ motion for obtain a temporary restraining order and a permanent/preliminary injunction reasoning that the exceptions to the Act’s ban on owning wild and exotic animals does not violate the owners’ freedom of association rights, that the legislature had a legitimate purpose so as to not violate procedural due process with regards to micro-chipping wild and exotic animals, and that the Act did not constitute an unconstitutional takings. Significantly, the court recognized that owners of wild and exotic animals have a limited or qualified property interest in said animals. |
Case | |
| NH - Divorce - 458:16-a Property Settlement. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 458:16-a | NH ST § 458:16-a | This New Hampshire statute defines "property" for purposes of the state's marriage dissolution (divorce) procedure. In August of 2019, a new provision was added to this law related to animals (Subsection II-a). This subsection states that "[t]angible property shall include animals. In such cases, the property settlement shall address the care and ownership of the parties' animals, taking into consideration the animals' wellbeing." | Statute |
| Rowley v. City of New Bedford | 333 F.Supp.3d 30 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018) | 2018 WL 4600647 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018) | This opinion concerns the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts' motion to dismiss plaintiff Rowley's (formerly plaintiff "Friends of Ruth & Emily, Inc.") citizen suit for injunction under the federal Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that two Asian Elephants, Ruth and Emily, were mistreated by the Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford by chaining their legs, housing them in inadequate facilities, failing to provide proper socialization, and failing to provide adequate veterinary care, which gives rise to a "taking" under Section 9 of the ESA. Rowley claims that she is a member of the zoological society there and visits the elephants on a "near daily basis," resulting in “an aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual relationship with Ruth and Emily over the years.” The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked both parties to brief on the issue of standing for the instant action. The court first noted that the ESA expressly authorizes citizen suits for injunctive relief. To survive a motion to dismiss, Rowley must, through facts, clearly demonstrate standing, and then the court must analyze those facts under a multi-pronged approach. To begin, the court distinguished cases that established the proper "animal nexus" for injury in fact with those that did not meet that finding. Here, Rowley's complaint established injury in fact because she lives in New Bedford, is a member of the Zoo's Zoological Society, and observes the elephants on a near daily basis. Rowley alleges that the maltreatment of Ruth and Emily injures this ability because she observes their ongoing suffering while in substandard captivity. The court was not persuaded by New Bedford's claim that Rowley has not established injury in fact because she has no specialized training in wildlife or animal welfare. In fact, this claim ignored precedent from this very circuit that "aesthetic injury" can be established by viewing animals in inhumane conditions. In addition, the court rejected New Bedford's "nonexistent requirement into the injury in fact analysis" that Rowley must have observed or will observe Asian elephants in their native habitats. As a result, the court found Rowley properly established injury in fact. As to the next requirement of causation, the court found that Rowley sufficiently alleged that the Zoo's actions caused the harm complained of for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. Finally, as to redressability, the court found that Rowley's request for a declaratory judgment as to the Zoo's treatment of Ruth and Emily, and an injunction prohibiting the Zoo from euthanizing the elephants met this prong. New Bedford's contention that Rowley's further suggestion of moving the elephants to a sanctuary in Tennessee impaired her redressability argument because Rowley did not propose how the cost of relocation would be funded was also rejected. At this stage, the court does not need to determine whether this solution is necessary or feasible. The District Court ultimately held that Rowley demonstrated sufficient standing to pursue her claims. Hence, New Bedford's motion to dismiss was denied. | Case |