Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What to Expect When Adopting a Dog |
What to Expect When Adopting a Dog, Diane Rose-Solomon, SOP3 Publishing (2016).
|
Policy | ||
| LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. WATSON | 208 Ala. 319 (1922) | 94 So. 551 (Ala., 1922) |
On November 2, 1920, on a “moonlit night”, plaintiff was fox hunting by a railroad track when his dog was hit by the train. Plaintiff claimed that defendant’s employee negligently ran over his dog while acting within the scope of his duties as an operator of the train. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a jury award of $50, and held that it was proper for the plaintiff to show the excellent hunting qualities displayed by this dog to determine its market value. |
Case |
| MI - Research - Chapter 333. Health. Public Health Code. | M.C.L.A. 333.2671 - 2678 | MI ST 333.2671 - 2678 | This set of Michigan laws proclaims that "[t]he public health and welfare depend on the humane use of animals for the diagnosis and treatment of human and animal diseases." It also creates an animal research advisory board which may regulate and establish standards pursuant to section 2678 controlling the humane use of animals. Further, the department, its representative, or a member of the animal research advisory board may inspect any premises or property on or in which animals are kept for experimental purposes for the purpose of investigation of compliance with board standards. A person shall not keep or use animals for experimental purposes unless registered to do so by the department. | Statute |
| GA - Bite - § 51-2-6. Dogs, liability of owner or keeper for injuries to livestock | Ga. Code Ann., § 51-2-6 to 7 | GA ST § 51-2-6 to 7 | This Georgia statute represents the state's relevant dog bite strict liability law. While the law imposes strict liability for injury to a person, the dog (or other animal) must first be considered "vicious" or "dangerous," which can be as simple as showing the animal was required to be leashed per city ordinance. Second, the animal must be at large by the careless management of the owner. Finally, the person injured must not have provoked the animal into attacking him or her. | Statute |
| IN - Farriers - PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (LICENSING OF FARRIERS) RULES, 1965 | Licensing of Farriers Rules, 1965 | The Rules, drafted under Section 38(2) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, regulate farriers (persons who attach shoes to hooves of animals). It is mandatory for farriers to obtain a license. | Statute | |
| Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc'y et. al. v. USDA et. al. | 946 F.3d 615 (D.C. Cir. 2020) | Congress passed the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) in 1966 to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities, for exhibition purposes, or for use as pets were provided humane care and treatment. Initially the definition of the word “animal” excluded birds according to the USDA. In 2002, Congress amended the AWA to make it known that birds were to be protected as well. The USDA promised to publish a proposed rule for public comment once it determined how to best regulate birds and adopt appropriate standards. Eighteen years later, the USDA has yet to issue any standards regarding birds. The American Anti-Vivisection Society and the Avian Welfare Coalition sued to compel the USDA to either issue bird-specific standards or to apply its general standards to birds. These animal-rights groups argued that the USDA’s utter failure to promulgate any bird specific standards amounted to arbitrary and capricious agency action. Their second argument was that USDA unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed action. The district court dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim to which the animal-rights groups appealed. The Court of Appeals found that the AWA, when it was amended in 2002, required the USDA to issue standards governing the humane treatment, not of animals generally, but of animals as a defined category of creatures including birds not bred for use in research. The USDA failed to take “discrete action” issuing standards to protect birds that the AWA requires it to take. The Court ultimately affirmed the district court as to the arbitrary and capricious claim but reversed and remanded as to the unreasonable delay claim to determine whether the issuance of bird-specific standards has been unreasonably delayed. | Case | |
| Anderson v. Evans | 314 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) | 55 ERC 1481, 2 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 12,197, 2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,605 |
Concerned citizens and animal conservation groups brought an action against United States government, challenging the government's approval of quota for whale hunting by Makah Indian Tribe located in Washington state. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals held that the failure of the government to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement before approving a whale quota for the Makah Tribe violated National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The court also found that the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) applied to tribe's proposed whale hunt, as the proposed whale takings were not excluded by the treaty with the tribe. |
Case |
| Tuman v. VL GEM LLC | Slip Copy, 2017 WL 781486 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017) |
In this case, Tuman sued the owners of her apartment complex, VL GEM LLC and GEM Management Partners LLC, after the apartment complex refused to allow her to keep an emotional support dog in her apartment to help her deal with her post-traumatic stress disorder. Truman argued that she was discriminated against after she requested a “reasonable accommodation” for her disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The defendants argued that Truman failed to provide sufficient medical documentation of her need for the support dog and therefore were not liable for discrimination under the FHA. The court found that Truman was able to establish a disability under FHA by showing that her PTSD “causes her to have severe anxiety and difficulties with socialization.” The court held that this satisfied the requirement under the FHA that the disability must “substantially limit one or more major life activities.” Since Truman qualified as disabled under the FHA, the court turned to whether or not she had provided the apartment complex with sufficient documentation and notice. Ultimately, the court found that Truman had provided the apartment with sufficient documentation because she provided them with a note from her doctor stipulating that Truman needed an accommodation in order to cope with her disability. Lastly, the court found that the apartment complex knew of Truman’s disability and request for an accommodation and still refused to allow her to have a dog, which resulted in a violation under the FHA. As a result, the court found for Truman. |
Case | |
| Massa v. Department of Registration and Education | 507 N.E.2d 814 (Ill. 1987) | 116 Ill.2d 376 (1987) |
Dr. Massa sought judicial review of the gross malpractice finding and resulting license revocation in the circuit court after the circuit court reversed the Department's finding of gross malpractice as a conclusion against the manifest weight of the evidence. This finding arises from the death of plaintiff’s German Shepard, after Dr. Massa removed the dog’s healthy uterus and ovaries, while failing to treat the dog’s soon-to-be fatal thoracic condition. The Department's findings in this case could only be disturbed only upon Dr. Massa's showing that they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court held that the record in this case was plainly sufficient to support the Department's determination of gross malpractice in that Dr. Massa ignored the serious nature of Charlie's lung condition and proceeded to remove reproductive organs which, at least at the time of surgery, he knew or should have known to have been healthy. |
Case |
| Lira v. Greater Houston German Shepherd Dog Rescue, Inc. | 488 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016) | 2016 WL 1267745 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016) |
In this case, plaintiff’s family dog, a German Shepherd named Monte, ran away and was rescued by Greater Houston German Shepherd Dog Rescue (GHGSDR). The organization refused to return the dog to plaintiff, so plaintiff filed suit against GHGSDR. The court found that there is no common law that states that a dog owner loses property rights to its dog if it runs away and is found by someone else. The court also looked to whether or not there was a city ordinance that would determine the proper ownership of the dog. Ultimately, the court found that the city ordinance regarding stray dogs did not strip the plaintiff of ownership rights because the dog had run away. The court also held that if there were any doubts as to the meaning of the ordinance, it should always be read “against a forfeiture of property.” The Supreme Court of Texas reversed judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment reinstating the trial court's judgment that Monte belonged to the Liras and the court properly enjoined GHGSDR to return him to his owners. |
Case |
