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Displaying 71 - 80 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 1342597 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2024) | 2024 WL 1342597 (W.D.Mo., 2024) | Plaintiffs, a nonprofit advocacy organization and a plant-based meat alternative producer, filed this case to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that criminalizes the misrepresentation of a product as meat that is not derived from livestock or poultry. Plaintiffs bring four constitutional claims against the statute: violation of the First Amendment, violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, violation of Due Process, and Declaratory Judgment. For the First Amendment violation, plaintiffs specifically argue that the statute is an unlawful restriction on truthful commercial speech. However, the court finds that the statute does not restrict truthful commercial speech, since plaintiffs are still able to accurately indicate what sort of products they are selling to consumers. For the Dormant Commerce Clause argument, the court finds that the statute does not discriminate in purpose or effect, and that the statute passes the Pike balancing test. For the Due Process claim, the court finds that the statute provides sufficiently specific guidance to both the public and prosecutors as to what actions are prohibited, so it does not violate Due Process. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff's claims and motion for summary judgment. | Case |
| Sentencia T-146/16 | Sentencia T-146/16 | Plaintiffs, a family that owned a howler monkey named "bebé" or "King Kong," filed "Amparo" seeking the protection of their rights to life and health, arguing that such rights had been violated by "Corporación Autónoma Regional de Cundinamarca's" (CAR) refusal to return "bebé" to his family. The plaintiffs alleged that "bebé" was a member of their family, and not having him affected the family's emotional and physical health. Finally, they argued that the sadness and depression were so severe that they took group therapy with a psychologist. The monkey was stolen from the family's property and rescued was assisted by "Corporación Autónoma Regional de Cundinamarca," who sent the monkey to "Fundación Bioandina." However, the defendants reported the monkey to be completely "humanized." He was so stressed that he did not eat and had to be relocated to the Medellin Zoo to be rehabilitated. The Second Chamber of Review of the Constitutional Court determined that wildlife is not subject to property by individuals and that the state of freedom of wildlife should be privileged. According to article 248 of the National Code of Renewable Natural Resources, the court stated that wildlife belongs to the nation. Therefore, the defendant's actions did not violate the family's well-being, as the forfeiture of wildlife is necessary to ensure their conservation protection as it is a constitutional mandate to protect biodiversity and environmental integrity. The court noted that the monkey had completed his rehabilitation process and had been reintroduced to his natural habitat. | Case | |
| CA - Burro - § 53074.5. Undomesticated burros; removal by officer or employee of local | West's Ann. Cal. Gov. Code § 53074.5 | CA GOVT § 53074.5 | This California law allows an officer or employee of a local animal control agency to remove an undomesticated burro that strays onto private land at the request of the landowner. Such officer can also remove an undomesticated burro that strays onto a public roadway to ensure public safety. | Statute |
| LA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | LSA-R.S. 3:2361 - 2367; LSA-R.S. 14:102 - .29 | These Louisiana statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty provisions. The term "cruel" is defined in the first section every act or failure to act whereby unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted. The crime of cruelty to animals is subdivided into simple cruelty or aggravated cruelty. Simple cruelty occurs when a person intentionally or with criminal negligence overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, or overworks, torments, cruelly beats, or unjustifiably injures, or, having charge, custody, or possession of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, unjustifiably fails to provide any living animal with proper food, proper drink, proper shelter, or proper veterinary care. | Statute | |
| MT - Initiatives - Constitutional Amendment 41 | Constitutional Amendment 41 (2004) | This 2004 ballot measure was an amendment to the constitution proposed by the legislature. The 2003 Legislature submitted this proposal for a vote. It would amend the Montana Constitution by adding a provision specifically to recognize and preserve the opportunity of Montana citizens to harvest wild fish and wild game animals. The amendment specifies that this new provision does not create a right to trespass on private property or diminish any other private rights. This amendment is effective upon approval by the electorate. It was passed in 2004 by 80.6% of voters. | Statute | |
| State v. Brown | 771 N.W.2d 267 (N.D.,2009) | 2009 WL 2506287 (N.D.), 2009 ND 150 |
In this North Dakota case, the defendant appeals from a criminal judgment finding she violated the Cass County Animal Control Ordinance after her neighbors reported her barking dogs. In her first appeal ground, Brown contended that the Ordinance constituted an unconstitutional delegation of power. The court disagreed, finding that Cass County adopted a home rule charter and thus had the power to create criminal penalties for violations of ordinances. Brown next argued that the legislature “has statutorily prohibited the county from attempting to regulate dogs as public nuisances.” Since the state has defined certain “dog activities” that constitute a public nuisance, the county is precluded from declaring any other dog-related activity a public nuisance according to defendant. The court found that this broad interpretation would preclude action by the county if the state has exercised any authority and would virtually eliminate the county's authority granted by home-rule authority. The court also rejected Brown’s argument that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. The Ordinance provides that an animal that “barks ... in an excessive or continuous manner” is a public nuisance. The court held that its holding in Kilkenny, 2007 ND 44, ¶¶ 20-25, 729 N.W.2d 120, is controlling here, where the words excessive, continuous, or untimely have a common understanding and are not vague. |
Case |
| Bal Harbour Village v. Welsh | 879 So.2d 1265 (Fl. 2004) | 879 So.2d 1265 (Fl. 2004) |
Defendant owned four dogs prior to the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting municipality residents from owning more than two dogs in one household. The municipality brought suit against Defendant for failing to comply with the ordinance. The trial court denied the municipalities prayer for permanent injunctive relief, but the Court of Appeals overruled the decision holding the ordinance could constitutionally be enforced under the police power to abate nuisance. |
Case |
| Berres v. Anderson | 561 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) | This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought by the purchasers of cattle that tested positive for Johne's disease. The veterinarian diagnosed the disease in the seller's herd and treated the buyer's herd for the disease. The trial court granted summary judgment for the veterinarian on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired for the malpractice claim. On appeal, the court reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment, as it determined that the record indicated a genuine issue for trial as to the causation of the spread of the disease among the herd of cattle and whether adequate hygiene would have reduced the spread of the disease. | Case | |
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds | 591 F. Supp. 3d 397 (S.D. Iowa 2022), rev'd and remanded, 89 F.4th 1065 (8th Cir. 2024) | 2022 WL 777231 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 14, 2022) | Plaintiffs, five non-profit organizations dedicated to animal protection, food safety, and other advocacy issues, filed suit challenging Iowa Code § 717.3B, which they contend infringes on their constitutional rights. Specifically, these organizations contend that Iowa's new "ag-gag" law criminalizes their actions in gathering information through undercover investigations at animal production facilities. These organizations must misrepresent or conceal their identities to gather gather evidence of animal abuse and other alleged illegal conduct in day-to-day activities at facilities where they suspect wrongdoing occurs. Iowa Code § 717A.3B is the second in a series of laws passed by the Iowa legislature aimed at criminalizing undercover investigations such as the ones conducted by Plaintiffs. The previous law was challenged by these same plaintiffs and a permanent injunction was passed by the United States District Court. The defendants challenged the injunction in the Eighth Circuit, but before that was decided, the Iowa legislature passed the new section (§ 717A.3B). Here, both parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs contend that the new law violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it discriminates based on content and viewpoint and cannot survive strict scrutiny. Defendants argue that the law does not regulate protected speech under the First Amendment or, if it does regulate protected speech, it is content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral and passes intermediate scrutiny. The court first noted that the issue with § 717A.3B, and other laws aimed at prohibiting trespassers at agricultural facilities, is the law seeks to single out specific individuals for punishment based on their viewpoint regarding such facilities. This law operates in a viewpoint discriminatory fashion because it prohibits the deceptive trespasser who gains access or obtain employment at an agricultural facility with the intent to cause “economic harm ... to the agricultural production facility's ... business interest" as opposed to trespassers with an intent to benefit the facility. Thus, Section 717A.3B does not focus solely on the right to exclude, the legally cognizable harm of trespass, but only on the right to exclude those with particular viewpoints. While the court noted that a state legislature may determine whether specific facilities—such as agricultural facilities, nuclear power plants, military bases, or other sensitive buildings—are entitled to special legal protections, the First Amendment does not allow those protections to be based on a violator's viewpoint. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and Defendant's was denied. | Case |
| Morawek v. City of Bonney Lake | 184 Wash. App. 487, 337 P.3d 1097 (2014) | 2014 WL 6061489 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2014) | A woman filed a complaint with the Bonney Lake animal control authority after her neighbor’s dog killed her cat. The animal control officer served plaintiff with paperwork stating that his dog satisfied the definition of a dangerous dog under the Bonney Lake Municipal Code because the dog had killed a domestic animal without provocation while off his owner's property. Plaintiff appealed the designation to the police chief, the city hearing examiner, and the superior court; all of which affirmed the designation. The Washington Court of Appeals, however, held that the hearing examiner's finding that the owner's dog killed the neighbor's cat without provocation was not supported by substantial evidence, as required to uphold a dangerous dog designation, even though the “location” element of the dangerous dog designation was satisfied. The dangerous dog designation was therefore reversed. | Case |