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| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Canada Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 | TS 628 | Per Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: This 1916 treaty adopted a uniform system of protection for certain species of birds which migrate between the United States and Canada, in order to assure the preservation of species either harmless or beneficial to man. Sets certain dates for closed seasons on migratory birds. Prohibits hunting insectivorous birds, but allows killing of birds under permit when injurious to agriculture. The Convention was signed at Washington, D.C., on August 16, 1916, and ratified by the United States on September 1, 1916, and by Great Britain on October 20, 1916. Documents of ratification were exchanged on December 7, 1916. Implementing legislation for the United States was accomplished by enactment of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918 (16 USC 703-711; 40 Stat. 755). Canada and the United States signed an agreement on January 30, 1979, to amend the treaty to allow subsistence hunting of waterfowl outside of the normal hunting season, but it was never ratified by the Senate and never took effect. The treaty was amended in 1995 to establish a legal framework for the subsistence take of birds in Alaska and northern Canada by Alaska Natives and Aboriginal people in Canada. The Senate provided its advice and consent to the amendments in November, 1997. The treaty was formally implemented in 1999. | Treaty | ||
| CT - Horse - § 22-415. Inhumane transportation of equines. Penalty. Regulations | C.G.S.A. § 22-415 | CT ST § 22-415 | This Connecticut law makes it unlawful to carry any equine in an unnecessarily cruel or inhumane manner, or in a way and manner which might endanger the equine or knowingly and wilfully authorizes or permits such equine to be subjected to unnecessary torture, suffering or cruelty of any kind. Violation results in a fine of not less than one hundred dollars or more than five hundred dollars. [Also see the administrative regulations at https://www.animallaw.info/administrative/connecticut-equines-transportation-equines]. | Statute | |
| Beasley v. Sorsaia | 880 S.E.2d 875 (2022) | 247 W.Va. 409 (W.Va., 2022) | Petitioner was charged with animal cruelty in West Virginia. The incident stemmed from 2020 where humane officers in Putnam County seized several horses and a donkey that were denied “basic animal husbandry and adequate nutrition[.]” After the seizure, petitioner claimed the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the case because farm animals are excluded under the Code. That motion was granted by the magistrate and the animals were returned to the petitioner. After a short period of time, petitioner was charged with six counts of criminal animal cruelty and again the magistrate dismissed the complaint. However, the magistrate stayed the dismissal on the State's motion so that the circuit court could determine whether § 61-8-19(f) excludes livestock. The circuit court agreed that the section encompasses livestock from inhumane treatment and the magistrate was prohibited from dismissing the complaint. Petitioner now appeals that decision here. This court first examined the anti-cruelty statute finding that the structure of the exception under subsection (f) refers back to the conditional phrase that ends in "standards" for keeping the listed categories of animals. The court disagreed with the petitioner's claim of a "blanket exclusion" for livestock since the Commissioner of Agriculture has promulgated rules that govern the care of livestock animals that includes equines. The court rejected petitioner's attempt to parse the placement of clauses and antecedents to support her claim. The court held that § 61-8-19(f) establishes an exclusion for farm livestock only when they are “kept and maintained according to usual and accepted standards of livestock ... production and management." The circuit court's writ of prohibition was affirmed and the matter was remanded. | Case | |
| MO - Liberty - Breed - Sec. 4-24. - Keeping of pit bull dogs prohibited. | LIBERTY, MO., CITY CODE §§ 4-24 - 4-25 (2010) |
In Liberty, Missouri, it is be unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog, with exceptions for pit bull dogs already residing in the city. Such dogs may remain as long as the owner complies with certain requirements, such as proper registration, proper confinement, the use of a leash and muzzle, the posting of "Beware of Dog-Pit Bull," keeping $50,000 liability insurance, and taking identification photographs. Any dog found to be the subject of a violation may be subject to seizure and impoundment. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Faulkner v. Watt | 661 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1981) |
Reaffirms that purpose of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) is to stabilize the livestock industry and protect the rights of sheep and cattle growers from interference and that the Secretary of the Interior may reasonably classify lands under the TGA as suitable for agriculture. |
Case | ||
| Test Map | Other jurisdictions can be added here in the summary or ... | State map | |||
| Susan, Russell and Mary Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Department of Animal Regulation | In this petition for a rehearing, respondents argued that the appellate court's decision (Phillips v. Department, 183 Cal.App.3d 372 (1986)) misstates crucial facts concerning the operation of the subject ordinance; that hearings required under the Atascadero ordinances apply to all dogs, not just strays; and that the appellate court may have been misled in its decision to conclude that no notice had been required. | Pleading | |||
| Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue, Inc v. Bengal | 2011 WL 4867541 (C.A.3 (Pa.),2011) |
Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue rescued three dogs from North Carolina and had them delivered to Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement seized them and turned them over to Appellants PSPCA. The District Court ordered Appellants to return the dogs to Sixth Angel based on a state law conversion claim. The motion was affirmed because PSPCA deprived Sixth Angel of its unique property. Returning the dogs to their owner served the public interest by settling property rights and allowing Sixth Angel to fulfill its mission of finding homes for the dogs. |
Case | ||
| IN - Cruelty - Section 429 Indian Penal Code 1860 | 45 of 1860 | Killing, poisoning, maiming, or 'rendering useless' cattle, including elephants, or any other animal worth over fifty rupees, is a criminal offence. | Statute | ||
| Moore v. Knower | 214 So.3d 165 (La.App. 4 Cir., 2017) | 2016-0776 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/23/17) | Bruce Moore and Amy Knower were in a relationship and decided to adopt a dog together. Bruce alleged that they both jointly adopted Abby, a Boston Terrier in 2010. The couple jointly shared expenses for the care and management of the dog. After the parties broke up, they agreed to an arrangement in which each party alternated possession of Abby every week. The parties continued this arrangement even during their brief reconciliation up until July of 2015 when Amy Knower refused to exchange the dog with Bruce Moore. Moore filed suit and the trial court found for him and awarded him the use and management of Abby. Knower alleged that she was the sole owner of Abby. Knower appealed, alleging five assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in finding that she failed to support her claim of full ownership; (2) the trial court erred in finding that she co-owned Abby with Moore; (3) the trial court erred in failing to accept the testimony of Sheila Ford of the Mississippi Boston Terrier Rescue; (4) the trial court erred by stating that there was no basis in law for her to decide the custody of a dog and then doing just that; (5) the trial court erred by exercising jurisdiction over the matter. The Court determined that the trial court did in fact have jurisdiction over the matter. The Court did not find any errors in the trial court’s findings. It concluded that Abby was indeed co-owned by Moore and Knower and ultimately held that Knower had no right to unilaterally end the arrangement. Knower did not supply sufficient proof to support her claim of full ownership. Moore was awarded Abby and the right to solely determine use and management of the dog. | Case |