Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NJ - Humane Societies - 40:48-5.1. Contracts with humane societies where no pound established; advertisement unnecessary | N. J. S. A. 40:48-5.1 | NJ ST 40:48-5.1 | This law relates to municipalities that do not have public pounds for the keeping of stray dogs or cats.Those municipalities may contract with nonproift humane societies or similar associations that have been operating for one or more years for the keeping and redemption of those animals. | Statute | |
| Christensen v. Lundsten | 863 N.Y.S.2d 886, 2008 WL 4118071 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.) | 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 28320 |
In this New York case, the parent of child injured by a dog brought an action seeking to have the dog declared a “dangerous dog” under the relevant law. The Court conducted a trial of the “dangerous dog” petition filed and rendered an oral decision that declared the respondents' Chesapeake Bay Retriever “Nellie” to be a dangerous dog under New York Agricultural and Markets Law § 121. The parties contested the appropriateness of a finding of “negligence” and “strict liability” and the entry of judgment. The District Court held that the court would not resolve issue of negligence because the issue was not properly joined for disposition; however, the owners were strictly liable for child's unreimbursed medical expenses. |
Case | |
| Moore v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | 932 N.E.2d 448 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2010) | 2010 WL 2266081 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.), 402 Ill.App.3d 62 |
Plaintiffs, Ami Moore and Doggie Do Right-911, Inc., aver that defendants PETA, Diane Opresnik, John Keene, and Mary DePaolo defamed them and placed them in a false light by stating that the plaintiff dog trainer placed a shock device on a dog's genitals and allegedly shocked it. Prior to this action, the claim against PETA was settled and dismissed. The defamation claims against Opresnik, Keene, and DePaolo, persisted. In dismissing the remaining claims, the court found that there was no positive factual statement of criminal animal cruelty to support a defamation per se claim. Further, another claim fell outside the statute of limitations period and was also inadequately supported by specific allegations. |
Case | |
| VT - Veterinary - CHAPTER 44. Veterinary Medicine. | 26 V.S.A. § 2401 - 2433 | VT ST T. 26 § 2401- 2433 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| US - Dogs at Large - Chapter X. Presidio Trust. Part 1002. Resource Protection, Public Use and Recreation. § 1002.15 Pets. | 63 FR 35697, June 30, 1998 | 36 C.F.R. § 1002.15 | This rule sets outs the prohibitions for pets in the Presidio Trust. | Administrative | |
| CO - Cruelty, reporting - § 19-3-304. Persons required to report child abuse or neglect | C. R. S. A. § 19-3-304 | CO ST § 19-3-304 | This Colorado statute relates to mandatory reporting for child abuse or neglect. With respect to animal-related issues, the statute requires veterinarians, officers and agents of the state bureau of animal protection, and animal control officers to report suspected abuse or neglect as described in the law. | Statute | |
| IL - Exotic pets - 5/48-10. Dangerous animals | 720 I.L.C.S. 5/48-10 | IL ST CH 720 § 5/48-10 | This Illinois law states that no person shall have a right of property in, keep, harbor, care for, act as custodian of or maintain in his or her possession any dangerous animal or primate except at a properly maintained zoological park, federally licensed exhibit, circus, college or university, scientific institution, research laboratory, veterinary hospital, hound running area, or animal refuge in an escape-proof enclosure. A "dangerous animal" is defined as a lion, tiger, leopard, ocelot, jaguar, cheetah, margay, mountain lion, lynx, bobcat, jaguarundi, bear, hyena, wolf or coyote.This Section does not prohibit a person who had lawful possession of a primate before January 1, 2011, from continuing to possess that primate if the person registers the animal by providing written notification to the local animal control administrator on or before April 1, 2011. Violation is a Class C misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| State v. Gerard | 832 N.W.2d 314 (Minn.App.,2013) | 2013 WL 3155477 (Minn.App.,2013) |
This case considers whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the felony count of unjustifiably killing an animal based on lack of probable cause. The incident stems from the killing of the neighbors' cat with a shotgun by defendant-respondent. At trial, he filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause that was accompanied by a notarized affidavit of the responding police deputy stating the shooting of the cat was "justified." The trial court dismissed the complaint finding insufficient evidence that respondent had unjustifiably killed the cat. On appeal, the court found the district court's reliance on the deputy's lay opinion was improper. The court found it was within the jury's province to determine whether respondent's actions were justified or unjustified based on the evidence at trial. |
Case | |
| Humane Soc. of the U.S. v. Hodel | 840 F.2d 45 (C.A.D.C.,1988) | 268 U.S.App.D.C. 165, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,636 (C.A.D.C.,1988) |
In this appeal, the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) challenged a series of actions by the Fish and Wildlife Service to allow hunting on some of America's national wildlife refuges. The District Court held that HSUS failed to satisfy the Supreme Court's requirements for associational standing because the 'recreational' interest of Society members was not germane to the group's self-described mission of insuring the humane treatment of animals and other wildlife. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's finding that the Humane Society had no standing to challenge the hunt openings, and remanded the action to allow HSUS to pursue its challenge to the introduction of hunting. This Court did affirm the district court's finding on the merits that the Wildlife Service complied with NEPA when it permitted hunting at the Chincoteague preserve. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
Case | |
| TN - Hunting - Part 3. Hunter Protection Act. | T. C. A. § 70-4-301 - 303 | TN ST § 70-4-301 - 303 | This section represents Tennessee's "Hunter Protection Act." The law makes it a Class C misdemeanor to interfere with the lawful taking of a wild animal by another with the intent to prevent the taking; disturb or engage in an activity that will tend to disturb a wild animal, with the intent to prevent the lawful taking; disturb a person engaged in lawful hunting with the intent to prevent the taking; enter or remain on land with intent to violate this section; fail to obey a peace officer's orders to desist from conduct in violation of this section; or use a drone with the intent to conduct video surveillance of private citizens who are lawfully hunting or fishing without obtaining the written consent of the persons being surveilled. A person affected by conduct in violation of this section may seek an injunction or recover damages, including punitive damages. | Statute |