Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman | 313 F.3d 1904 (9th Cir. 2002) | 55 ERC 2051, 54 Fed.R.Serv.3d 526, 2 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,915, |
In 1999, President Clinton ordered the Forest Service ("FS") to initiate a nationwide plan to protect inventoried and uninventoried roadless areas in national forests, which eventually became termed the "Roadless Rule" (after extensive study was conducted in the 1970's). The Kootenai Tribe, several livestock and recreational groups, and other plaintiffs filed suit contending that the Roadless Rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), claiming the rule would prevent access to national forests for proper purposes (e.g., fighting wildfires and threats from insects or disease). On appeal of the grant of preliminary injunction, the Court held the Forest Service complied with the APA and NEPA in implementing the roadless rule, the court noted the extensive public notification process as well as the impact statements, which considered a full range of reasonable alternatives. The court held that the district court erred in finding a strong likelihood that the Forest Service violated NEPA, as there was only minimal showing of irreparable harm ("restrictions on human intervention are not usually irreparable in the sense required for injunctive relief"). |
Case |
| NY - Licenses - Chapter 69. Of the Consolidated Laws | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 109 | NY AGRI & MKTS § 109 | This New York statute provides that the owner of any dog reaching the age of four months shall immediately make application for a dog license. Certain villages and other municipalities may provide for differing licensure regulations as described in this statute. The statute outlines the specific application procedures for obtaining a license, including a purebred license. | Statute |
| Sligar v. Odell | 233 P.3d 914 (Wash.App. Div. 1, 2010) | 2010 WL 2674037 (Wash.App. Div. 1), 156 Wash.App. 720 (2010) |
In this Washington case, plaintiff Sligar was bitten on the finger by the Odells' dog after Sligar's finger protruded through a hole in the six-foot high chain link fence that separated their two properties. The court found the dispositive question was whether, pursuant to RCW 16.08.040 and .050 (a law that defines when entry onto the property of the dog owner is for a lawful purpose) Sligar's finger was “lawfully in or on ... the property of the” Odells at the time of the dog bite. The court found that the statute provides that consent may not be presumed where the property is fenced. Concerning the common law negligence claim, Sligar contends that the Odells were negligent in failing to protect her from harm because they failed to erect a solid fence on the property boundary until after the bite occurred. However, the court had previously found that it is not unreasonable to keep a dog in a fenced backyard where the dog has not shown any dangerous propensities. |
Case |
| Bermudez v Hanan | Slip Copy, 44 Misc.3d 1207(A), 2013 WL 5496124 (Table) (N.Y.City Civ.Ct.), | 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 51610(U) |
This unpublished small claims court opinion concerns a dog bite. Claimant sought to recover monetary damages for medical bills and related expenses she incurred as a result of personal injuries suffered when Defendant's dog named "Chino" bit her on the face. At issue is whether Chino had vicious propensities and whether Defendant was aware of or had knowledge of those vicious propensities. The court found that Plaintiff did not raise an issue of fact as to the dog's vicious propensities. The court found compelling evidence that Chino was certified by the Good Dog Foundation to visit healthcare facilities as a therapy dog. As a result, the court dismissed the motion. |
Case |
| Wales - Collars, electronic - The Animal Welfare (Electronic Collars) (Wales) Regulations 2010 | 2010 No. 943 (W.97) | Regulations prohibiting the use of electronic collars on dogs and cats in Wales. | Statute | |
| Animal Law Index Volume 20, Part 2 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 20, Issue 2 (Spring 2014)
INTRODUCTIONTHE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT FORTY: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
|
Policy | ||
| U.S. v. 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets | 689 F.Supp. 1106 (S.D.Fla., 1988) | 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,101 (1988) |
Plaintiff U.S. sought to forfeit the Defendant parakeets on the ground that they were imported in violation of Peruvian law and consequently, in violation of the Lacey Act. The court held that, if even the "innocent owner" defense was available under the Lacey Act (which the court held it is not under the forfeiture provision of the statute), the claimant importer never attempted to independently confirm or verify that the parakeet species in question (brotogeris versicolorus) could be lawfully imported from Peru. Thus, the court held the forfeiture valid where the U.S. established by probable cause to believe the Lacey Act was violated where the testimony at trial established that Peruvian Supreme Decree No. 934-73-AG prohibits from anywhere in the national territory the exportation of wild live animals coming from the forest or jungle region. |
Case |
| Reams v. Irvin | 561 F.3d 1258 (C.A.11 (Ga.),2009) | 2009 WL 579222 (C.A.11 (Ga.)); 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1607 |
On Plaintiff’s civil rights § 1983 action against Defendant, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Agriculture, based on the impoundment of forty-six horses and three donkeys from Plaintiff’s property following an investigation into potential violations of the Georgia Humane Care for Equines Act (the “Act”), Plaintiff appealed the District Court’s decision to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity because Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of her equines, adequate notice of Plaintiff’s right to and procedure for requesting a hearing, and adequate post-deprivation process. The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the risk of erroneous deprivation in this case was minimal in light of the State’s compliance with the standards and procedures for inspection and impoundment prescribed by the Act, that the statutory notice of the right to contest the impoundment was reasonably calculated to provide Plaintiff with notice of her right to a hearing, and that the Act provided adequate power to review and to remedy violations of due process. |
Case |
| NC - Ordinances - § 67-4.5. Local ordinances | N.C.G.S.A. § 67-4.5 | NC ST § 67-4.5 | This North Carolina statute provides that nothing in the dangerous dog laws shall be construed to prevent a city or county from adopting or enforcing its own program for control of dangerous dogs. | Statute |
| Commonwealth v. Gonzalez | 403 Pa. Super. 157 (Pa. 1991) | Appellant was convicted of cruelty to animals for cockfighting. On appeal, appellant claimed that the delegation of police power to animal welfare agents was unconstitutional. The court found that appellant was without standing to complain because he failed to show an injury. Appellant also argued that the animal fighting statute was preempted by a federal statute, 7 U.S.C.S. § 2156. The court disagreed. Finally, appellant asserted that § 5511 was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court determined that appellant lacked standing to challenge the statute's overbreadth. | Case |