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Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
Hanrahan v. Hometown America, LLC 90 So.3d 915 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) 2012 WL 2327814 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.)

While walking his dog one evening, the plaintiff's husband was attacked by fire ants. In an attempt to remove the ants off his person, the plaintiff's husband collapsed in the shower. Two days later, he died. As a representative for her husband's estate and in her own capacity, the plaintiff filed a negligence suit against her landlord. After the trial court granted the landlord's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed. Affirming the lower court's decision, the appeals court reasoned that since the landlord did not harbor, possess, or introduce the fire ants onto the premises, the landlord owed no duty to the plaintiff.

Case
MI - Emergency - 333.20925. Emergency transport of police dog M.C.L.A. 333.20925 This law, effective in March of 2019, states that the provisions of the Emergency Medical Services Act does not prohibit an ambulance from providing emergency transport of a police dog that is injured in the line of duty to a veterinary clinic or similar facility, if the police dog is in need of emergency medical treatment and there are no individuals who require transport or emergency assistance at that time. Statute
MD - Spay/neuter - § 2-1602. Spay/Neuter Fund MD Code, Agriculture, § 2-16021 - 1605 This Maryland law establishes a spay/neuter fund to finance local governments and animal welfare organizations for programs to facilitate the spay and neutering of dogs and cats in the state. In addition, as of 2014, each county and organization that receives funding shall quarterly report: (1) the number of cats and dogs taken in; (2) the number of cats and dogs disposed of, broken down by method of disposal, including euthanasia; and (3) any other relevant data the Department requires. Statute
CA - Cruelty - § 286.5. Sexually assaulting animal; misdemeanor West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 286.5 CA PENAL § 286.5 This California law, amended in 2019, provides that every person who has sexual contact with an animal is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any authorized officer investigating a violation of this section may seize an animal that has been used in the commission of an offense to protect the health or safety of the animal or the health or safety of others, and to obtain evidence of the offense Statute
BD - Cruelty - THE CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT, 1920 Cruelty to Animals Act, 1920 (Act No. I of 1920)

This Act constitutes Bangladesh's prevention of cruelty to animals act. The act defines "animal" as "any domestic or captured animal." Any person who: overdrives, cruelty or unnecessarily beats, or otherwise ill-treats any animal; binds or carries an animal in a position as to subject the animal to unnecessary pain or suffering; offers or has in his possession an animal that is suffering because of mutilation, thirst, starvation or other ill-treatment shall be punished for every such offence with fine up to one hundred Taka, or imprisonment up to three months, or with both. Overloading an animal is also punishable with a fine or jail term, and animal fighting results in a fine.  

Statute
Haviland v. Butz 543 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 543 F.2d 169, 36 A.L.R. Fed. 615, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 22

This case addresses whether the Secretary of Agriculture intended to include “animal acts” under the AWA. Animal acts are any performance of animals where such animals are trained to perform some behavior or action or are part of a show, performance, or exhibition. Defendant presented an animal act with dogs and ponies to paying audiences and occasionally appeared on commercial television. Defendant asserted that he did not “exhibit” animals simply by showing dogs and ponies and argued that the Secretary unconstitutionally added “animal acts” to the AWA. The court held that the inclusion of “animal acts” was authorized as“[t]he words ‘includes’ and ‘such as’ [in the AWA] point convincingly to the conclusion that the listing of types of exhibitions in the statutory text was intended to be but partial and illustrative.”

Case
Thurston v. Carter 92 A. 295 (Maine, 1914) L.R.A. 1915C,359, 112 Me. 361, 92 A. 295, Am.Ann.Cas. 1917A,389 This action of trespass is brought for the recovery of damages for the killing of the fox hound of plaintiff by defendant.  Defendant claimed that he shot and killed the plaintiff's dog while it was chasing and worrying a cat belonging to and upon the land of the defendant. After the introduction of all the evidence, the court ordered a verdict for defendant. To this direction, plaintiff filed his bill of exceptions in which it is stipulated that if a cat is a domestic animal, the ruling below is to stand, otherwise judgment is to be entered for plaintiff in the sum of $50. Case
US - Eagle - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Reopening of Comment Period 1995 WL 121178 (F.R.)

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) is reopening the comment period on the bald eagle reclassification proposal for thirty days. On July 12, 1994, the Service proposed reclassifying the bald eagles of the lower 48 States as threatened, except those already listed as threatened and those of the Southwestern Recovery Region and Mexico. The bald eagles of the Southwestern Recovery Region were proposed to remain listed as endangered. The Service also proposed classifying bald eagles in Mexico as endangered; they are not currently listed as endangered or threatened. Specific public comment was solicited on the status of bald eagles in the Southwest and Mexico and the distinctness of those eagles as a separate population.

New information indicates that the Southwestern and Mexican bald eagles may not warrant a classification as endangered. The Service is making available for public review and comment information recently received about bald eagles of the Southwestern Recovery Region.

Administrative
Western Watersheds Project v. USDA APHIS Wildlife Services 320 F.Supp.3d 1137 (D. Idaho June 22, 2018) 2018 WL 3097016 (D. Idaho June 22, 2018) This action considers motions for summary judgment by both parties. At issue here is a plan by a branch of the USDA called Wildlife Services (WS), which is responsible for killing or removing predators and other animals that prey on wild game animals, threaten agricultural interests, or pose a danger to humans. The decision to kill the animals comes from requests from individuals or other state and federal agencies rather than a decision by WS. For this case, the facts center on an expanded operation to kill game animals and protected species in Idaho (mainly coyotes and ravens) known as PDM. As part of this process, WS prepared and circulated a draft Environmental Assessment (EA) to other federal agencies, stakeholders, and the public seeking comment to the expanded plan. However, instead of taking the criticisms and suggestions from the EA and then undertaking a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), WS instead rejected most responses and labeled them as unconvincing or invalid. This led plaintiff to file suit against WS, arguing that the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by not preparing the EIS after comments to the EA. For example, the BLM, the Forest Service, and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG), found that the EA was not an "objective analysis" and instead sounded "like a pre-decisional defense of lethal methods." These agencies warned WS that the predator control methods were "likely to be futile over the long-term" and did not consider cascading effects on both cyclic and non-cyclic prey populations. In analyzing the factors, this court found that WS failed to consider "several federal agencies with long experience and expertise in managing game animals and protected species" when proposing to expand the expanded PDM program. There was a lack of crucial data to support WS' assumptions in its modeling that was exacerbated by use of unreliable data, according to the court. In addition, the court found that WS failed to "explain away scientific challenges to the effectiveness of predator removal." Not only was the court troubled by the lack of reliable data used by WS, but the WS’ “unconvincing responses” to agencies that had substantial experience managing wildlife and land-use concerns demonstrated to the court that the PDM is controversial and the environmental impacts were uncertain. This in and of itself necessitated an EIS under NEPA. The court held that the lack of reliable data, the unconvincing responses from WS, combine to trigger three intensity factors that combine to require WS to prepare an EIS. The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted and the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied (the motion by plaintiff to supplement the administrative record was deemed moot). Case
State v. Chilinski 330 P.3d 1169 (Mont. 2014) 2014 MT 206, 2014 WL 3842953 (Mont. 2014) After a call reporting the poor health of over 100 dogs at a large Malamute breeding operation and the recruitment of the Humane Society of the United States, including several volunteers, to help execute a warrant, defendant was charged with one misdemeanor count of cruelty to animals and 91 counts of felony cruelty to animals pursuant to § 45–8–211, MCA. Defendant was convicted by a jury of 91 counts of animal cruelty and sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a total of 30 years with 25 years suspended. A prohibition from possessing any animals while on probation was also imposed on the defendant, as well as an order to forfeit every seized dog and all puppies born after the execution of the warrant. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, defendant argued the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court held, however, that the search warrant authorizing seizure of “any and all dogs” and “any and all records pertaining to dogs” was not impermissibly overbroad; that the participation by civilian volunteers and Humane Society personnel in execution the warrant was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment or the Montana Constitution; and that the use of civilian volunteers to assist in execution of search did not violate defendant's right to privacy. The Supreme Court therefore held that the lower court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence. Next, the defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion when it improperly determined that the results of an investigation of his kennels in 2009 were irrelevant pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403. The court, however, agreed with the District Court, despite defendant's claim that 2009 inspection would show that the poor conditions of the kennels and the dogs in 2011 were justified due to economic hardship and health issues. Finally, defendant argued that the District Court was not authorized to order forfeiture of the defendant’s dogs that were not identified as victims of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, however, held that the statute authorizing forfeiture of “any animal affected” as part of sentence for animal cruelty did not limit forfeiture of defendant's dogs to only those that served as basis for underlying charges, nor did it implicate the defendant's right to jury trial under the Apprendi case. The Supreme Court therefore held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the defendant to forfeit all of his dogs. The lower court’s decision was affirmed. Case

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