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Displaying 161 - 170 of 6822
Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
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AR - Racing - Arkansas Greyhound Racing Law | A.C.A. §§ 23-111-101 to 23-111-518 | AR ST §§ 23-111-101 to 23-111-518 | This Act gives the Arkansas Racing Commission sole jurisdiction over the business and the sport of greyhound racing. Greyhound racing may only be conducted in the State of Arkansas by a franchise that is approved by the Arkansas Racing Commission. A franchise must be a corporation organized under the state of Arkansas. A franchise may not be a individual, partnerships, associations, or trusts. A franchise may not be granted by the Commission until it is authorized by a majority of the qualified electors within the county in which the franchise intends to operate. The voters will be able to choose whether to allow or reject the Racing Commission's grant to the franchise to conduct greyhound racing. Each county is only allowed to have one franchise conducting greyhound racing. | Statute |
CT - Cruelty - § 54-86n. Appointment of advocate in proceeding re the welfare or custody of a cat or dog. | C.G.S.A. § 54-86n | CT ST § 54-86n | This 2016 law states that, in a cruelty or welfare proceedings, the court may order, upon its own initiative or upon request of a party or counsel for a party, that a separate advocate be appointed to represent the interests of justice. That advocate can monitor the case and supply the court with information about the welfare of the cat or dog. The Department of Agriculture shall maintain a list of attorneys with knowledge of animal issues and the legal system and a list of law schools that have students, or anticipate having students, with an interest in animal issues and the legal system. Such attorneys and law students shall be eligible to serve on a voluntary basis as advocates under this section. | Statute |
MS - Endangered Species - Chapter 5. Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act | Miss. Code Ann. § 49-5-101 to 49-5-119 | MS ST §§ 49-5-101 to 49-5-119 | These Mississippi statutes provide the short title for the Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act, the definitions for the Act, the legislative findings, and the associated regulations of the Act. Violations under the Act may incur up to a $1,000 fine and/or one-year term of imprisonment as well as equipment confiscation. | Statute |
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert | 2013 WL 4017889 (D. Utah July 22, 2013) | The Animal Legal Defense Fund and other plaintiffs challenged Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-112, which criminalizes recording images or sounds at industrialized farming operations, and entering industrialized farming operations by false pretenses or misrepresentation. The Plaintiffs alleged that § 76-6-112 violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Plaintiffs had not suffered actual harm, and thus did not have standing. The U.S. District Court Judge dismissed some Plaintiffs from the case, but allowed it to move forward. | Case | |
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Austin | 55 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (D. Mont. 2014) | 2014 WL 5439589 | Plaintiff challenged the defendants' approval of the Rennic Stark Project in the Ninemile Ranger District of the Lolo National Forest under the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Project proposed a host of forest management measures. Under the National Environmental Protection Act, the defendant published an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for the project in November 2012. The EA discussed the likely effects of the project on a number of wildlife species, including the ESA-listed threatened Canada lynx, the Forest Service-sensitive fisher, the Forest Service-sensitive North American wolverine, goshawk, and westslope cutthroat trout. The defendant signed and issued a Decision Notice adopting Alternative 2 from the EA, as well as a Finding of No Significant Impact. Plaintiff timely appealed the defendant's decision, but the defendant denied the appeal. Plaintiff then filed its complaint in this court and moved for summary judgment. Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied on all claims and defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted on all claims. | Case |
Haggblom v. City of Dillingham | 191 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2008) | This is an owner's appeal of the city order which ordered her dog be euthanized or banished from city limits because the dog bit a person without provocation. The order had been affirmed by the superior court and is now in front of the state Supreme Court. Haggblom argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not provide meaningful process, and is too vague because it does not explicitly offer the alternative of banishment from city limits. This court found that due process was satisfied and that the ordinance is constitutionally clear, and thus affirms the order. | Case | |
DC - Cruelty - Subchapter V. Classroom Animals. | DC CODE § 8-1851.01 to .02 | These DC statutes allow animals of appropriate size and temperament be kept in classrooms for instructional purposes. The animals must be provided with sufficient food and water, and be cared for in a safe and humane manner. If the animals are no longer needed, they should be adopted out or given to a local humane organization for adoption. | Statute | |
Keep Michigan Wolves Protected v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res. | Not Reported in N.W.2d2016 WL 6905923 (2016) | Plaintiff, Keep Michigan Wolves Protected (KMWP), appealed an order of the Court of Claims concluding that PA 281 does not violate Michigan's Constitution or statutes, and the granting of summary disposition in favor of defendants, the State of Michigan, the Department of Natural Resources, and the Natural Resources Commission. The issue began in 2011 when the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service removed gray wolves from the federal list of endangered species, returning management of wolf populations to Michigan. In 2012, the governor of Michigan signed PA 520 into law, which added the wolf to the definition of "game" animals. Plaintiff KMWP organized a statewide referendum petition drive to reject PA 520 at the November 4, 2014 general election, which would have rendered PA 520 ineffective unless approved by a majority of voters. In 2013, Michigan's Governor signed into law PA 21 and PA 22, which granted the Natural Resources Commission (NRC) authority to manage wolves. In addition, the laws also gave qualified members of the military free game and fish licenses. Another petition drive was initiated by plaintiff and required signatures were collected to place the issue on the November 2014 ballot. However, in December 2013, before this, Citizens for Professional Wildlife Management (CPWM) circulated a petition to initiate the Scientific Fish and Wildlife Management Act also known as PA 281. This new law would reenact PA 520 and 21, giving the NRC authority for designating game animals, offering free military hunting and fishing licenses, and appropriating $1 million to manage invasive species. In May of 2014, the CPWM certified this initiative petition and submitted directly it to the Legislature to enact or reject the law. The Legislature adopted the law, which became known as PA 281. Notably, at the November 2014 election, a majority of voters rejected PA 520 and PA 21. Regardless, PA 281, which included the voter-rejected designation of the wolf as a game species, was signed into law and the NRC designated wolves as a game species effective March 2015. Following this, plaintiff filed the underlying complaint that challenged the constitutionality of PA 281, specifically that it violated the Title–Object Clause of Michigan's Constitution, Const 1963, art 4, § 24, which states that (1) a law must not embrace more than one object, and (2) the object of the law must be expressed in its title. The Court of Claims granted defendants' summary disposition motion, holding the the general purpose of PA 281 is to “manage fish, wildlife, and their habitats” and that all of the law's provisions relate to this purpose, and concluded that the law did not violate the single-object requirement of the Title–Object Clause. The Court of Appeals found that some provisions of PA 281 did not violate the Title-Object Clause including (1) free licenses to military and (2) appropriating $1 million to respond to the threat of invasive fish species. However, the court did find that the free licenses to members of the military has no necessary connection to the scientific management of fish, wildlife, and their habitats violating the single-object rule of the Title-Object Clause. While the court noted that there is a severability option with provisions of laws that violate the Title-Object Clause, the court cannot conclude the Legislature would have passed PA 281 without the provision allowing free hunting, trapping, and fishing licenses for active members of the military. Thus, this provision cannot be severed from PA 281, and, consequently, the court found PA 281 is unconstitutional. The court noted that its decision rests solely under an analysis of the Michigan Constitution and related cases. However, the court noted that plaintiff's assertion that the initiating petition by defendant put "curb appeal" of free military licenses and invasive species control to "surreptitiously" reenact a provision that would ensure wolves would be on the game species list was an "accurate" assessment. The court even said that PA 281 "conjures up images of a Trojan Horse, within which the ability to hunt wolves was cleverly hidden." The order granting summary judgment for defendants was reversed and the matter was remanded. | Case | |
Decreto Supremo N.° 010-2022-MIDAGRI, 2022 (Peru) | Este Decreto Supremo expedido por el Ministerio de Agricultura y Riego del Perú, aprueba el Reglamento Sanitario para la Producción y Comercialización de Material Genético de Animales de Producción. El objetivo de este decreto es establecer disposiciones para la aplicación de medidas sanitarias en la producción y comercialización de material genético de animales de producción, contribuyendo a la vigilancia epidemiológica, prevención, control y erradicación de enfermedades que afecten a los animales. Todo lo anterior con la finalidad de evitar la propagación y diseminación de enfermedades que afecten el estatus sanitario del país. | Statute | ||
ME - Humane Slaughter - Subchapter IV. Slaughter. | 22 M. R. S. A. § 2521 to 2521-C | ME ST T. 22 § 2521 to 2521C | The Maine humane slaughter provisions begin with a statement of policy that a method of slaughtering or handling in connection with slaughtering does not comply with the public policy of the State unless it is humane. A humane method is defined as one which renders animals insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective before they are shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast or cut. Additionally, slaughtering and handling in accordance with the ritual requirements of a religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain is allowed. The section applies only to "livestock" and does not list a penalty for noncompliance (although the associated regulations may define both). | Statute |