Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fackler v. Genetzky | 595 N.W.2d 884 (Neb., 1999) |
Plaintiffs sued defendant for the death of their racehorses resulting from alleged veterinary malpractice. The court held that a genuine issue of material fact as to whether veterinarian's actions comported with professional standard of care in treating racehorses precluded summary judgment. However, the owners were not entitled to recover damages for their emotional distress as result of veterinarian's alleged negligent destruction of horses. Nebraska law has generally regarded animals as personal property and emotional damages cannot be had for the negligent destruction of personal property. |
Case | ||
| Ranwez v. Roberts | 601 S.E.2d 449 (Ga.App., 2004) | 2004 WL 1405703 (Ga.App.), 268 Ga.App. 80 |
In this Georgia case, after sustaining severe injuries inflicted during a vicious attack by four pit bulls, Helene Ranwez sued her tenant neighbor and the owner of the rental property, Scott Roberts. The crucial question in this case was whether an out-of-possession landlord has liability for a tenant's dog bite. Roberts contended that because he had relinquished possession and control of the premises to his tenant, Glenn Forrest, he could not be held liable for Ranwez's injuries as a matter of law. In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court held that an out-of-possession landlord's tort liability to third persons is subject only to the statutory provisions of OCGA § 44-7-14, which makes it clear that a landlord who relinquishes possession of the premises cannot be liable to third parties for damages arising from the negligence of the tenant. |
Case | |
| Carroll v. County of Monroe | 712 F.3d 649 (2nd Cir. 2013) | Upon executing a no-knock warrant by using a battering ram to break through the front door of the plaintiff’s home, police encountered the plaintiff’s dog. An officer claimed the dog was growling, barking, and quickly and aggressively approaching him. He then fired one shot from his shotgun, striking the dog and killing him. Prior to the execution of the warrant, the officers were aware that a dog would be present and did not discuss a plan for controlling the dog or neutralizing the dog by any non-lethal means. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the police officers and municipality, alleging violations of her Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgement and held that the issue of whether the officer acted reasonably was a question for the jury. | Case | ||
| IA - Dog - Iowa Dangerous Dog/General Dog Laws | I. C. A. § 351.1 - 46; I. C. A. § 162.20; § 481A.22; § 481A.56; § 481A.56A | IA ST 351.1 - .46; IA ST § 162.20; § 481A.22; § 481A.56; § 481A.56A | These Iowa statutes comprise the state's dog laws. With regard to damage done by dogs and dog bites, the owner of a dog shall be liable to an injured party for all damages done by the dog, when the dog is caught in the action of worrying, maiming, or killing a domestic animal, or the dog is attacking or attempting to bite a person, except when the party damaged is doing an unlawful act, directly contributing to the injury. Further, the law states that it shall be the duty of the owner of any dog, cat or other animal which has bitten or attacked a person or any person having knowledge of such bite or attack to report this act to a local health or law enforcement official. The section also contains general rabies vaccination provisions and a prohibition on dogs running at large (results in impoundment). | Statute | |
| Knox v. Massachusetts Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | 425 N.E.2d 393 (Mass.App., 1981) | 12 Mass.App.Ct. 407 (Mass.App., 1981) |
In this Massachusetts case, the plaintiff, a concessionaire at the Brockton Fair intended to award goldfish as a prize in a game of chance. The defendant, Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (MSPCA), asserted that such conduct would violate G.L. c. 272, s 80F. In the action for declaratory relief, the court considered whether the term "animal" in the statute includes goldfish. The court concluded in the affirmative that, "in interpreting this humane statute designed to protect animals subject to possible neglect by prizewinners," former G.L. c. 272, s 80F applies to goldfish. |
Case | |
| Green v. Animal Protection League of Mercer Cty. | 51 N.E.3d 718 (Ohio,2016) | 2016 WL 1730535 (Ohio,2016) | Carl Green III, owned a dog, which was seized by the Mercer County Dog Warden in Ohio because it was running at large and was not wearing a current registration tag. The Animal Protection League of Mercer County (“APL”), purchased the dog from the Mercer County Dog Warden and placed the dog up for adoption. Appellant, Lori Winner adopted the dog. Green then filed a complaint in the Municipal Court, Celina County, asserting claims for replevin and conversion. The municipal court granted replevin and ordered Winner to return the dog to Green. Winner appealed this decision in the instant action arguing that (1) Green's ownership interest was terminated by operation of law; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to find that the Mercer County Dog Warden Was an Indispensable Party to the Litigation. The Court of Appeals agreed with Winner on the first assignment of error, finding that, because replevin is a statutory remedy in Ohio, the trial court's conclusion that the dog should be returned to Green is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court exercised its equitable powers to award possession to Green, and that it was "in the best interest of the dog" to return it to Green. The Court of Appeals found that the statute does not provide for this type of remedy. As to the second error, this Court overruled Winner's claim, finding that there was no claim raised that the Mercer County Dog Warden wrongfully sold the dog to the APL. Thus, the dog warden had no interest in the action and the trial court did not err by failing to join the warden as a party. The judgment was reversed and remanded. | Case | |
| CO - Lien, veterinary - Part 1. Lien on Personal Property. | C.R.S.A. § 38-20-102, 103 | CO ST § 38-20-102, 103 | These Colorado laws concern liens on pet animals for persons who are entrusted with caring for the animals. Under 38-20-102, any feeder, veterinarian, or other person entrusted with the pet for feeding, keeping, boarding, or medical shall have a lien for the amount of costs incurred in the care of the animal. Any contracts (or copies thereof) made by the owner of the pet animal with the person caring for the animals may be filed with the county clerk where the owner resides (or where the contract was made for non-residents). The filing of this contract constitutes notice to the contents of the contract and the legal effect of the filing. | Statute | |
| US - Dogs at Large - Part 2. Resource Protection, Public Use and Recreation. § 2.15 Pets. | 36 C.F.R. § 2.15 | This rule outlines the prohibitions for pets in designated Park Service areas. Pets or feral animals that are running-at-large and observed by an authorized person in the act of killing, injuring or molesting humans, livestock, or wildlife may be destroyed if necessary for public safety or protection of wildlife, livestock, or other park resources. Pets that do not pose a direct risk to wildlife may be impounded. | Administrative | ||
| US - Migratory - Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act | 16 USC 718 - 718k | The Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act, or the "Duck Stamp Act," as this March 16, 1934, authority is commonly called, requires each waterfowl hunter 16 years of age or older to possess a valid Federal hunting stamp. Receipts from the sale of the stamp are deposited in a special Treasury account known as the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund and are not subject to appropriations. A contest is held each year by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to select the design of the stamp. | Statute | ||
| State v. Pless | 646 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 2007) | 282 Ga. 58 (2007) |
In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court found that the evidence showed that in the months prior to the July 14 and August 1 incidents, Pless's dogs were repeatedly found loose in neighbors' yards and garages. Accordingly, evidence supported the conviction on the charge of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance under § 3-4-7(5). ("Public nuisance" is defined, among other things, as any animal which "[i]s found repeatedly at large."). On certiorari review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the issue was not properly before the Court of Appeals and there was no authority for the court to address it sua sponte. |
Case |