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Displaying 81 - 90 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Article 70 of CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley | 49 Misc. 3d 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 4612340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2015) | Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 and under the common law for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees in the custody of respondent State University of New York at Stony Brook. It sought an order directing respondents to demonstrate the basis for detaining Hercules and Leo, and an order directing their release and transfer to a sanctuary in Florida. Respondents opposed the petition and cross moved to change venue. While the Supreme Court of New York County found that neither CPLR 7002(b)(3) nor CPLR 7004(c) required a change of venue to Suffolk County; that the petitioner had standing to bring the case; and that prior proceedings did not bar this case from being heard, the substance of the petition required a finding as to whether a chimpanzee was a legal person entitled to bring a writ of habeas corpus. Since the Court found it was bound by the Third Department in People ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, which ruled that chimpanzees were not “legal persons” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by a writ of habeas corpus, it denied the habeas corpus petition and dismissed the proceeding. | Case |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell | 2014 WL 4714847 (D.D.C. 2014) (unpublished) | 2014 WL 4714847 (D.D.C. 2014) | In 2012, a rule transferred management of the gray wolf in Wyoming from federal control to state control. In the present case, plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, Fund for Animals, Humane Society of the United States, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Sierra Club, challenged the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to remove the gray wolf from the endangered species list in Wyoming. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and maintained that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because Wyoming's regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to protect the species, the level of genetic exchange shown in the record did not warrant delisting, and the gray wolf was endangered within a significant portion of its range. Given the level of genetic exchange reflected in the record, the Court decided not to disturb the finding that the species had recovered, and it would not overturn the agency's determination that the species was not endangered or threatened within a significant portion of its range. However, the Court concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Service to rely on the state's nonbinding promises to maintain a particular number of wolves when the availability of that specific numerical buffer was such a critical aspect of the delisting decision. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, denied it in part, and remanded the matter back to the agency. | Case |
| GA - Assistance Animal - Georgia's Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | Ga. Code Ann., § 30-4-2 to 4; Ga. Code Ann., § 40-6-94; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-12-120; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-11-107.1 | GA ST § 30-4-2 to 4; GA ST § 40-6-94; GA ST § 16-12-120; GA ST § 16-11-107.1 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |
| Labor Commission, Antidiscrimination and Labor Division v. FCS Community Management | --- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 1203693 (Utah App., 2024) | 2024 UT App 39 | This is an appeal of a complaint filed by the Utah Anti-discrimination and Labor Division (ULAD) seeking review of the determination that an HOA violated members' request for reasonable accommodation by denying homeowner's the ability to keep chickens on their property. The chickens were intended to be assistance animals for the homeowner's daughter, who has anxiety and PTSD. The district court found that the HOA constructively denied the homeowner's request for reasonable accommodation by delaying their response to the request for three months. This court reversed the decision of the lower court, finding that there was no constructive denial of the request since the HOA allowed the homeowners to keep the chickens during the interim period, did not punish them for keeping the chickens, and ultimately granted the request to keep the chickens. | Case |
| Colombia - Cruelty - Ley 1801 de 2016 | Ley 1801 de 2016 | Ley 1801 of 2016, or “National Code of Safety and Citizen Coexistence.” Title XIII is titled “of the relationship with animals.” chapter one talks about the respect and care owed to animals, prohibiting behaviors that negatively affect animals, such as the promotion, participation, or sponsorship of betting activities involving animals; the sale of domestic animals on public roads; the wandering of animals on the streets; and the use of captive animals as shooting targets. Chapter II “Domestic animals or pets,” establishes that only species authorized by the law can be kept as pets. The ownership of wild animals as pets is prohibited. Services animals accompanying their owners are always allowed in public spaces. Dog fighting is prohibited in the entire territory. Chapter IV regulates the management and ownership of potentially dangerous dogs, tort liability, the registry of potentially dangerous dogs. | Statute | |
| CA - Crimes - § 597y. Violations; methods of killing; penalty | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597y | CA PENAL § 597y | A violation of Section 597u [Animals; prohibited killing methods] or 597v [Newborn dog or cat; methods of killing] is a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| ND - Initiatives - Prevention of Animal Cruelty Initiative, Measure 5 | Initiative, Measure 5 (2012) | This initiated statutory measure would create section 36-21.1-02.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. This measure would make it a class C felony for an individual to maliciously and intentionally harm a living dog, cat or horse and provide a court with certain sentencing options. The measure would not apply to production agriculture, or to lawful activities of hunters and trappers, licensed veterinarians, scientific researchers, or to individuals engaged in lawful defense of life or property. It failed at the polls in 2012 (34.6% yes). | Statute | |
| DC - Animal Control - Subchapter III. Release of Animals. | DC CODE § 8-1831.01 | DC ST § 8-1831.01 | This D.C. law states that no animal shall be released from custody of animal protection except for the purposes of adoption, redemption by the owner of the animal, or other suitable placement in the best interest of the animal. No animals shall be knowingly released from any entity charged with animal protection for the purposes of research, experimentation, testing, or medical instruction or demonstration. Violation is a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Hines v. Pardue | --- F.Supp.3d -------, 2023 WL 5254673 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2023) | 2023 WL 5254673 (S.D.Tex., 2023) | Plaintiff and veterinarian Ronald S. Hines brings this action to challenge a Texas law that mandates a veterinarian conduct a physical examination of an animal before practicing veterinary medicine on the grounds that the law violates his First Amendment right to free speech. Plaintiff, who was unable to maintain a veterinary practice in person due to medical issues, began providing veterinary advice to animal owners via a website without first examining their animals. Plaintiff was disciplined by the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners for doing this, and was fined $500 and sentenced to a year of probation. Plaintiff then sued the members of the Board on two separate occasions, with the second appeal being remanded by the Fifth Circuit with instructions to determine whether the requirement for a physical examination before issuing veterinary advice regulates speech incidentally to the regulation of non-expressive professional conduct, or is a regulation of non-expressive conduct. Here, the district court first examined multiple instances of plaintiff providing veterinary advice to animal owners via the internet. Next, the court asserts that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims against the board. Lastly, the court examines plaintiff’s First Amendment argument. Plaintiff argues that his email exchanges with animal owners constitutes speech, and the court agrees that this is speech and that the Examination Requirement regulates this speech. However, the court finds that this regulation of plaintiff’s speech is content neutral, because the requirement for a physical examination of the animals before issuing advice applies neutrally to all forms of veterinary care and veterinary speech regardless of content. Therefore, the court held that defendants may enforce the Examination Requirement without violating plaintiff’s free speech rights. | Case |
| Ass'n des Éleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Bonta | 33 F.4th 1107 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Ass'n des Éleveurs de Cananards et D'oies du Quebec v. Bonta, 143 S. Ct. 2493, 216 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2023) | California prohibits the in-state sale of products that are “the result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird's liver beyond normal size.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25982. The law had a 7.5-year grace period before it went into effect. The law has two components: first, it bans the practice of force-feeding ducks and geese to produce foie gras; and second, the law banned the in-state sale of products that are "the result" of that practice. After nine years of litigation and in their third set of appeals before this Court, the parties ask the court here to decide whether California's sales ban is preempted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”) or violates the dormant Commerce Clause. As to the first issue of preemption, the plaintiff sellers contend that at least one USDA Policy Book defines foie gras as liver from poultry that has been "specially fed and fattened" and other USDA documents suggest this is done via forced-feeding. Thus, contend the sellers, it is impossible to produce and properly label foie gras, as is required by the PPIA, and then also comply with the California law. The court disagreed with the assertion, finding that the sellers can still force feed birds to make their products, but not sell those in California. Said the court, "The sales ban is neither a command to market non-force-fed products as foie gras nor to call force-fed products something different." Further, the sellers raise a new suggestion that the ban constitutes express preemption because force feeding operates as an "ingredient requirement." Essentially, they contend you cannot have foie gras without force-feeding birds. This was also rejected, as the court found nothing new that would reverse the precedent established in the prior decision by the court. Finally, the sellers appeal dismissal of their dormant Commerce Clause claim, arguing that the sales ban is impermissibly extraterritorial because force-feeding is only banned in California and therefore, only regulates out-of-state conduct. The court dismissed this, noting states are free to regulate commerce within their boundaries provided such regulation does not affect transactions from out of that state. Moreover, the sellers' argument that the ban is "unduly burdensome" for this reason also failed since there is not requirement that a state impose the "least burdensome" method for in-state commerce. The court held that the sales ban is neither preempted nor unconstitutional and that the specified transactions are out-of-state sales permitted by California law. | Case |