Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Xu v. Chen | 2008 CarswellBC 1693 | 2008 BCPC 234 |
The Claimant's six-month old sheltie puppy, "Diamond,” suffered a serious limb injury outside the front yard of the family home. Claimant seeks to recover the veterinarian costs she incurred to treat the dog's injury against Defendants, the owners of the other dog that allegedly attacked claimant’s dog. The court found that there was evidence that Defendant was previously contacted by Animal Control as well as a neighbor about an incident where Angus lunged at another dog. The Claimant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that Angus had manifested a propensity to cause the type of harm occasioned that night. Claimant was 25% liable for the incident where she left Diamond in an unfenced yard that gave other dogs access. The court denied Xu’s claim of $5500 for future medical costs for the care of Diamond because there was no evidence what these would be and the dog was currently living with another family. |
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| Yanner v Eaton | (1999) 201 CLR 351 | (1999) 105 LGERA 71; (1999) 166 ALR 258; (1999) 73 ALJR 1518; (1999) 18 Leg Rep 2; (1999) 107 A Crim R 551; [1999] HCA 53 |
The appellant was a member of the Gunnamulla clan of Gangalidda tribe from Gulf of Carpentaria and killed estuarine crocodiles by harpooning. He was charged under the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld) with taking fauna without holding a licence. The Court ultimately found that the appellant's right to hunt crocodiles in accordance with the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) were not extinguished by the Fauna Conservation Act. |
Case | |
| You Are What Your Food Eats: How Regulation Of Factory Farm Conditions Could Improve Human Health And Animal Welfare Alike | Anastasia S. Stathopoulos | 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 407 (2010) |
Part I of this Note discusses the current conditions on factory farms, including the suffering endured by the animals, the unsanitary and crowded conditions, the unwholesome contents of animal feed, and the drugs regularly administered to the animals. Part II describes how those conditions pose significant health risks for humans who consume factory-farmed meat and dairy products, including threats of antibiotic resistance, bacterial infections, cancer, heart disease, animal-origin influenza, and mad cow disease. Finally, Part III proposes six specific on-farm regulations that could drastically reduce such risks and explores whether the proposed regulations could be enacted by the FDA under the existing regulatory scheme. |
Article | |
| YOU DON’T OWN ME: FERAL DOGS AND THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP | Stacy A. Nowicki | 21 Animal L. 1 (2014) | Feral dogs occupy an ambiguous position, challenging standard categories of domestication, wildness, and property ownership. This ambiguity, in turn, complicates the legal status of feral dogs. Feral dogs’ property status is particularly critical, as whether a feral dog is owned by someone, or no one at all, hold implications not only for civil and criminal liability in incidents involving feral dogs, but also the legal ability of animal rescue organizations to intervene in the lives of feral dogs. Part II of this Article summarizes the application of property law to animals, particularly highlighting the role played by an animal’s status as wild or domestic; Part III explores the factors distinguishing feral dogs from other canines, determining that feral dogs should properly be situated as domestic animals; Part IV discusses the legal landscape relevant to feral dogs, focusing particularly on ownership and liability; and Part V examines the ways in which the property status of feral dogs may impact an animal rescue organization’s ability to care for those animals. | Article | |
| Young v. California Fish and Game Commission | 24 Cal. App. 5th 1178 (Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied (July 20, 2018), review denied (Sept. 26, 2018) | 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366 (Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied (July 20, 2018), review denied (Sept. 26, 2018) | Kele Young operated a wildlife preserve called Magic Jungle. Young received her first permit from the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (the Department) in 1990 which was renewed each year thereafter. On August 8, 2013, Young filed her restricted species permit renewal application. On the application, Young stated that she was exempt from payment of the permit fee, application fee, and the inspection fee. Young’s permit was set to expire on November 9, 2013. The Department notified Young on July 14, 2014 that her renewal application was incomplete because the fee had not been paid. The Department agreed to waive the $56.14 permit fee and the $56.65 application fee, but the Department stated that she still had to pay the $227.91 inspection fee. Young was given 30 days to pay the fee. The Department ultimately denied Young’s renewal application. Young appealed to the Commission. The Commission found for the Department. Young then sought a writ of mandate to require the Department to perform its duty to determine whether justified reasons existed to grant or deny Young’s request for a waiver of certain restricted species permitting fees. The trial court denied Young’s writ and this appeal followed. Young failed to support many of her arguments by reference to the record or legal authority, therefore, the only issues that were reviewed were whether the Wildlife Agencies could refuse to waive the inspection fee without consideration of the justified reasons or whether it was in the best interests of the public to waive the fee and if reversal was warranted due to the trial court failing to issue a statement of decision. The Court of Appeals found that no statement of decision was required by the trial court because a statement of decision is only required as to issues of fact and the trial court stated that it was only deciding issues of law and that there was no dispute as to the facts. As for the inspection fee, the Court found that the regulations specifically provided for a waiver of the permit fee but did not contain any other language that would allow for a waiver of the inspection fee. The permit fee was separate from the inspection fee and nothing in the regulations entitled her to a waiver of the inspection fee nor granted the Department the authority to waive such fee. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition for writ of mandate. | Case | |
| Young's Bus Lines v. Redmon | 43 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1931) |
Appellee blind newspaper vendor had a trained seeing eye dog that was run over and killed by a public bus, driven by appellant. The court held that the measure of damages was the market value of the dog at the time and place where it was killed. If the dog had no market value, then the intrinsic or actual value to appellee was the measure of damages. |
Case | ||
| Youngstown v. Traylor | 123 Ohio St.3d 132, 914 N.E.2d 1026 (Ohio,2009) | 2009 WL 2634570 (Ohio), 2009 -Ohio- 2971 | Defendant was charged with two misdemeanors after his unrestrained Italian Mastiff/Cane Corso dogs attacked a wire fox terrier and its owner. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that YCO 505.19(b) is unconstitutional and a violation of his procedural due process rights. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Youngstown municipal ordinance was constitutional because it was “rationally related to the city's legitimate interest in protecting citizens from vicious dogs,” provided “the dog owner with a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the dog's classification,” and did not “label dogs as dangerous or vicious” solely based on their breed type. | Case | |
| Yuzon v. Collins | 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004) | 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1702, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2535 |
In this California case, a dog bite victim sued a landlord, alleging premises liability in landlord's failure to guard or warn against tenants' dangerous dog. On appeal from an order of summary judgment in favor of the landlords, the Court of Appeal held that the landlord owed no duty of care, as he had no actual knowledge of dog's dangerous propensities and an expert witness's declaration that the landlord should have known of the dog's vicious propensities was insufficient to warrant reconsideration of summary judgment ruling. The landlord's knowledge that tenants may have a dog because it is allowed through a provision in the lease is insufficient to impute liability where the landlord has no knowledge of any previous attacks or incidents. |
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| Zageris v. Whitehall | 594 N.E.2d 129 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.,1991) | 72 Ohio App.3d 178 |
The single-family residence property owner and owner of dogs kept on property filed suit for declaratory judgment, petition for habeas corpus, and civil rights claims against city based on city's enforcement of ordinance prohibiting number of dogs on property. He then appealed the ruling in favor for the city. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the local ordinance limiting number of dogs on single family property was a nuisance and not zoning measure and consequently a valid exercise of city's police power. |
Case | |
| Zalaski v. City of Hartford | 723 F.3d 382 (C.A.2 (Conn.)) | 2013 WL 3796448 (C.A.2 (Conn.)) |
When animal rights activists, who were protesting the treatment of animals at a race sponsored by a circus, were arrested for criminal trespass and obstruction of free passage, the filed a section 1983 lawsuit for false arrest, unlawful retaliation, malicious prosecution, and interference with free expression under both the U.S. and Connecticut constitution against the city and the officer. Upon appeal of the lower court’s rejection of the activists’ First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court (1) affirmed the lower court’s decision on the ground of qualified immunity under section 1983, (2) would not address whether a pro se attorney who represented plaintiffs in addition to himself may be awarded fees because the issue was not raised in district court, and (3) vacated the judgment only in order to remand the case for the limited purpose of having the district court clarify whether it awarded the activists the costs incurred as a result of a discovery certification violation. |
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