Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SD - Vehicle - SDCL § 41-1-12. Euthanasia of animal injured in motor vehicle accident | SDCL § 41-1-12 - 13 | SD ST § 41-1-12 - 13 | Any person who has seriously injured a wildlife animal or who comes upon a wildlife animal that has been seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident may euthanize the animal if that person has the means, skill, and will to euthanize humanely. | Statute |
| State v. Newcomb | 359 Or 756 (2016) | In this case, the Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed a case in which defendant accused the State of violating her constitutional rights by taking a blood sample of her dog without a warrant to do so. Ultimately, the court held that the defendant did not have a protected privacy interest in the dog’s blood and therefore the state did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights. Defendant’s dog, Juno, was seized by the Humane Society after a worker made a visit to plaintiff’s home and had probable cause to believe that Juno was emaciated from not receiving food from plaintiff. After Juno was seized and taken into custody for care, the veterinarian took a blood sample from Juno to confirm that there was no other medical reason as to why Juno was emaciated. Defendant argued that this blood test was a violation of her constitutional rights because the veterinarian did not have a warrant to perform the test. The court dismissed this argument and held that once Juno was taken into custody, defendant had “lost her rights of dominion and control over Juno, at least on a temporary basis.” Finally, the court held that because Juno was lawfully seized and Juno’s blood was “not ‘information’ that defendant placed in Juno for safekeeping or to conceal from view,” defendant’s constitutional rights had not been violated. | Case | |
| NM - Invasive Species - Chapter 17. Game and Fish and Outdoor Recreation. | NMSA 1978, § 17-4-35 | NM ST § 17-4-35 | These New Mexico statutes pertain to controlling aquatic invasive species. If a conveyance or equipment has been in an infested water body, the owner must decontaminate it or have it inspected and certified prior to entering another water body in the state. Law enforcement officers must take action to prevent infested equipment from entering water bodies, and may impound equipment if the person transporting it refuses to submit to an inspection and the officer has reason to believe that an aquatic invasive species may be present. | Statute |
| MD - Pet Trust - §Title 14. Trusts. | MD Code, Estates and Trusts, § 14.5-407 | MD EST & TRST § 14.5-407 | Maryland enacted its original "pet trust" law in 2009. The law was then repealed and reenacted in 2015 under a different section. Under the law, a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the lifetime of the settlor. The trust terminates when the last animal subject to the trust dies. The property of the trust may only be used for the intended purpose of the trust (e.g., taking care of the animal). | Statute |
| Woods v. KittyKind, Inc. | 2005 WL 1404712 (N.Y.Sup.,2005 (not reported)) | 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 50911(U); 801 N.Y.S.2d 782 (table only) |
The court granted the plaintiff's motion for an animal shelter to disclose the identity of her lost cat's adopter because the plaintiff alleged that the shelter did not comply with the law and its transfer of ownership was therefore invalid. |
Case |
| State v. Meerdink | 837 N.W.2d 681 (Table) (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) | 2013 WL 3457628 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) |
After defendant/appellant took a baseball to the head of and consequently killed a 7-month-old puppy, the Iowa District Court of Scott County found defendant/appellant guilty of animal torture under Iowa Code section 717B.3A (1). Defendant/appellant appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the evidence shown was insufficient to support a finding he acted “with a depraved or sadistic intent,” as stated by Iowa statute. The appeals court agreed and reversed and remanded the case back to district court for dismissal. Judge Vaitheswaran authored a dissenting opinion. |
Case |
| Hawthorn Corp. v. U.S. | 98 F.Supp.3d 1226 (M.D. Fla., 2015) | 2015 WL 1346473 (M.D. Fla., 2015) | Plaintiff's complaint was based on government employees’ duty to exercise reasonable care in the execution of their official duties. Government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found the action was barred by three exceptions to the Federal Torts Claims Act: the misrepresentation exception, the discretionary exception, and the interference with contracts exception. Government motion was granted. | Case |
| MT - Hunting - Chapter 3. Restrictions and Regulations | MCA 87-6-215 | MT ST 87-6-215 (formerly MT ST 87-3-142) | This law represents Montana's hunter harassment law. Under the law, a person may not intentionally interfere with the lawful taking of a wild animal or fishing by another, which includes disturbing a wild animal by engaging in actions or the placement of objects/substances to prevent its taking. This section does not prohibit a landowner or lessee from taking reasonable measures to prevent imminent danger to domestic livestock and equipment. | Statute |
| IL - Disaster - Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act. 3305/4. Definitions. | 20 I.L.C.S. 3305/4 | IL ST CH 20 § 3305/4 | The Illinois' Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act defines Emergency Operations Plan as the written plan of the State and political subdivisions describing the organization, mission, and functions of the government and supporting services for responding to and recovering from disasters and shall include plans that take into account the needs of those individuals with household pets and service animals following a major disaster or emergency. | Statute |
| People v Beam | 624 N.W.2d 764 (Mich. 2000) | 244 Mich. App. 103 (2000) |
Defendant argues on appeal that his conviction under MCL 750.49, which punishes the owner of a dog trained or used for fighting that causes the death of a person, must be reversed because the statute is unconstitutionally vague; specifically, that the terms "trained or used for fighting," "without provocation," and "owner" are vague. The court disagreed and held that the statute is sufficiently clear and gives the defendant fair notice of the offense. |
Case |