Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cascadia Wildlands v. Dep't of Fish and Wildlife | 455 P.3d 950 (Or.App., 2019) | 300 Or.App. 648 (Or.App., 2019) | Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission ("Respondent") removed the species Canis lupus (gray wolf) from the list of species protected under the Oregon Endangered Species Act (OESA). Cascadia Wildlands, Center for Biological Diversity, and Oregon Wild ("Petitioners") sought judicial review of the amendment to Oregon law. The Petitioners contended that the decision to delist exceeded the commission’s statutory authority and did not comply with applicable rulemaking procedures. After the Petitioners filed their petition, the Oregon legislature passed House Bill 4040 which ratified the administrative rule that the Respondent promulgated delisting the gray wolf. The Respondents argued that the passage of the bill made the Petitioners' petition for judicial review moot. The Petitioners argued that the Oregon law ratifying the administrative rule had no legal effect and was merely an expression of legislative agreement. The Court held that the legislature using the word “ratify” in the statute indicated that they intended to confirm that the Commission’s rule delisting the gray wolf was legally satisfied, therefore, rendering judicial review moot. The Petitioners also contended that the statute violated the separation of powers because the statute performed an entirely judicial function by neither appealing nor amending the statute. Petitioners asserted that evaluating whether a particular agency satisfied requirements of law is a fact-specific inquiry which is reserved for the court. The Court held that the statute did not violate the separation of powers. The Court ultimately held that the Petitioners' rule challenge was moot. The petition for judicial review was ultimately dismissed. | Case |
| RI - Shark - § 20-1-29. Trade in shark fins | Gen.Laws 1956, § 20-1-29 | RI ST § 20-1-29 | This Rhode Island law, effective in 2017, prohibits the possession, sale, offering for sale, trading, or distribution of shark fin. “Shark fin” means the raw, dried, or otherwise processed detached fin or the raw, dried, or otherwise processed detached tail of a shark. Even if a person holds a license to take sharks, he or she must immediately destroy any shark fin separated from the shark unless used by the person for the purposes of taxidermy and subsequent display. Violation incurs a fine or not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 imprisonment of up to 90 days, or both. | Statute |
| IA - Assistance Animals - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | I. C. A. § 216C.1 - 12; 216.8B, 216.8C; 321.333 | IA ST § 216C.1 - 12; 216.8B; 216.8C; 321.333 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant service and assistance animal laws. | Statute |
| NY - Ecoterrorism - § 378. Unlawful tampering with animal research | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 378 | NY AGRI & MKTS § 378 | This New York law comprises the state's ecoterrorism provision. A person who has been given "notice," as defined by the law, is guilty of the crime of "unlawful tampering with animal research" if he or she: (1) knowingly or intentionally releases an animal from a facility or causes the abandonment of an animal knowing that such animal was exposed to infectious agents prior to such release or abandonment and was capable of transmitting such infectious agents to humans; or (2) with intent to do so, causes loss or damage to secret scientific material, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, causes loss of or damage to any secret scientific material in an amount in excess of two hundred fifty dollars at a facility. | Statute |
| Dorman v. Satti | 678 F.Supp. 375 (D.Conn.,1988) | The federal district court here considered the constitutionality of Connecticut’s Hunter Harassment Act (Conn.Gen.Stat. Section 53a-183a) of 1985. The plaintiff was arrested under the Act after she approached hunters who were hunting waterfowl in public lands adjacent to her property and attempted to verbally dissuade them from hunting. The charge was ultimately dismissed, but plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action to adjudicate the constitutionality of the Act. In finding the Act unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the Court found that it criminalized constitutionally protected speech. Specifically, the Court found that the Act failed to define “interference” and did not adequately limit the reach of “acts in preparation” to hunt. | Case | |
| Bolivia - Cruelty - Ley 700, 2015 | Ley 700, 2015 | Ley 700, is the animal cruelty statute of Bolivia. This law lays out the rules for the defense of animals against cruelty committed by humans. Animals are considered part of mother earth, and therefore, their life has to be defended and respected. This law punishes physical, psychological, emotional and sexual mistreatment, and prohibits the breeding of domestic animals for commercial purposes. It also prohibits sport hunting and overworking animals, especially those of an older age. | Statute | |
| US - Exotic Birds - Wild Exotic Bird Conservation Act | 16 USC 4901 - 4916 | The Wild Exotic Bird Conservation Act addresses the population threat to non-indigenous wild birds due to the demand the from U.S. as the number one importer of exotic birds (e.g., the "pet" bird trade). Exceptions under the statute include qualified breeding facilities, scientific or zoological study, and people returning the U.S. who have been out of the country for more than a year (limited to two birds). | Statute | |
| US - AWA - 1990 Public Law 101-624 | 1990 PL 101-624 | 104 Stat 3359 | Enacted November 28, 1990, this public law amends the Animal Welfare Act by establishing holding period for dogs and cats at shelters and other holding facilities before sale to dealers. It requires dealers to provide written certification regarding each animal's background to the recipient. Specific items included on the certificate are mechanisms of enforcement, injunctions, and penalties for violation. | Statute |
| Humane Society-Western Region v. Snohomish County | 2007 WL 2404619 (W.D. Wash) |
Plaintiff Humane Society Western Region (d/b/a "Happy Paws Farm") filed this lawsuit against Snohomish County alleging provisions of the county code regulating barking are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the state and federal constitutions, and that the SCC provision governing the temporary housing of animals in shelters violates its federal constitutional right to substantive due process. Plaintiff argued that the noise ordinances invite subjective evaluation resulting in arbitrary enforcement because the code contains no reference to identifiable levels of noise, only to noises that are repetitive. The absence of identifiable levels of noise, or decibel levels, does not render the noise ordinances unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that this method is not easily understood by individuals of ordinary intelligence or that it fails to protect against arbitrary enforcement. This opinion was Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part by Humane Society Western Region v. Snohomish County, 357 Fed.Appx. 144 (9th Cir., 2009). |
Case | |
| U.S. v. One Afghan Urial Ovis Orientalis | 964 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1992) |
Claimant appeals the order granting summary judgment to the government in a order of forfeiture under the Lacey Act for the hide and parts of a sheep killed in Pakistan and exported to the U.S. Claimant argues that because there is no national Pakistani law enacted for the protection of wildlife, no Pakistani law interferes with his right to remove the respondent sheep from Pakistan based upon the provincial permit. The court disagreed, noting the Pakistan Constitution honors provincial law to the extent that it does not conflict with national law and Pakistani law prohibits the export of "wild animal skins and garments made from such skins, products or derivatives of such skins." The Court held that the Government established probable cause for the forfeiture, and Claimant did not demonstrate that any genuine issue of material fact exists which would preclude the award of summary judgment. |
Case |