Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KS - Pet Trusts - Chapter 58A. Kansas Uniform Trust Code. | K. S. A. 58a-408 | KS ST 58a-408 | This Kansas statute provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime (note that it does not state "domestic" or "pet" animal). The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its intended use, except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for the intended use. | Statute |
| CO - Pet Shop - Article 80. Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act | C. R. S. A. § 35-80-101 - 117 | CO ST § 35-80-101 to 117 | This Colorado Act regulates pet animal facilities (i.e., shelters, large kennels, and breeders). The Act covers licensing of the facilities and those activities deemed unlawful, such as selling a kitten or puppy under the age of 8 weeks and refusing a lawful inspection. | Statute |
| U.S. v. Mitchell | 985 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1993) |
Defendant, a zoologist working for the Department of Interior, was charged in nine count indictment taking and transporting animals in violation of foreign law under the Lacey Act among other violations. Defendant filed motion to dismiss and government filed motion to determine foreign law. The government alleged in Count 8 that in September of 1987, Mitchell transported the hides and horns of a Punjab urial (wild sheep) and a Chinkara gazelle out of Pakistan and into the United States knowing that the animals had been taken, possessed or transported in violation of Pakistani law; the Pakistani Imports and Exports (Control) Act of 1950 and the Punjab Wildlife Act of 1974. The court rejected defendant's reading of the imports and exports law and found it unnecessary to determine the constitutionality of the Punjab Wildlife Act as the Lacey Act impinges on whether defendant violated the portions of the law prohibiting possession of the animals without a permit. |
Case | |
| Conservancy v. USFWS | 677 F.3d 1073 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) | 2012 WL 1319857 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) |
In this case, many environmental advocacy groups petitioned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate critical habitat for a species, the Florida panther, which was listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1967. The petition was denied. Claiming the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, the groups filed a citizens suit under the ESA in district court. At district, the group's complaints were dismissed and the groups subsequently lost on appeal. |
Case |
| Article 70 of CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley | 49 Misc. 3d 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 4612340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2015) | Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 and under the common law for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees in the custody of respondent State University of New York at Stony Brook. It sought an order directing respondents to demonstrate the basis for detaining Hercules and Leo, and an order directing their release and transfer to a sanctuary in Florida. Respondents opposed the petition and cross moved to change venue. While the Supreme Court of New York County found that neither CPLR 7002(b)(3) nor CPLR 7004(c) required a change of venue to Suffolk County; that the petitioner had standing to bring the case; and that prior proceedings did not bar this case from being heard, the substance of the petition required a finding as to whether a chimpanzee was a legal person entitled to bring a writ of habeas corpus. Since the Court found it was bound by the Third Department in People ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, which ruled that chimpanzees were not “legal persons” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by a writ of habeas corpus, it denied the habeas corpus petition and dismissed the proceeding. | Case |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell | 2014 WL 4714847 (D.D.C. 2014) (unpublished) | 2014 WL 4714847 (D.D.C. 2014) | In 2012, a rule transferred management of the gray wolf in Wyoming from federal control to state control. In the present case, plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, Fund for Animals, Humane Society of the United States, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Sierra Club, challenged the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to remove the gray wolf from the endangered species list in Wyoming. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and maintained that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because Wyoming's regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to protect the species, the level of genetic exchange shown in the record did not warrant delisting, and the gray wolf was endangered within a significant portion of its range. Given the level of genetic exchange reflected in the record, the Court decided not to disturb the finding that the species had recovered, and it would not overturn the agency's determination that the species was not endangered or threatened within a significant portion of its range. However, the Court concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Service to rely on the state's nonbinding promises to maintain a particular number of wolves when the availability of that specific numerical buffer was such a critical aspect of the delisting decision. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, denied it in part, and remanded the matter back to the agency. | Case |
| GA - Assistance Animal - Georgia's Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | Ga. Code Ann., § 30-4-2 to 4; Ga. Code Ann., § 40-6-94; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-12-120; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-11-107.1 | GA ST § 30-4-2 to 4; GA ST § 40-6-94; GA ST § 16-12-120; GA ST § 16-11-107.1 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |
| CA - Hunting - Chapter 3. Nongame Mammals and Depredators | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4150 - 4158, 4180 - 4190 | CA FISH & G § 4150 - 4158, 4180 - 4190 | These sections regulate the taking and killing of nongame mammals and depredatory animals. Nongame and fur-bearing mammals that are injuring crops or other property may be taken at any time or in any manner in accordance with this code. In some cases, a permit is required. It is unlawful to use snares, hooks, or barbed wire to remove from the den, or fire to kill in the den, any immature predatory mammal. Predators that are relocated by the department must be tagged. | Statute |
| U.S. v. Clucas | 50 F.Supp. 609 (D.C. Va. 1943) |
Defendant and several individuals went on a duck hunt in and were charged with exceeding the limit for migratory birds under Virginia law. The game wardens testified that the defendant, Clucas, admitted in the presence of the other parties that they had killed more than the 'bag', meaning thereby that they had killed more than ten ducks allowed for each person. The government held the position that the other individuals were hired for the reason of taking or killing the ducks. The court held that in view of the fact that January 6, 1943, was not the first day of the season the possession of twenty-six ducks by the two defendants did not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Virginia regulation. The possession being legal, the burden of proof did not shift to the defendants. |
Case | |
| Labor Commission, Antidiscrimination and Labor Division v. FCS Community Management | --- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 1203693 (Utah App., 2024) | 2024 UT App 39 | This is an appeal of a complaint filed by the Utah Anti-discrimination and Labor Division (ULAD) seeking review of the determination that an HOA violated members' request for reasonable accommodation by denying homeowner's the ability to keep chickens on their property. The chickens were intended to be assistance animals for the homeowner's daughter, who has anxiety and PTSD. The district court found that the HOA constructively denied the homeowner's request for reasonable accommodation by delaying their response to the request for three months. This court reversed the decision of the lower court, finding that there was no constructive denial of the request since the HOA allowed the homeowners to keep the chickens during the interim period, did not punish them for keeping the chickens, and ultimately granted the request to keep the chickens. | Case |