Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Map of Beagle Freedom Laws | This map contains the 15 state laws commonly called "Beagle Freedom Laws" as of January 2024. These laws mandate that retired research dogs be released for adoption when they are no longer needed for research purposes. Typically, the laws facilitate relationships between research facilities and non-profit animal rescues or other animal adoption organizations to allow those organizations to offer the retired dogs to members of the public. Iowa became the most recent state to enact such a law. | State map | ||||||||
| Strickland v. Medlen | -397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013) | 2013 WL 1366033 (Tex.,2013) |
The Supreme Court of Texas considers petitioner's appeal from the court of appeals' decision holding that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The facts underlying the action involved the improper euthanization of respondents' dog, Avery. They sued for Avery's “sentimental or intrinsic value” because the dog had little or no market value and was irreplaceable. The trial court found that Texas law barred such damages, and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The Court of Appeals of Texas became the first court to hold that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The Supreme Court reverses that decision here, ruling that dogs are ordinary property, with damages limited to market value, and noneconomic damages based in relational attachment are not permitted. |
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| CA - Circus - Article 5. Circus Cruelty Prevention Act | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 2207 - 2210 | CA FISH & G § 2207 - 2210 | The California Circus Cruelty Prevention Act, effective in 2020, states that a person shall not sponsor, conduct, or operate a circus in this state that uses any animal other than a domestic dog, domestic cat, or domesticated horse, or exhibit or use any other animals than those animals. The term “circus” means a performance before a live audience in which entertainment consisting of a variety of acts, such as acrobats, aerialists, clowns, jugglers, or stunts, is the primary attraction or principal business, but excludes rodeos. | Statute | ||||||
| JACQUELINE CONRAD, PlaintiffAppellant, v. SUSAN CATAPANO and JIM CATAPANO, DefendantsRespondents | Not Reported in A.3d 2013 WL 673463 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2013) |
Plaintiff was injured by defendants' dog after being knocked to the ground. The plaintiff had her dog over to defendants' house for a "doggie play date" and the dogs were running off-leash in the fenced yard.The lower court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of negligence and absolute liability, finding that the defendants had not prior knowledge of the dog's propensity to run into people. The Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to defendants' prior knowledge of the dog's proclivities to become "hyper" in the presence of other dogs. Thus, the decision to grant summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for trial. Notably, the Court did state that it shared "the motion judge's observation that plaintiff may well be comparatively at fault here for choosing to stand in the backyard while the three unleashed dogs ran around." |
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| Derecho Animal Volume 6 Núm 4 |
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| Animal Welfare Institute v. BP America, INC | This complaint is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(2)(A), to bring an immediate halt to defendants’ actions that are killing endangered and threatened sea turtles in the Gulf of Mexico as part of defendants’ efforts to contain the catastrophic oil spill that has occurred at defendants’ Deepwater Horizon facility in the Gulf of Mexico. In this complaint, several animal rights organizations allege, in an effort to contain the oil spill by burning the oil, defendants are also corralling and burning alive endangered and threatened sea turtles without a permit from the Department of Commerce, in violation of Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). A motion for temporary restraining order is also included. | Pleading | ||||||||
| Petersheim v. Corum | 815 N.E.2d 1132 (Ohio, 2004) | 2004 WL 1812820 |
Driver struck bull that had wandered onto a public highway and driver was killed. Court of appeals ruled for wife in a wrongful death action against the bull's owner. The owner had a duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent the bull's escape. |
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| AL - Restaurant - § 22-20-5.3. Pet dogs permitted in outdoor dining areas | Ala.Code 1975 § 22-20-5.3; Ala.Code 1975 § 22-20-5.4 | AL ST § 22-20-5.3; § 22-20-5.4 | This Alabama law enacted in 2021 states that a pet dog that is under the control of a person shall be permitted in an outdoor dining area of a food service establishment if conditions listed in the law are all met. These include things like the food service facility owner filing a waiver with the State Health Department stating they will adhere to the prescribed rules, a prominent sign that puts the public on notice, a separate entrance for the dogs and owners that does not go through the food establishment, and making sure the pet owners adhere to rules like keeping dogs on leashes or in carriers. | Statute | ||||||
| State v. Murphy | 10 A.3d 697 (Me.,2010) | 2010 ME 140; 2010 WL 5353130 (Me.) |
Defendant appeals her convictions for assault of an officer, refusing to submit to arrest, criminal use of an electronic weapon, and two counts of cruelty to animals. In October 2009, a state police trooper was dispatched to defendant's home to investigate complaints that she was keeping animals despite a lifetime ban imposed after her 2004 animal cruelty conviction. The appellate found each of her five claims frivolous, and instead directed its inquiry as to whether the trial court correctly refused recusal at defendant's request. This court found that the trial court acted with "commendable restraint and responsible concern for Murphy's fundamental rights," especially in light of defendant's outbursts and provocations. |
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| Just Puppies, Inc. v. Frosh | 438 F. Supp. 3d 448 (D. Md. 2020), vacated and remanded, No. 20-1631, 2021 WL 4452349 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2021) | The State of Maryland passed a “No More Puppy-Mill Pups Act” which went into effect January 1, 2020. The Act prohibits retail pet stores in Maryland from offering for sale or otherwise transferring or disposing of cats or dogs. Four pet stores, a dog breeder, and a dog broker filed suit against Brian Frosh, the Attorney General of Maryland, the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (CPD), the Maryland House Economic Matters Committee, and the Maryland State Senate Finance Committee seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Act as well as a declaration that it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Defendants were all entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, unless an exception were to apply. Under the Ex parte Young exception “private citizens may sue state officials in their official capacities in federal court to obtain prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law.” The CPD and Committee Defendants were not State officials and, therefore, they did not fall within the Ex parte Young exception. The Ex parte Young exception, however, applied to Mr. Frosh as he was the Attorney General of Maryland since he had some connection with the enforcement of the Act. In Counts I, II, and III, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the Act discriminated against out-of-state breeders and brokers in its text, in its effect, or in its purpose. Count IV alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act was preempted by the AWA. The Court found that prohibiting Maryland pet stores from selling dogs or cats had no effect on the operation of the AWA. The Puppy-Mill Act's impact on pet stores did not clash with the AWA, because pet stores were explicitly exempt from the AWA. Count V alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to the equal protection of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court found no merit in this argument. Count VI asserted that the Act created a monopoly prohibited by Article 41 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court found that the Puppy-Mill Act did not constitute an exclusive right to sell cats and dog in Maryland. Although the Act prohibited brick and mortar stores from participating in the sale of cats and dogs, consumers still had a plethora of choices when seeking to obtain a pet, including rescue shelters, animal control units, USDA licensed breeders and brokers, and unregulated hobby breeders. The Court ultimately dismissed all claims against the CPD and the Committee Defendants and allowed the claims against Brian Frosh to proceed. | Case |