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Displaying 6551 - 6560 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Animal Control - Chapter 20.5. Animal Control Officer Standards Act. | West's Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 26220 - 26230 | This comprises the Animal Control Officer Standards Act. The law requires the Board of Directors of the California Animal Welfare Association to develop and maintain standards for various classes of CACOs. The standards for education, training, and certification shall be adopted by administrative rule of the board, and shall not be less rigorous than those described in this chapter. The board shall maintain a registry of each application for a certificate of registration under this chapter. | Statute | ||
| Noway - Cruelty - Norwegian Animal Welfare Act (2010) | Norwegian Animal Welfare Act |
This comprehensive Animal Welfare Act from Norway covers nearly all aspects in the treatment of animals, including research, farming, and general care. The intention of this Act is to promote good animal welfare and respect for animals. |
Statute | ||
| Hoog-Watson v. Guadalupe County, Tex | 591 F.3d 431 (Tex., 2009) | 2009 WL 4828742 C.A.5 (Tex.) |
In this Texas case, Hoog-Watson asserted that a search and seizure of her home violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Texas tort law, and sought both monetary and injunctive relief against county officials. On appeal, this Court found that Hoog-Watson presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the the requisite prior criminal proceeding took place, thereby precluding summary judgment. As to County Attorney Murray-Kolb's claim of prosecutorial immunity, this court found that because Murray-Kolb partipated in the search and seizure, an investigative function normally performed by the police, she is protected only by qualified immunity. |
Case | |
| Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management | 548 F. Supp. 3d 39 (D.D.C. 2021) | 2021 WL 2935900 (D.D.C. July 13, 2021) | This case involves a motion for a preliminary injunction by the group Friends of Animals to prevent the Bureau of Land Management from gathering and removing excess horses inside and adjacent to the Onaqui Mountain Herd Management Area (“Onaqui Mountain HMA”) to reduce the number of horses to the low end of the appropriate management level (“AML”). The BLM contends such an accelerated removal is necessary because of the historic drought that has gripped the American West. The court first examined the language and legislative history of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WHA), noting that the overarching goal of the act is provide balance between the horses and ecological impact on the lands. The WLA requires the Secretary to strike this balance by setting appropriate management levels and deciding on how to deal with excess animals. In addition, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is also implicated with decisions to gather horses which is done primarily through the Environmental Assessment (EA) process. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction finding the advocacy organizations were unlikely to succeed on merits. | Case | |
| Chimps, Inc., International Primate League, and Marguerite Gordon v. Primarily Primates, Inc. | Plaintiffs Chimps, Inc., International Primate Protection League, and Marguerite Gordon (collectively known as the plaintiffs) file this Complaint for declaratory relief, quantum meruit, and a lien for services against Defendant Primary Primates, Inc. (PPI). In this complaint, plaintiffs allege that PPI had over 700 animals, most of them nonhuman primates, living in abusive, substandard and dangerous conditions. | Pleading | |||
| In the Matter of: Darcy Lynn Shawyer | 1980 NOAA LEXIS 2 | 2 O.R.W. 301 (1980) |
This case is a civil penalty proceeding under the MMPA for the unlawful importation of eight bottlenose porpoises into the United States. In this case, the court found that specific intent is not required for importation under the MMPA. The court found that the route taken over the United States, the requirement to land for customs clearance purposes, or weather conditions was known or should have been foreseeable to all parties. |
Case | |
| CO - Wildlife - Rules for Possession of Terrestrial Wildlife. | 2 CO ADC 406-0:006 to 0:009 | 2 CCR 406-0:006 to 0:009 | This set of regulations comprises the Colorado Department of Natural Resources general rules for the importation, transportation, possession, and release of terrestrial wildlife. | Administrative | |
| Pennsylvania Statute Laws 1920: Article 16: Agriculture Laws | 14 Pa. Stat. §§ 394-402 (1920) | Pennsylvania laws concerning the treatment of animals in agriculture. The laws cover such topics as maiming and disfiguring animals to the transportation of an animal. | Statute | ||
| McNeely v. U.S. | 874 A.2d 371 (D.C. App. 2005) | Defendant McNeely was convicted in a jury trial in the Superior Court of violating the Pit Bull and Rottweiler Dangerous Dog Designation Emergency Amendment Act. On appeal, t he Court of Appeals, held that the Act did not deprive defendant of fair warning of the proscribed conduct, as the defendant here was required to know that he owned pit bulls in order to be convicted under the Act; and the prosecutor's improper comment was rendered harmless by the trial court's curative instructions. | Case | ||
| Dallas Safari Club v. Bernhardt | 453 F. Supp. 3d 391 (D.D.C. 2020) | 2020 WL 1809181 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2020) | Individual elephant sport hunters and their hunting organizations (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) seeking to import their sport-hunted elephant trophies from Africa into the United States. The Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the Service to process pending and subsequently filed permit applications. The African Elephant is listed as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and is also a species that is regulated by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”). All African elephant trophy imports require the Service to make an enhancement finding, meaning that the killing of the trophy animal will enhance the survival of the species, and issue an ESA permit. Additionally, certain African elephant trophy imports require a non-detriment finding and a CITES import permit. Historically, the Service made periodic countrywide enhancement and non-detriment findings, however, this came to a halt due to a Presidential tweet surrounding media criticism over the Service’s decision to lift the suspension on Zimbabwe’s ESA enhancement finding. The Court found that injunctive relief was not warranted because the Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm as to any Plaintiff. The individual Plaintiffs argued that they had suffered both emotional harm and economic harm. However, the Plaintiffs were on notice that their applications could take a significant amount of time to process. Additionally, the emotional distress claimed by the Plaintiffs would be alleviated when the Service issues a decision either granting or denying their permit applications, therefore, the harm that the Plaintiffs were claiming was not irreparable. The Court found that the individual hunter Plaintiffs’ alleged emotional and economic injuries were insufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction. The organizational Plaintiffs argued that they each were suffering irreparable harm derivatively because the Service’s delay in processing permit applications would decrease the popularity of sport hunting in Africa and cause a decrease in funding for conservation efforts. The problem was that the organizational Plaintiffs offered no proof to substantiate this argument. The Court ultimately held that in light of the disruptions caused by COVID-19 and the diminished capacity of the Service to process permit applications during this unprecedented time, it would be unwise and not in the public interest to order the expeditious processing of sport trophy permit applications. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. | Case |