Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Wahchumwah | 704 F.3d 606 (C.A.9 (Wash.)) | 2012 WL 5951624 (C.A.9 (Wash.)) |
After a government agent recorded a sale of eagle parts using a concealed audio visual device, the agent obtained a warrant and arrested the defendant for violating the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. Upon appeal, the defendant challenged his jury conviction arguing two Constitutional violations, a Federal Rules of Evidence violation, and multiplicitous counts. The appeals court affirmed the jury conviction on all claims except the multiplicitous counts claim; this conviction was reversed. This opinion was Amended and Superseded on Denial of Rehearing by U.S. v. Wahchumwah , 710 F.3d 862 (9th Cir., 2012). |
Case |
| The South African Predator Breeders Association v. The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism | South African Predator Breeders Association and Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (1900/2007) [2009] ZAFSHC 68 (11 June 2009) | This application is about the validity of regulations designed to regulate the hunting of lions that were bred in captivity. | Case | |
| Harby v. Harby | 331 So. 3d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) | This Florida case involves an appeal of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. With respect to animal law, the wife appealed the trial court's distribution of family dogs, Liberty and Nico, to the former husband. According to testimony, the dogs were bonded to each other. The former wife testified that the family adopted Liberty "to be an emotional support dog" and was her constant companion. The former wife testified that she cared for the dogs when they were adopted in 2013 and 2014 until the parties separated in 2017. Since that separation, the dogs have been in the husband's possession and care. The trial court determined that the dogs were marital property and that the wife appeared to be in good health with no physical or mental disabilities. Further, both parties agreed the dogs should not be separated from each other and the court found the dogs had been in the husband's possession since the parties separated. On appeal, the wife argues that the trial court's distribution of the family dogs to Former Husband was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the record. In particular, the wife contends that one of the dogs is her emotional support animal and former husband expressed no desire or claim for the dogs in testimony. The court first observed that Florida is not one of the handful of states with statutes that give pets a special property status in distribution of marital assets. Instead, animals are considered personal property. Here, the court found both parties have cared for the dogs at times and the husband cared for them after the parties separated in 2017. And, while the court found that Liberty was "emotionally comforting," there was no evidence that the former wife had a disability and that Liberty provided emotional support to alleviate an effect of such disability. Thus, the role Liberty played was to provide comfort and companionship like most household pets. Since the trial court also considered each party's sentimental interest in the pets, including the children's attachment since they resided primarily with the former husband, there was no showing that the court abused its discretion in awarding the dogs to former husband. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion by awarding the family dogs to the former husband. | Case | |
| OH - Falconry - Chapter 1533. Hunting; Fishing. Falconry. | R.C. § 1533.05, 1533.051 | OH ST § 1533.05, 1533.051 | This Ohio statute regulates falconry in the state. It specifically excludes bald eagles from the listed species of raptors for use in falconry. | Statute |
| In re: DELTA AIR LINES, INC. | 53 Agric. Dec. 1076 (1994) | 1994 WL 657125 (U.S.D.A.) | The Judicial Officer affirmed the Decision by Chief Judge Palmer (Chief ALJ) assessing civil penalties of $140,000, with $60,000 held in abeyance for 1 year, for transporting 108 dogs and cats in a cargo space that was without sufficient air, causing the death of 32 dogs. The Order also directs Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Act, regulations and standards, and, in particular, to cease and desist from failing to ensure that dogs and cats have a supply of air sufficient for normal breathing. On appeal, the court held that when regulated entity fails to comply with Act, regulations or standards, there is separate violation for each animal consequently harmed or placed in danger. | Case |
| MI - Cruelty - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. The Michigan Penal Code. | M.C.L.A. 750.50b | MI ST 750.50b | This is the felony animal cruelty law in Michigan. Under the law, a person is guilty of killing or torturing animals if they: (a) knowingly kill, torture, mutilate, maim, or disfigure an animal; (b) commit a reckless act knowing or having reason to know that the act will cause an animal to be killed, tortured, mutilated, maimed, or disfigured; (c) knowingly administer poison to an animal, or knowingly expose an animal to any poisonous substance, with the intent that the substance be taken or swallowed by the animal; or (d) violate or threaten to violate subdivision (a) or (c) with the intent to cause mental suffering or distress to a person or to exert control over a person. Whether the offense becomes a first, second, or third degree felony depends on listed factors, including whether the animal is a companion animal (as defined in the law). A first degree felony conviction results in imprisonment up to 10 years, a fine of not more than $5,000, and/or community service for not more than 500 hours. As a part of the sentence, the court may order the defendant to pay the costs of the prosecution and the costs of the care, housing, and veterinary medical care for the animal victim, and the court may order the defendant to not own or possess an animal for ANY period of time including permanent relinquishment. Lawful killing of animals including fishing, hunting, pest control, and scientific research are excluded. | Statute |
| Prior Cases of the Month 2010 to 2016 | This document contains cases of the month from 2010 - 2016. | Policy | ||
| Casebook Update |
Updated material for David Favre, Animal Law, 3rd edition (2019) |
Basic page | ||
| NE - Wildlife - Article 2. Game Law General Provisions | Neb. Rev. St. § 37-201 to 248 | NE ST § 37-201 to 248 | These statutes comprise the definitional section of Nebraska's wildlife code. Among the definitions include game, aquaculture, wildlife, hunt, and take. | Statute |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton | 239 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2002) |
Plaintiffs, twelve conservation organizations and one individual involved in Lynx conservation efforts, challenge a final decision by the USFWS declaring the Lynx in the contiguous United States to be a "threatened," rather than "endangered," species under the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that the designation of the Lynx as threatened is "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," in violation of § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Service has violated the ESA by failing to designate "critical habitat" for the Lynx as required by that statute. The Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the FWS's conclusion that, "[c]ollectively, the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Southern Rockies do not constitute a significant portion of the range of the DPS," (three of the Lynx's four regions) were collectively not a significant portion of its range was counterintuitive and contrary to the plain meaning of the ESA phrase "significant portion of its range." With regard to the FWS's failure to designate critical habitat, the excessive delays experienced by the FWS ran completely counter to the mandate of the ESA and were without proper justification. |
Case |