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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Stamm v. New York City Transit Authority Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 2011 WL 1315935 (E.D.N.Y., 2011) Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and New York State and New York City laws, alleging that the New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”) and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (“MaBSTOA”) (collectively, “Defendants”) failed to ensure that their vehicles and facilities were accessible to her and other persons with disabilities who utilize service animals. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff (1) was not disabled, (2) was not entitled to use a “service animal,” (3) was seeking to bring dogs which do not qualify as “service animals” onto Defendants' vehicles; had not made out a Title II claim and (5) could not make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted only with respect to that portion of the eleventh cause of action that alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties were also directed to submit supplemental briefing. Case
Hoffmann v. Marion County, Tex. 592 F. App'x 256 (5th Cir. 2014) 2014 WL 6306580 Plaintiffs operated a derelict-animal “sanctuary” on their ten-acre property in Marion County, Texas, where they held over one hundred exotic animals, including six tigers, several leopards, and a puma. Plaintiffs were arrested and charged with animal cruelty and forfeited the animals. Afterward, plaintiffs sued many of those involved in the events under a cornucopia of legal theories, all of which the district court eventually rejected. On appeal, plaintiffs argued Marion County and the individual defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by illegally searching their property and seizing the animals. The court held, however, that government officials may enter the open fields without a warrant, as the defendants did here, because “an open field is neither a house nor an effect, and, therefore, the government's intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those unreasonable searches proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment.” One plaintiff further alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; however, the court dismissed this claim because the plaintiff failed to allege how he was excluded from a government benefit or effective service as a result of not having an interpreter during the investigation or arrest. The other claims were either dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, not being properly appealed, or not stating a proper cause of action. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was therefore affirmed. Case
CA - Horse docking - § 597q. Docked horses; unregistered; prima facie evidence West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597q CA PENAL § 597q

This statute provides that driving, working, keeping, racing or using any unregistered docked horse 60 days after the passage of this act is prima facie evidence of the fact that the party engaged in such activity docked the tail of such horse.

Statute
United States v. Hughes 626 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980)

The defendant had adopted 109 wild horses through the federal Adopt-a-Horse program, whereby excess wild horses were adopted out to private individuals under the stipulation that the horses would be treated humanely and not used for commercial purposes.  The defendant was charged under the criminal provisions of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act and with conversion of government property after he sold a number of the adopted horses to slaughter.  At trial, the defendant argued that he could not be found guilty of conversion because the federal government did not have a property interest in the horses, as the power to regulate wild horses on public lands does not equate to an ownership interest in the horses by the federal government.  The court held that, regardless of whether the WFRHBA intended to create an ownership interest in wild horses, the government has a property interest in wild horses that it has captured, corralled, and loaned out.  

Case
In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation 627 F.Supp.2d 16 (D.D.C.,2009) 2009 WL 1750413 (D.D.C.)

Plaintiffs Safari Club International and Safari Club International Foundation brought this action under the APA challenging the FWS's legal determination that the listing of the Polar Bear as "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act was a final agency action. At issue here is defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the grounds that plaintiffs fail to challenge a final agency action as required for judicial review under the APA. Alternatively, defendants argue that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. This Court found that the action challenged by SCI and SCIF is final agency action for purposes of judicial review pursuant to the APA. On the issue of standing, defendants argue that plaintiffs' suit must be dismissed for lack of standing because plaintiffs have not alleged facts to establish that they have suffered an injury-in-fact. The court disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that the “procedures in question” threaten a “concrete interest" - an interest in conservation that is impacted by the import ban. Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was denied.

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Animal Legal Defense Fund v. LT Napa Partners LLC, 234 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015), review filed (Apr. 16, 2015) 2015 WL 1004423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) Plaintiff and respondent Animal Legal Defense Fund filed an action against defendants and appellants LT Napa Partners LLC and Kenneth Frank for unfair competition, alleging defendants sold foie gras in their Napa restaurant in violation of California law. Defendants moved to strike plaintiff's claim pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing it was exercising its free speech rights by protesting the law. Defendants appealed the trial court's denial of the motion. The appeals court affirmed the lower court's decision because the ALDF demonstrated probability of prevailing on the claim that it had standing under Unfair Competition Law (UCL); showed basis for liability against chef; and showed probability of prevailing on its claim that owner and chef unlawfully sold foie gras. Case
Let the Animals Live Assiciation;et al. v. Israel Institute of Technology et al. No. 54789-12-11 (English version) After pressures from multiple animal rights organizations, an Israeli airline stopped flying monkeys to Israeli research institutions. Multiple Israeli research institutions then filed suit, asking the court to present the airline with a permanent order to fly animals as per their requests, including monkeys, for bio-medical research purposes. In the present case, the question to be decided was whether to allow several animal protection organizations to be added to the claim (whether the airline was bound to fly animals for experiments or not) as defendants or as amicus curiae. The court held that the animal protection organizations should be allowed to join the proceedings as defendants because they could bring before the court a more complete picture of the issue before it was decided; they filed their request at a very early stage; and they spoke and acted for the animals in the face of a verdict that might directly affect the legal rights of the animals. Case
AR - Ordinances - § 14-16-701. River and improvement district A.C.A. § 14-16-701 AR ST § 14-16-701

This Arkansas statute provides that, upon the written request of the governing body of a suburban improvement district (as defined by statute), a county may by ordinance control and regulate dogs and cats within all or any part of the suburban improvement district.  This statute does not elaborate on the confines of such ordinances, so it is assumed the subject matter is constrained only through preemption.

Statute
Vickers v. Egbert 359 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (Fla. 2005)

A commercial fisherman brought a claim against the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission alleging substantive due process violations.  The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission instituted licensing requirements and restrictions on lobster trapping certificates in order to alleviate an overpopulation of lobster traps.  The court held in favor of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, reasoning fishing was not a fundamental right.

Case
Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church 894 A.2d 329 (Conn.App., 2006) 94 Conn.App. 617, 2006 WL 797892 (Conn.App.)

The plaintiff, Virginia Auster, brought this action pursuant to General Statutes § 22-357FN1 to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the dog of an employee of the defendant, Norwalk United Methodist Church.  Ms. Auster was a visitor who was on the premises to attend a meeting in the parish house when she was bitten by dog of church employee, who lived in an apartment in the parish house.  After a jury trial, the verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.  (See summary judgment appeal, 2004 WL 423189).  The Appellate Court held that church was not a “keeper” of the church employee's dog for purposes of statute which imposed strict liability on the keeper of any dog that did damage to the body or property of any person.  The court reversed the judgment and remanded the action for a new trial on the issue of common-law negligence

Case

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