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Displaying 101 - 110 of 6638
Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
OH - Falconry - Chapter 1533. Hunting; Fishing. Falconry. R.C. § 1533.05, 1533.051 OH ST § 1533.05, 1533.051 This Ohio statute regulates falconry in the state. It specifically excludes bald eagles from the listed species of raptors for use in falconry. Statute
MI - Cruelty - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. The Michigan Penal Code. M.C.L.A. 750.50b MI ST 750.50b This is the felony animal cruelty law in Michigan. Under the law, a person is guilty of killing or torturing animals if they: (a) knowingly kill, torture, mutilate, maim, or disfigure an animal; (b) commit a reckless act knowing or having reason to know that the act will cause an animal to be killed, tortured, mutilated, maimed, or disfigured; (c) knowingly administer poison to an animal, or knowingly expose an animal to any poisonous substance, with the intent that the substance be taken or swallowed by the animal; or (d) violate or threaten to violate subdivision (a) or (c) with the intent to cause mental suffering or distress to a person or to exert control over a person. Whether the offense becomes a first, second, or third degree felony depends on listed factors, including whether the animal is a companion animal (as defined in the law). A first degree felony conviction results in imprisonment up to 10 years, a fine of not more than $5,000, and/or community service for not more than 500 hours. As a part of the sentence, the court may order the defendant to pay the costs of the prosecution and the costs of the care, housing, and veterinary medical care for the animal victim, and the court may order the defendant to not own or possess an animal for ANY period of time including permanent relinquishment. Lawful killing of animals including fishing, hunting, pest control, and scientific research are excluded. Statute
Flikshtein v. City of New York 273 A.D.2d 439 (N.Y. 2000) 710 N.Y.S.2d 112

The New York appellate court held that the dangerousness or viciousness of plaintiff’s pet monkey was irrelevant, and that the city could remove the monkey regardless of its benevolent behavior.

Case
State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne 505 P.2d 732 (Kan. 1973)

The Kansas Attorney General had advised the cockfighter that cockfighting was illegal in Kansas under the provisions of § 21-4310 (Supp. 1972). The gamecock fighter believed the Attorney General was wrong and advised a county attorney that he intended to fight gamecocks on his farm so the State then sought a declaratory judgment.  On appeal, the court found that cockfighting did not fall within the prohibition of § 21-4310 as constituting cruelty to animals, as Kansas statutes proscribing cruelty to animals had traditionally been directed toward protection of the four-legged animal, especially beasts of the field and beasts of burden. 

Case
Friends of Animals v. The United States Bureau of Land Management 232 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2017) No. 17-CV-00136 (CRC), 2017 WL 499882 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2017)

Friends of Animals, an animal welfare organization, filed suit for a preliminary injunction against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Friends of Animals filed suit after the BLM started organizing a new “gather” which is a a term used for the removal of wild horses. The BLM planned to “gather” wild horses from a range in Utah and the Friends of Animals challenged the decision on three grounds: (1) the decision to gather was not grounded on any National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) document such as a environmental assessment (EA); the BLM failed to honor its previous commitment to include new EAs for any new gathers; and (3) the gather violates the Wild Horses Act on the basis that the BLM failed to make a excess population determination before authorizing the gather.

The court reviewed the three claims separately and determined that Friends of Animals’ challenges to the gather were not likely to succeed and there was not a sufficient irreparable harm to warrant a preliminary injunction. First, the court found that under NEPA, an agency is able to rely on a previous EA so long as “new circumstances, new information or changes in the action or its impacts not previously analyzed [do not] result in significantly different environmental effects.” The court found that previous EAs were sufficient because they had assessed an “essentially similar” capture method. Additionally, the court determined that although BLM had previously agreed to provide new EAs for any new gathers, the BLM was not legally required to do, so the Friends of Animals argument regarding this issue would not succeed. Lastly, the court found that the BLM had not violated the Wild Horses Act because the BLM had in fact conducted an excess population determination.

Lastly, the court analyzed whether or not the gather created an irreparable harm that would warrant a preliminary injunction. The court found that there was not sufficient evidence to prove any irreparable harm. As a result, the court denied the preliminary injunction and held in favor of the BLM.

Case
MS - Dog Theft - Chapter 17. Crimes Against Property Miss. Code. Ann. § 97-17-51 MS ST § 97-17-51 This Mississippi Statute provides that a person commits a felonious offense by stealing, taking and carrying away any dog that is the property of another. If the person who commits the offense is indicted and convicted for stealing the dog, he or she shall be punished by a fine not more than $500, imprisonment not more than 6 months, or both, or imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than 1 year nor more than 2 years. Statute
NE - Wildlife - Article 2. Game Law General Provisions Neb. Rev. St. § 37-201 to 248 NE ST § 37-201 to 248 These statutes comprise the definitional section of Nebraska's wildlife code. Among the definitions include game, aquaculture, wildlife, hunt, and take. Statute
KY - Impound - Chapter 258. Animal Control and Protection. KRS § 258.265 KY ST § 258.265 This Kentucky statute provides that an owner shall exercise proper care and control of his dog to prevent the dog from violating any local government nuisance ordinance. Any peace officer or animal control officer may seize or destroy any dog found running at large between the hours of sunset and sunrise and unaccompanied and not under the control of its owner or handler. A peace officer or animal control officer shall be under a duty to make a fair and reasonable effort to determine whether any dog found at large between sunset and sunrise is a hound or other hunting dog which has become lost temporarily. Statute
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Woodley 640 S.E.2d 777; 2007 WL 475329 (N.C.App., 2007) 181 N.C.App. 594 (2007)

In this North Carolina Case, Barbara and Robert Woodley (defendants) appeal from an injunction forfeiting all rights in the animals possessed by defendants and the removal of the animals from defendants' control, and an order granting temporary custody of the animals to the Animal Legal Defense Fund. On 23 December 2004, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions under North Carolina's Civil Remedy for Protection of Animals statute (Section 19A). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 19A-1 et seq. (2005). Plaintiff alleged that defendants abused and neglected a large number of dogs (as well as some birds) in their possession. On appeal, defendants argue that Section 19A is unconstitutional in that it purports to grant standing to persons who have suffered no injury, and that it violates Article IV, Section 13 of the N.C. Constitution by granting standing through statute. The court held that Article IV, Section 13 merely “abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity," rather than placing limitations on the legislature's ability to create actions by statute, contrary to defendants' interpretation.

Case
US - Endangered Species - 50 CFR Part 17. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Mariana Fruit Bat (Pteropus mariannus m 50 CFR Part 17, RIN 1018-AH55

This final rule downgrades the Mariana fruit bat from endangered to threatened throughout its range in the Mariana archipelago, which is subject to US jurisdiction.   The reason for the down grade is the FWS initially made a mistake in the taxonomy of the Mariana fruit bat.   When the FWS listed the bat as endangered on Guam in 1984, it believed that the bat was a species only endemic to Guam.   Since that time, the FWS has discovered that the bat is endemic to the entire Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and the Territory of Guam, thus there is actually a larger number of bats with a wider distribution.   Yet, threats to the Mariana fruit bat still remain, so its listing as threatened is still warranted.   Additionally, it is more convenient for the FWS to update the listing of the Mariana fruit bat to threatened in the entire Mariana archipelago, than to keep the species in the Guam as endangered and hold the remainder of the archipelago as threatened.

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