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Displaying 51 - 60 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TN - Ordinances - § 5-1-120. Dogs and cats; licenses, shelters and other animal control facilities | T. C. A. § 5-1-120 | TN ST § 5-1-120 | This Tennessee statute outlines the broad police power counties have with respect to dog and cats. It provides that counties, by resolution of their respective legislative bodies, may license and regulate dogs and cats, establish and operate shelters and other animal control facilities, and regulate, capture, impound and dispose of stray dogs, stray cats and other stray animals. | Statute | |
| OK - Breeders - Commercial Pet Breeder Operations Guidelines | OK ADC 532:15-1-1 - 532:15-7-6 | OAC 532:15-1-1 - 532:15-7-6 | These regulations describe standards for pet breeders including sufficient food and water, regular exercise, veterinary care, adequate grooming, natural or artificial light during daylight hours, adequate space in living quarters, protection from the elements and extreme temperatures, and adequate resting time between breeding cycles, that ensures the general health and well-being of all pets the commercial pet breeder owns.“Commercial pet breeder” means any person that possesses or has possessed at any time in the last twelve months eleven or more adult intact female animals for use in breeding or dealing in animals for direct or indirect sale or for exchange in return for consideration. Household pets kept by breeders which the breeder has registered with the Board as not being used in breeding or dealing shall not be counted under this definition. Mandated record-keeping is outlined in Subchapter 7, which includes a required pet health history provided to purchasers. | Administrative | |
| Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law Vol. 8 |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of LawJournal of Animal & Natural Resource Law Vol. VIII (2012)The table of contents is provided below. |
Policy | |||
| AL - Facility dog - § 12-21-148. Use of certified facility dog in certain legal proceedings. | Ala.Code 1975 § 12-21-147 -148 | This Alabama law from 2017 covers use of both registered therapy dogs and registered facility dogs in certain legal proceedings. A "registered therapy dog" is defined as "[a] trained emotional support dog that has been tested and registered by a nonprofit therapy dog organization that sets standards and requirements for the health, welfare, task work, and oversight for therapy dogs and their handlers . . ." A "certified facility dog" is defined as "[a] trained working dog that is a graduate of an assistance dog organization, a nonprofit organization that sets standards of training for the health, welfare, task work, and oversight for assistance dogs and their handlers . . ." Both must meet minimum standards including minimum months/years of training, documentation showing graduation from an assistance dog organization, a current health certificate, and proof of at least $500,000 in liability insurance. During trial proceedings, all precautions should be taken to obscure the presence of the dog from the jury. | Statute | ||
| Southall v. Gabel | 277 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio App. 1971) | 28 Ohio App.2d 295 (1971) |
This case resulted from the alleged negligent transport of a horse that resulted in a drastic change in the horse's temperament (to a "killer horse"), which ultimately led to its destruction by its owner. Before trial, defendant demurred to plaintiff's petition on the ground that the action was barred under R.C. s 2305.11, the act being 'malpractice' and therefore required to be brought within one year after the termination of treatment. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's decision overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's petition was correct, 'the petitioner is based on negligence for the transporting rather than malpractice.' Further, the Court held that until the Supreme Court speaks, veterinarians are not included in the definition of malpractice (reversed and remanded - See , 293 N.E.2d 891 (Ohio, Mun.,1972). |
Case | |
| WA - Ordinances - 35.27.370. Specific powers enumerated | West's RCWA 35.27.370 | WA ST 35.27.370 | This Washington statute provides that the council of said town shall have power to pass ordinances not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of this state, or of the United States. Specifically, the council may regulate, restrain, or prohibit the running at large of any and all domestic animals within the city limits, or any part or parts thereof, and to regulate the keeping of such animals within any part of the city; to establish, maintain and regulate a common pound for estrays, and to appoint a poundkeeper, who shall be paid out of the fines and fees imposed on, and collected from, the owners of any impounded stock. | Statute | |
| OR - Pet Dealers - 609.520. Inspection of records; procedure for obtaining animal held by dealer; | O. R. S. § 609.520 | OR ST § 609.520 | This Oregon statute sets out the right of a person to inspect a pet dealer's business for the purpose of finding a lost companion animal. The statute also outlines acceptable methods to prove ownership and the procedure for resolving a dispute of ownership. | Statute | |
| Art and Antique Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Seggos | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 3817305 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019) | The plaintiffs are trade organizations representing arts and antique dealers. Plaintiff’s members have an “economic and professional interest in. . .the purchase, sale, distribution or trading of antique elephant ivory.” The Defendant is the Commissioner of DEC which is a state agency tasked with protecting New York’s natural resources and environment. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits the import and export of endangered species and the sale, offering for sale, or movement of endangered species in interstate or foreign commerce. The prohibitions, however, had exceptions for “antique articles” that are 100 years of age or older. Those wishing to import such antique articles needed to first obtain a federal permit. Under the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, trade of African elephant ivory is generally prohibited. Only certain items containing a de minimus quantity of ivory are exempt. The state of New York imposed a ban on elephant ivory with even narrower exceptions than the ESA. The DEC only issued licenses authorizing trade in ivory pursuant to the State Ivory Law’s exceptions. The licenses actually issued by the DEC restricted the advertisement and display of ivory products. Plaintiff’s filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the State Ivory Law on preemption and First Amendment grounds. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Defendants and Intervenors crossed-moved to dismiss. The Court examined the ESA and determined that section 1535(f) did not preempt the State Ivory Law because the ESA prohibitions only applied to interstate or foreign commerce while the State Ivory Law applied to intrastate commerce. As result, the exceptions contained in the State Ivory Law did not prohibit what was authorized by the ESA. The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Count I because it was not “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state laws restricting purely intrastate commerce in ivory.” The Plaintiff’s second count alleged that the State Ivory Law’s permit requirement violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The display restriction in the license prohibited the physical display for sale of any item not authorized for intrastate sale under the State Ivory Law even if the merchant was authorized under the ESA to sell the item in interstate commerce. The Court determined that the in-store display of ivory products constituted commercial speech because the display constituted lawful activity, New York had a substantial interest in regulating the sale of ivory within its borders and the display restriction directly advanced that interest. The Court was unable to determine whether the display restriction burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Ultimately the Court granted the Defendant’s and Intervenor’s cross-motions to dismiss with respect to preemption and denied both the Defendant’s and Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment with respect to the First Amendment Claim. | Case | ||
| WV - Charleston - Chapter 10: Animals (Article IV. Urban Deer Management) | Code of the City of Charleston, West Virginia § 10-171 |
This Charleston, West Virginia ordinance allows a person to hunt deer within city limits, but only upon certain conditions. For instance, a person must obtain a permit from the city, must hunt only with a bow and arrow, and must hunt only on certain tracts of land—amongst other things—in order to be compliant with these provisions. A violation of this ordinance is a misdemeanor and may result in fines ranging from $10 to $500, imprisonment for up to 30 days, or both. Additionally, a violation may suspend or revoke a person's hunting permit. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| NJ - Education - 18A:35-4.25. Right of pupil to refuse participation in dissection activities | N.J.S.A. 18A:35-4.25 | This New Jersey law allows a public school pupil from kindergarten through grade 12 to refuse to dissect, vivisect, incubate, capture or otherwise harm or destroy animals or any parts thereof as part of a course of instruction. The school must notify pupils and parents at the beginning of each school on the right to decline participation. Any pupil who chooses to refrain from participation in or observation shall be offered an alternative education project for the purpose of providing the pupil with the factual knowledge, information or experience required by the course of study. A pupil shall not be discriminated against, in grading or in any other manner, based upon a decision to exercise the rights of this act. | Statute |