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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NY - Police dog - § 122-c. Transport of police work dogs injured in the line of duty | McKinney's General Municipal Law § 122-c | NY GEN MUN § 122-c | This New York law from 2015 states that an emergency medical service paramedic or emergency medical service technician may transport any police work dog injured in the line of duty to a veterinary clinic or similar such facility provided, however, that there are no persons requiring medical attention or transport at such time. | Statute | |
| Harvey v. Southern Pac. Co. | 80 P. 1061 (1905) | 46 Or. 505 (1905) |
This is a case involving a train hitting a cow. This case involves a judgment for defendant based upon plaintiff's common-law negligence complaint in that defendant ran its train upon and killed the plaintiff's cow. The appellate court upheld defendant's motion for a directed verdict where plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of defendant for failing to fence in its track. |
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| MN - Initiatives - Amendment 2 (right to hunt) | Amendment 2 (1998) | This ballot measure asked whether the Minnesota Constitution should be amended to affirm that hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a valued part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good. The measure was passed in 1998 by 77.2% of voters. | Statute | ||
| VT - Kennels - Rule 300. Animal Welfare Regulations | VT ADC 20 022 001 - 3.14 | Vt. Admin. Code 2-4-300:1.1 to 3.14 | These Vermont regulations for animal welfare set out the requirements kennels, pet stores and other animal facilities must follow in order to ensure the safe handling, care, treatment and transportation of animals is met. Precisely, the following regulations include: provisions regarding registration and licensing periods; government inspections; and specific instructions for the housing and care of cats and dogs. | Administrative | |
| NY - Sharks - Article 13. Marine and Coastal Resources. | McKinney's E. C. L. § 13-0338 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 13-0338 | This New York law prohibits the practice known as "shark finning." The section provides that no person shall possess shark fins in the marine and coastal district unless the requisite shark carcass is also possessed. It defines "finning" as "the removal of a fin, other than the caudal fin, from a shark and not retaining the remainder of the shark's carcass." | Statute | |
| MI - Foxes - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M.C.L.A. 324.43101 - 43104 | MI ST 324.43101 - 43104 | These sections lay out the regulations and prohibited acts with regard to foxes in captivity. | Statute | |
| NH - Divorce - 458:16-a Property Settlement. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 458:16-a | NH ST § 458:16-a | This New Hampshire statute defines "property" for purposes of the state's marriage dissolution (divorce) procedure. In August of 2019, a new provision was added to this law related to animals (Subsection II-a). This subsection states that "[t]angible property shall include animals. In such cases, the property settlement shall address the care and ownership of the parties' animals, taking into consideration the animals' wellbeing." | Statute | |
| Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management v. State | 71 P.3d 644 (Wash. 2003) | 149 Wash.2d 622 (Wash. 2003) |
A citizen groups filed a declaratory judgment action against the State of Washington seeking a determination that the 2000 initiative 713 barring use of body-gripping traps, sodium fluoroacetate, or sodium cyanide to trap or kill mammals was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found that appellants did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Initiative 713 violated the constitution, and thus affirmed the superior court's denial of the summary judgment motion. The court also held that the initiative was exempt from the constitutional provision prohibiting legislation that revises or amends other acts without setting them forth at full length. |
Case | |
| Rowley v. City of New Bedford | 333 F.Supp.3d 30 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018) | 2018 WL 4600647 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018) | This opinion concerns the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts' motion to dismiss plaintiff Rowley's (formerly plaintiff "Friends of Ruth & Emily, Inc.") citizen suit for injunction under the federal Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that two Asian Elephants, Ruth and Emily, were mistreated by the Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford by chaining their legs, housing them in inadequate facilities, failing to provide proper socialization, and failing to provide adequate veterinary care, which gives rise to a "taking" under Section 9 of the ESA. Rowley claims that she is a member of the zoological society there and visits the elephants on a "near daily basis," resulting in “an aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual relationship with Ruth and Emily over the years.” The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked both parties to brief on the issue of standing for the instant action. The court first noted that the ESA expressly authorizes citizen suits for injunctive relief. To survive a motion to dismiss, Rowley must, through facts, clearly demonstrate standing, and then the court must analyze those facts under a multi-pronged approach. To begin, the court distinguished cases that established the proper "animal nexus" for injury in fact with those that did not meet that finding. Here, Rowley's complaint established injury in fact because she lives in New Bedford, is a member of the Zoo's Zoological Society, and observes the elephants on a near daily basis. Rowley alleges that the maltreatment of Ruth and Emily injures this ability because she observes their ongoing suffering while in substandard captivity. The court was not persuaded by New Bedford's claim that Rowley has not established injury in fact because she has no specialized training in wildlife or animal welfare. In fact, this claim ignored precedent from this very circuit that "aesthetic injury" can be established by viewing animals in inhumane conditions. In addition, the court rejected New Bedford's "nonexistent requirement into the injury in fact analysis" that Rowley must have observed or will observe Asian elephants in their native habitats. As a result, the court found Rowley properly established injury in fact. As to the next requirement of causation, the court found that Rowley sufficiently alleged that the Zoo's actions caused the harm complained of for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. Finally, as to redressability, the court found that Rowley's request for a declaratory judgment as to the Zoo's treatment of Ruth and Emily, and an injunction prohibiting the Zoo from euthanizing the elephants met this prong. New Bedford's contention that Rowley's further suggestion of moving the elephants to a sanctuary in Tennessee impaired her redressability argument because Rowley did not propose how the cost of relocation would be funded was also rejected. At this stage, the court does not need to determine whether this solution is necessary or feasible. The District Court ultimately held that Rowley demonstrated sufficient standing to pursue her claims. Hence, New Bedford's motion to dismiss was denied. | Case | |
| Snyder v. Bio-Lab, Inc. | 405 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y.Sup.,1978) | 94 Misc.2d 816 (N.Y.Sup.,1978) |
Plaintiffs sought damages after having to slaughter dairy cows that were injured by defendant’s defective machine. The Court held that plaintiffs could recover 1) the fair market value less salvage value of the cows, 2) the loss of profit during the period after the incident when cows of comparable quality became available on the market, and 3) the calculable loss in milk production caused by the incident's negative impact on the milk production level of the remaining cows. |
Case |