Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WA - Exotic Pet - Chapter 16.30. Dangerous Wild Animals | West's RCWA 16.30.005 - 900 | WA ST 16.30.005 - 900 | This Washington chapter passed in 2007 regulates the keeping of dangerous wild animals. By definition, a potentially dangerous wild animal includes, among others, lions, tigers, captive-bred cougars, jaguars, cheetahs, leopards, wolves, (but excluding wolf-hybrids), bears, hyenas, non-human primates, elephants, rhinoceroses, certain reptiles, and venomous snakes. A person shall not own, possess, keep, harbor, bring into the state, or have custody or control of a potentially dangerous wild animal. A person in legal possession of a potentially dangerous wild animal prior to July 22, 2007, and who is the legal possessor of the animal may keep possession of the animal for the remainder of the animal's life. | Statute |
| Park Management Corp v. In Defense of Animals | --- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 2019 WL 2539295 (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2019) | An animal rights activist named Joseph Cuviello appealed the entry of a permanent injunction in a trespass action that prohibited him from demonstrating outside of Six Flags Discovery Kingdom ("The Park") in California. The superior court rejected Cuviello’s federal and state constitutional claims that he had a right to picket there peacefully and his common law defense based on a claimed prescriptive easement. The Park was originally municipally owned and privately operated until 2007 when the Park's management acquired the park from the City of Vallejo. After that acquisition, the Park began to limit free speech until it ultimately banned all expressive activity on the property. Cuviello was one of the many people that protested at the park advocating for animals and he had done so many times in the past. The Park filed a single cause of action for private trespass against several animal advocacy groups. Cuviello argued that he had a First Amendment right to protest there because the park had been dedicated to public use, the park was a public forum under state constitutional law, and given the amount of times he had protested at the park in the past, he had acquired a common law prescriptive easement right to protest there. The trial court denied Cuviello’s cross-motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the Park. It ruled that the First Amendment does not apply to private property and that the property was not a public forum under California’s constitution. It also rejected the prescriptive easement claims. Although the Park was zoned as a public and quasi-public property, the Appeals Court grappled with whether to classify the Park as a private or public forum. The Court applied a balancing test which balanced society’s interest in free expression against the Park’s interests as a private property owner. The Court concluded that the unticketed, exterior portions of the Park was a public forum. Ultimately the Court held that the trial court erred in granting the Park’s summary judgment and in denying Cuviello’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial court and held that on the undisputed facts here, the Park may not ban expressive activity in the non-ticketed, exterior areas of Six Flags. | Case | |
| Index to Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law |
Index for Animal and Natural Resource Law ReviewVolume #1 (2005) |
Policy | ||
| Daniele v Weissenberger | 2002 WL 31813949,136 A Crim R 390 | 2002 WASCA 346 |
Court uphold conviction for failure to provide food and water for horses. Even thought not the owner, he was the responsible party. Sentence of $3,000 fine and suspended 3 month was not excessive. |
Case |
| Jefferson v. Mirando | 719 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio Co.,1999) | 101 Ohio Misc.2d 1 (1999) |
In this Ohio case, the defendant was charged with violating ordinance setting maximum number of dogs or cats that a person could "harbor" per family dwelling unit. The court first observed that the village of Jefferson's ordinance benefits from a strong presumption of constitutionality, and defendant Mirando bears the burden of demonstrating unconstitutionality of this ordinance beyond any remaining fair debate on the issue. The court held that ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague and did not conflict with state statutes regulating kennels. |
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| MI - Hunting - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M.C.L.A. 324.41901 - 41905 | MI ST 324.41901 - 41905 | These sections describe the powers of the Department of Natural Resources to regulate and even to close areas to hunting. | Statute |
| FL - Police animal - 943.69. Care for Retired Police Dogs Program | West's F.S.A. § 943.69 | FL ST § 943.69 | This Florida law enacted in 2022 first recognizes the value that police dogs provide for law enforcement agencies. It then establishes a stable funding source for veterinary care of retired police dogs | Statute |
| Giardiello v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C. | 261 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D. Mass. 2017) | 2017 WL 3610478 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2017) | This case dealt with a condo owner and his son who lived in a condo and relied on a service dog for treatment of PTSD. The Plaintiffs filed suit against the condo trust, Board of Trustees, Board members, and others, alleging violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) by not allowing the Plaintiffs to keep the dog in their condo unit. The father attempted to communicate with the Trustees about a reasonable accommodation for the service dog, but was met with silence from the Trustees. After the dog had already moved into the condo, the Board sent correspondence stating that fines would be assessed if the dog was not removed after a certain date. After complications with securing the requisite medical info, the dog was ultimately allowed to say, but fines had accrued. The Court held that 1) plaintiffs stated claim that defendants violated FHA; 2) owner was an aggrieved person under the FHA, and thus owner had standing to bring claim; 3) district court would decline to dismiss claim on exhaustion grounds; and 4) under Massachusetts law, claims against attorney and law firm were barred by the litigation privilege. Thus, the court the Court denied the Board and Trust's motion to dismiss and granted Attorney Gaines and the Law Firm's motion to dismiss. | Case |
| TX - Horse - Sale of Horsemeat (Chapter 149. Sale of Horsemeat for Human Consumption) | V. T. C. A., Agriculture Code § 149.001 - 007 | TX AGRIC § 149.001 - 007 | These statutes prohibit the sale of horsemeat, the possession of horsemeat with the intent to sell, and the knowing transfer of horsemeat to a person who intends to sell it for human consumption. Horsemeat is defined as the flesh of an animal of the genus equus. Prima facie evidence of an offense is prescribed by these statues and includes, for example, the presence of horsemeat in a restaurant or cafe. The penalty for an offense may be a fine of up to a $1,000, confinement for not less than 30 days and not more than two years, or both a fine and confinement. | Statute |
| Kennedy House, Inc. v. Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations | 143 A.3d 476 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 11, 2016) | 2016 WL 3667992 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 11, 2016) |
In this case, Kennedy House appealed the lower court’s decision in finding that it had violated Section 9–1108 of the Philadelphia Fair Practice Ordinance when it denied Jan Rubin’s request for a housing accommodation in the form of a waiver of its no-dog policy. Rubin applied for a housing accommodation at Kennedy House because she suffered from multiple physical aliments. In a meeting with Kennedy House, Rubin did state that her dog was not a trained service animal that helped with her physical and mobility issues but rather helped with reminding her to take medication and getting out of bed. The lower court determined that Rubin had satisfied her burden of proving that her dog was necessary in helping with her medical issues. After reviewing the lower court’s decision, the Commonwealth Court held that the lower court had erred in its decisions. Ultimately, the court found that because Ms. Rubin's physician described a disability related to her mobility, and there was no evidence establishing a nexus between her mobility-related needs and the requested assistance animal, Ms. Rubin did not meet her burden necessary for Kennedy House to waive its no-dog policy. As a result, the court reversed the lower court’s decision. |
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