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Displaying 41 - 50 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Protocol of Amendment to the European Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes | The following are the additional protocol to the European Convention on Farm Animals. The definition of "intensive stock farming systems" has been elaborated on. Additions concerning the confines of artificial breeding and the feeding of harmful things to animals through food or drink are also included. | Treaty | ||
| TN - Dog, dangerous, felon - § 39-17-1363. Violent felony conviction; custody or control of dogs; application | T. C. A. § 39-17-1363 | TN ST § 39-17-1363 | Under this Tennessee law, it is an offense for any person convicted of a violent felony to knowingly own, possess, have custody or control of a potentially vicious dog or a vicious dog for a period of ten years after such person has been released from custody following completion of sentence. Additionally, it is an offense for any convicted violent felon to own or have custody of a dog that is not microchipped or spayed/neutered. This section shall only apply if a person's conviction for a violent felony occurs on or after July 1, 2010. | Statute |
| WA - Vehicle - 46.61.660. Carrying persons or animals on outside part of vehicle | West's RCWA 46.61.660 | WA ST 46.61.660 | This Washington law states that it is illegal to transport any living animal on the running board, fenders, hood, or other outside part of any vehicle unless suitable harness, cage or enclosure is provided that protects the animal from being thrown. | Statute |
| NH - Exotic Pets, Wildlife - Chapter 207. Import, Possession, or Release of Wildlife. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 207:14 - 207:15-a | NH ST § 207:14 - 207:15-a | This New Hampshire section states that no person shall import, possess, sell, exhibit, or release any live marine species or wildlife, or the eggs or progeny thereof, without first obtaining a permit from the executive director except as otherwise permitted. The executive director has the authority to determine the time period and any other conditions governing the issuance of such permit. Any wildlife release or imported contrary to these provisions are subject to seizure. | Statute |
| McQuaker v. Goddard | [1940] 1 KB 687 |
A camel is not to be regarded as a wild animal by the common law as a camel 'is, in all countries, a domestic animal, an animal that has become trained to the uses of man, and a fortiori accustomed to association with man.' Whether an animal is to be regarded as wild or domestic is a question of law, and is to be judged according to the genus or class of which it belongs, not the characteristics of the individual animal. |
Case | |
| E. LEE COX AND BECKY COX, D/B/A PIXY PALS KENNEL, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RESPONDENT | 50 Agric. Dec. 14 (1991) | 1991 WL 294529 (U.S.D.A.) |
Lee and Becky Cox, owners of Pixy Pals Kennel, petitioned for review of a decision of the Department of Agriculture suspending their license for ninety days, imposing a $12,000 civil fine, and ordering the Coxes to cease and desist from specified violations of the Animal Welfare Act. The Coxes claim that (1) the suspension violated s 558(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act because there was insufficient evidence to support the Department's finding that their violations of the Animal Welfare Act were willful; (2) they were unconstitutionally penalized for exercising their first amendment rights; and (3) the sanctions imposed on them were excessive. In affirming the USDA decision, the Eighth Circuit held that the definition of "willfulness" was not called into question; rather the Department had presented substantial evidence to demonstrate willfulness. Further, since petitioners' first amendment claim concerned the Department's "motivations," the court held that proof of motivation is a question of fact rather than law, not subject to de novo review. The sanction imposed by the Department, although severe, was not excessive given the size of petitioners' business and the severity of the violations. |
Case |
| Mahan v. State | 51 P.3d 962, 963 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) | 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 148 | Mahan had over 130 animals on her property. Alaska Equine Rescue went to check on the condition of the animals at the request of her family members. The animals were in poor health and were removed by Alaska State Troopers and the Rescue. The animals were then placed in foster homes. The defendant's attorney requested a writ of assistance to require law enforcement to assist and force the foster families to answer a questionnaire. The appellate court held that the families were under no legal obligation to answer the questionnaire unless the court were to issue a deposition order and the families were to be properly subpoenaed. The district court's denial of the writ was upheld. Mahan's attorney also asked for a change of venue due to the publicity the case garnered. The court held the defendant was not entitled to a change of venue when 15 jurors had been excused and there was no reason to doubt the impartiality of the jurors who were left after the selection process. There was no indication that the jurors were unable to judge the case fairly. Mahan's attorney also filed a motion to suppress a majority of the evidence, claiming that the Rescue and law enforcement unlawfully entered the property. The judge stated he would rule on the motion if it was appropriate to do so. The judge never ruled on the motion. To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must obtain an adverse ruling, thus it constituted a waiver of the claim. Mahan was also prohibited from owning more than one animal. She offered no reason why this condition of probation was an abuse of the judge's discretion, therefore it was a waiver of this claim. Lastly, although the Rescue received donations from the public to help care for the animals, that did not entitle Mahan to an offset. Restitution is meant to make the victims whole again and also to make the defendant pay for the expense caused by their criminal conduct. | Case |
| VT - Lost dog - Article 2. Killing Unlicensed Dogs; Subchapter 5. Control of Rabies | 20 V.S.A. § 3621 - 3626; 20 V.S.A. § 3806 - 3809 | VT ST T. 20 § 3621 - 3626; VT ST T. 20 § 3806 - 3809 | These Vermont statute provide the law for seizure, confinement of, and destruction of dogs and domestic wolf-hybrids. It also includes a warrant form necessary for local authorities to seize and impound an offending dog or wolf-hybrid. | Statute |
| People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium | 879 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2018) | 85 ERC 2299, 27 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 517, 2018 WL 385682 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2018) | PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed. | Case |
| OK - Leash - § 2217. Public access and use of state parks--Prohibitions (dog leash) | 74 Okl.St.Ann. § 2217 | OK ST T. 74 § 2217 | No person may enter a state park with a dog, unless the dog is on a leash, or permit any dog to enter a state park or recreation area under the jurisdiction of the Commission. It is further provided that any authorized member of the Department or any authorized employee of the Oklahoma Department of Wildlife Conservation may kill any vicious dog found running loose in any state park which poses imminent threat to humans or other animals, or which may be chasing or running any game in the state park. Any such authorized employees of the Departments shall not be held liable for the killing of said dog. | Statute |