Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stout v. U.S. Forest Service | 2011 WL 867775 (2011) |
Plaintiff ranch owners grazed cattle within the Murderer's Creek Wild Horse Territory (WHT), an area in which the threatened Middle Columbia River steelhead was present. The Forest Service approved a wild horse management plan in the area, but failed to prepare a Biological Assessment (BA) to determine whether the plan was likely to affect the threatened species, and whether formal consultation with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) was necessary. The Forest Service’s failure to comply with section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) was arbitrary and capricious, and was ordered to consult with NMFS on its plan. |
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| KS - Pet Trusts - Chapter 58A. Kansas Uniform Trust Code. | K. S. A. 58a-408 | KS ST 58a-408 | This Kansas statute provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime (note that it does not state "domestic" or "pet" animal). The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its intended use, except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for the intended use. | Statute |
| CO - Pet Shop - Article 80. Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act | C. R. S. A. § 35-80-101 - 117 | CO ST § 35-80-101 to 117 | This Colorado Act regulates pet animal facilities (i.e., shelters, large kennels, and breeders). The Act covers licensing of the facilities and those activities deemed unlawful, such as selling a kitten or puppy under the age of 8 weeks and refusing a lawful inspection. | Statute |
| Article 70 of CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley | 49 Misc. 3d 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 4612340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2015) | Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 and under the common law for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees in the custody of respondent State University of New York at Stony Brook. It sought an order directing respondents to demonstrate the basis for detaining Hercules and Leo, and an order directing their release and transfer to a sanctuary in Florida. Respondents opposed the petition and cross moved to change venue. While the Supreme Court of New York County found that neither CPLR 7002(b)(3) nor CPLR 7004(c) required a change of venue to Suffolk County; that the petitioner had standing to bring the case; and that prior proceedings did not bar this case from being heard, the substance of the petition required a finding as to whether a chimpanzee was a legal person entitled to bring a writ of habeas corpus. Since the Court found it was bound by the Third Department in People ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, which ruled that chimpanzees were not “legal persons” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by a writ of habeas corpus, it denied the habeas corpus petition and dismissed the proceeding. | Case |
| Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co. | 50 F.3d 781 (C.A.9 (Or.),1995) | 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,706 (1995) |
In this case, an environmental group filed a citizen suit under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) seeking an injunction to prevent modification of the habitat of a pair of spotted owls by defendant-logging company. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon entered summary judgment for the logging company. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Court found the issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly interpreted the ESA to foreclose citizen suits that only allege a future injury to a protected species. The Court held that the ESA's language, purpose, and structure authorize citizens to seek an injunction against an imminent threat of harm to a protected species. The proposed clear-cutting logging activity was imminent and reasonably certain to injure the owl pair by significantly impairing their essential behavioral patterns.
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| Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell | 2014 WL 4714847 (D.D.C. 2014) (unpublished) | 2014 WL 4714847 (D.D.C. 2014) | In 2012, a rule transferred management of the gray wolf in Wyoming from federal control to state control. In the present case, plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, Fund for Animals, Humane Society of the United States, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Sierra Club, challenged the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to remove the gray wolf from the endangered species list in Wyoming. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and maintained that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because Wyoming's regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to protect the species, the level of genetic exchange shown in the record did not warrant delisting, and the gray wolf was endangered within a significant portion of its range. Given the level of genetic exchange reflected in the record, the Court decided not to disturb the finding that the species had recovered, and it would not overturn the agency's determination that the species was not endangered or threatened within a significant portion of its range. However, the Court concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Service to rely on the state's nonbinding promises to maintain a particular number of wolves when the availability of that specific numerical buffer was such a critical aspect of the delisting decision. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, denied it in part, and remanded the matter back to the agency. | Case |
| Humane Society of U.S. v. Johanns | Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1120404 (D.D.C.) |
In this case, plaintiffs alleged that by creating a fee-for-service ante-mortem horse slaughter inspection system without first conducting any environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), has violated NEPA and the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ's) implementing regulations, abused its discretion, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). At the time Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, horses were slaughtered at three different foreign-owned facilities in the United States to provide horse meat for human consumption abroad and for use in zoos and research facilities domestically. The instant case pertains to the web of legislation and regulations pertaining to the inspection of such horses prior to slaughter. Based on the Court's finding of a NEPA violation, the Court declared the Interim Final Rule to be in violation of the APA and NEPA, vacated the Interim Final Rule, permanently enjoined the FSIS from implementing the Interim Final Rule, and dismissed this case. This present action is defendant-intervenor Cavel International, Inc's Emergency Motion for a Stay of the Court's March 28, 2007 Order. The Court notes that as of the Court's March 28, 2007 Order, Cavel was the only facility still in operation processing horsemeat for human consumption. The Court finds that a stay of its March 28, 2007 Order would not be in the public interest, and particularly in light of Cavel's failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and adequately demonstrate irreparable injury, the Court finds that a balancing of the factors enumerated above supports denying Cavel's request for a stay. |
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| GA - Assistance Animal - Georgia's Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | Ga. Code Ann., § 30-4-2 to 4; Ga. Code Ann., § 40-6-94; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-12-120; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-11-107.1 | GA ST § 30-4-2 to 4; GA ST § 40-6-94; GA ST § 16-12-120; GA ST § 16-11-107.1 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |
| CA - Hunting - Chapter 3. Nongame Mammals and Depredators | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4150 - 4158, 4180 - 4190 | CA FISH & G § 4150 - 4158, 4180 - 4190 | These sections regulate the taking and killing of nongame mammals and depredatory animals. Nongame and fur-bearing mammals that are injuring crops or other property may be taken at any time or in any manner in accordance with this code. In some cases, a permit is required. It is unlawful to use snares, hooks, or barbed wire to remove from the den, or fire to kill in the den, any immature predatory mammal. Predators that are relocated by the department must be tagged. | Statute |
| Labor Commission, Antidiscrimination and Labor Division v. FCS Community Management | --- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 1203693 (Utah App., 2024) | 2024 UT App 39 | This is an appeal of a complaint filed by the Utah Anti-discrimination and Labor Division (ULAD) seeking review of the determination that an HOA violated members' request for reasonable accommodation by denying homeowner's the ability to keep chickens on their property. The chickens were intended to be assistance animals for the homeowner's daughter, who has anxiety and PTSD. The district court found that the HOA constructively denied the homeowner's request for reasonable accommodation by delaying their response to the request for three months. This court reversed the decision of the lower court, finding that there was no constructive denial of the request since the HOA allowed the homeowners to keep the chickens during the interim period, did not punish them for keeping the chickens, and ultimately granted the request to keep the chickens. | Case |