Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OH - Hunting - Chapter 1533. Hunting; Fishing. General Provisions. | R.C. § 1533.03 - 1533.031 | OH ST § 1533.03 - 1533.031 | This section reflects Ohio's hunter harassment provisions. No person shall purposely prevent or attempt to prevent any person from hunting, trapping, or fishing for a wild animal. A person who is or may be reasonably affected by the prohibited conduct can seek an injunction. The companion statute also provides that no person shall purposely prevent or attempt to prevent hunting by creating noise or loud sounds through the use of implements that are intended to affect the behavior of the wild animal being hunted. | Statute | |
| MI - Constitutional Provisions - Protection of Natural Resources | M. C. L. A. Const. Art. 4, § 52 | MI CONST Art. 4, § 52 | This section declares the protection, conservation, and development of the state's natural resources to be of paramount public concern and the legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and destruction. | Statute | |
| People v. Arroyo | 777 N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. 2004) | 3 Misc.3d 668, 2004 N.Y.Slip Op. 24067 |
This case presents the court with a novel question: Does a pet owner commit an act of cruelty, for which he or she could be prosecuted criminally, by not providing an ill pet (in this case, terminally ill) with medical care? Defendant charged with violation of New York's anticruelty statute and moved for dismissal. In engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court held that: (1) provision prohibiting the deprivation of "necessary sustenance" was vague when applied to defendant, and (2) that the provision prohibiting "unjustifiably" causing pain to an animal was also vague when applied to defendant. Motion granted. |
Case | |
| Benningfield v. Zinsmeister | 367 S.W.3d 561 (Ky.,2012) | 2012 WL 2361778 |
An 8-year-old boy and his sister were walking down a street when they were approached by a Rottweiler. Scared, the boy ran and was attacked by the dog, which caused the boy to suffer serious injuries. As a result, the mother of the child sued the owner of the dog and the landlord of the house where the dog resided under a Kentucky dog bite statute. The landlord won at both the trial and the appellate court level. Upon granting discretionary review for the case, the Kentucky Supreme Court investigated whether or not a landlord could be held strictly liable under the dog bite statute. The Court ruled that a landlord could, but only if the landlord permitted the dog to stay on or about the premises. Since the attack did not occur on or about the premises, the landlord was not found liable under the dog bite statute. |
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| US - AWA - Subpart D. Specifications/Standards for Nonhuman Primates | 9 C.F.R. § 3.75 to .92 | This portion of the AWA regulations contains the humane care provisions for non-human primates. Included are requirements for housing facilities, primary enclosures, provisions for psychological well-being, feeding, watering, sanitization, employee requirements, and transportation standards. | Administrative | ||
| State Holding Period Laws for Impounded Companion Animals |
Holding period laws are state requirements that determine how long an impounded animal must be “held” by a government entity (or contracted agent) before it can be released or euthanized. |
State map | |||
| MD - Liens - § 16-401. Lien for care or custody | Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 16-401 | MD Code, Commercial Law, § 16-401 | Under Maryland law, any person who owns or operates a livery stable or other establishment who gives care or custody to livestock will have a lien on the livestock for any reasonable charge relating to: board and custody, training, veterinarian and blacksmith service, and other maintenance expenses. If the lien is not paid within 30 days after payment is due, the owner of the livery stable is entitled to sell the livestock. | Statute | |
| NE - Dangerous - ARTICLE 6. DOGS AND CATS. (B) DANGEROUS DOGS. | Neb. Rev. St. § 54-617 to 54-624 | NE ST § 54-617 to 54-624 | These Nebraska statutes outline the state's dangerous dog laws. Among the provisions include a requirement that the dog must be restrained when not in a secure enclosure on the owner's property. There is also a requirement that owners must post warning signs on the property notifying people that a dangerous dog is present. If a dangerous dog bites a person, the owner can be found guilty of a Class IV misdemeanor and the dog will be destroyed. | Statute | |
| KY - Exotic Animals - Chapter 65. General Provisions Applicable to Counties, Cities | KRS § 65.877 | KY ST § 65.877 | This Kentucky statue authorizes counties and cities to regulate or prohibit the holding of inherently dangerous wildlife. For example, the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources has identified some of the following animals as being dangerous: African buffalo, Hippopotamus, Hyenas, Old world badger, Lions, jaguars, leopards, or tigers, Clouded leopard, Cheetah, Elephants, Rhinoceroses, Gorillas, Baboons, drills, or mandrills, Crocodiles, Alligators or caimans, certain snakes, Gila monsters or beaded lizards, Komodo dragon, Wolverine, Bears, Wolf, mountain lion. | Statute | |
| Kitchin ex rel. Kitchin v. Halifax County | 665 S.E.2d 760 (N.C.App.,2008) |
In this North Carolina case, defendant dog owners appealed from a decision of the County Board of Health that ruled their dog could not be returned home because of the dog's potential exposure to rabies as result of attacking a raccoon (the dog was scheduled for euthanization). After the Board denied the owners' appeal, they filed a complaint against county which contained motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent dog's quarantine and for class certification. The Court of Appeals held that the owners' appeal of Board's decision to quarantine dog was moot because dog had already been returned home. The action against the animal control officers was dismissed because the officers were shielded by governmental immunity. |
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