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Displaying 21 - 30 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Vaught | 8 F.4th 714 (8th Cir. 2021) | Several animal advocacy organizations filed a complaint against the Vaughts and Peco Foods, Inc. seeking an order that would prevent defendants from bringing a civil suit under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-118-113 (colloquially known as Arkansas' "ag gag" law). The statute at issue provides a civil cause of action for unauthorized access to protected properties described under the law. Plaintiffs claim that the statute violates their right to free speech under the First Amendment by chilling them from engaging in activities protected under the First Amendment. In particular, the plaintiffs have "specific and definite plans" to investigate the defendants' chicken slaughterhouses and pig farms by sending undercover investigators to seek employment with defendants and collect information in an effort to support their mission to "reform[] animal agriculture." The district court found that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing to sue, finding that the injury at hand was too speculative. On appeal here, the court noted found that plaintiffs established the three primary elements of standing from the Lujan case ("(1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress the injury."). First, but for the statute, plaintiffs allege that they would engage in the protected constitutional conduct. Second, the plaintiffs adequately outlined their intention to engage in a course of conduct that is proscribed by the statute. Finally, the court found a credible threat of enforcement that was objectively reasonable. This is bolstered by the fact plaintiffs have successfully engaged in the conduct at other facilities in the past. While defendants contend that there is no credible threat that they would enforce the statute because these organizations would not find entry to their facilities worthwhile. However, plaintiffs presented allegations that indeed they would be interested in documenting the plaintiffs' operations because of the conditions of pigs in "nearly immovable quarters" and the use of controversial methods of slaughter. The court was equally unpersuaded by defendants' claims that there is no injury in fact since plaintiffs are not poised to publish any information gathered from their facilities. Additionally, plaintiffs sent letters to defendants asking them to waive their rights to sue and neither defendant responded. Thus, the complaint sufficiently established a case or controversy. The lower court judgment was reversed and the case was remanded. | Case | |
| Japan, Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment | TIAS 7990 | Per Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: This 1972 Convention is designed to provide for the protection of species of birds which are common to both countries, or which migrate between them by (1) enhancement of habitat, (2) exchange of research data, and (3) regulation of hunting. It was signed in Tokyo on March 4, 1974, with ratification advised by the Senate of March 27, 1973, and documents of ratification exchanged September 19, 1972. The Convention entered into force September 19, 1974. An agreement amending the annex to the Convention by adding the Maloy Bittern was effected by exchange of notes September 19, 1974, entering into force December 19, 1974 (25 UST 3373; TIAS 7990). This exchange also included a list of endangered birds as provided for in Article IV of the Convention. Implementing legislation for the United States was achieved by enactment of P.L. 93-300, June 1, 1975 (88 Stat. 190), amending the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (16 USC 703-711; 40 Stat. 755), as amended. By a 1988 exchange of diplomatic notes, Convention appendices were updated to correct common names of species, scientific names, and to both add and delete species on the list based upon the latest scientific knowledge. | Treaty | |
| Gibson v. Rezvanpour | 601 S.E.2d 848 (Ga. 2004) | 268 Ga. App. 377 (Ga. 2004) |
The prospective buyer of a home was bitten by the homeowner's dog. The prospective buyer filed a claim against the homeowners, real estate agents, real estate brokers and the real estate agency. The State Court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. |
Case |
| Friends of Animals v. Bernhardt | 961 F.3d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2020) | Appellants consisting of conversation organizations and a safari guide challenged a series of actions of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) governing imports of sport-hunted animal trophies from Africa. The Appellants challenged certain findings that the Service made allowing animal trophies to be imported. The Court had reviewed a similar set of findings in another case and concluded that they were legislative rules illegally issued without notice and comment. FWS subsequently withdrew all its findings that were issued without notice and comment including the ones that were challenged by the Appellants in a subsequent memorandum. The Appellants still desired to contest the withdrawn findings. The Appellants alleged that it was illegal for the FWS to abandon its prior findings without engaging in APA informal rulemaking and that it was illegal for the FWS to announce its intent to the make the necessary findings through informal adjudications in the future. The Appellant’s claims fell into three categories: (1) challenges to the 2017 Zimbabwe findings that sport-hunting of elephants would enhance the survival of the species; (2) challenges to the memorandum by the FWS withdrawing their prior findings; and (3) challenges to the memorandum’s announcement that the FWS intends to making findings on a case-by-case basis when considering individual permit applications. The Court found that since the FWS had withdrew the 2017 findings, they no longer caused the appellants any injury which made any challenges to them moot. The Appellants attempted to argue that the flaws in the 2017 Zimbabwe elephant finding were capable of repetition yet would evade review. The Court rejected this argument. As for the second challenges regarding the memorandum’s withdrawal of its prior findings, the Court found that the withdrawal caused no injury to the Appellants. The Court rejected the challenges to the memorandum’s announcement that the FWS intended to make findings on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. | Case | |
| OR - Animal Racing - Chapter 462. Racing. | O.R.S. § 462.010 - 990 | OR ST §§ 462.010 - 990 | Oregon created a Racing Commission that has the authority license, regulate, and supervise all race meets within the state and shall cause the race tracks that hold races to be inspected at least once each fiscal year. A race meet is not to be held unless a license is obtained from the Oregon Racing Commission. All employees of the race track as well as any public training facility or kennel for greyhounds involved in racing are also required to obtain a license from the Commission prior to engaging in their duties. The Commission may require each applicant to obtain a recommendation in writing of the board of county commissioners of the county in the event a race meet is to be held outside of a city and of the governing body of such city if the race meet is to be held within a city. The Commission is tasked with determining the number and classes of race meets to be held in any fiscal year and the total number of racing dates to be granted to a licensee, not to exceed 350 days in any metropolitan area in any fiscal year. The Commission is entitled to require chemical testing of the urine, blood, saliva, or other bodily substances of animals participating in races. Animals are prohibited from participating in races if they have been administered a drug that is prohibited by the Commission, prohibited drugs have been detected in the animal's system, and the animal has been stimulated or depressed in any way by a mechanical device not sanctioned by the Commission. | Statute |
| Keith v. Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvania, Department of Agriculture | 116 A.3d 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 2214849 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 2015) | This case focuses on the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture's preliminary objection that Petitioners' had taxpayer standing to request injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that regulations promulgated by the Department were in conflict with the mandates set forth in the Pennsylvania Dog Law Act. Petitioners asserted that the Department was not authorized to exempt nursing mothers from the statutory ban on metal strand flooring and from the statutory requirement of unfettered access to exercise areas. Department argued that Petitioners had not pled sufficient facts to show that those directly and immediately affected by the regulations were beneficially affected. The court found Petitioners were at least as well inclined and situated as any other entities to challenge regulations that might be in conflict with those provisions. The court therefore overruled the Department's preliminary objections to Petitioners' standing. | Case |
| Sri Lanka - Cruelty - Chapter 573 Cruelty to Animals (English) | Ordinances Nos 13 of 1907, 19 of 1912, 43 of 1917, Y of 1919, 33 of 1921, 16 of 1927, 17 of 1970, 12 of 1945, 22 of 1955 | This Ordinance, in English, details Sri Lanka's animal cruelty laws. It also provides provisions for starving animals, using disabled or ill animals for labor, killing animals with unnecessary cruelty, and permitting diseased animals to die in the street. This ordinance also gives the Minister the power to appoint infirmaries to treat and care for animals that are the victims of offenses committed under this ordinance; the owner of the animal is liable for the cost of caring for the infirmed animal. Any Magistrate, Superintendent, or Assistant Superintendent of Police, Judge of primary Court or the divisional Assistant Government Agent of a division may direct the immediate destruction of an animal who was a victim of an offense if in that person's opinion the animal's sufferings are such as to render such a direction proper. Offenders shall be fined or jailed depending on the seriousness of the offence. | Statute | |
| State v. Agee | --- N.E.3d ---- , 2019 WL 3504010 (Ohio App., 2019) | 2019-Ohio-3107 | The Humane Society brought this action in response to a complaint regarding a dog tangled in a tether. Three German Shepherds were discovered that belonged to the Defendant, Shawn Agee, Jr. The dogs were suffering from maltreatment. All three had been restrained without access to water or food and one of the dog’s tethers was wrapped so tightly that its leg had started to swell. Two of the dogs were suffering from fly strike. The State charged the Defendant with 12 criminal misdemeanors relating to the treatment of the three animals. The trial court acquitted the Defendant of 10 of those counts because of his unrebutted testimony that he had been out of town for the weekend and had left the dogs in the care of his mother. The Defendant was found guilty to two second-degree misdemeanors relating to the two dogs suffering from fly strike because those particular injuries were long time, very painful injuries that were not being treated and the Defendant was the dogs’ “confiner, custodian, or caretaker.” The Defendant was sentenced to community control, a fine of $100, a suspended jail sentence of 180 days, the surrender of the two dogs with fly strike, and the proviso that the remaining dog be provided with regular vet appointments and various other conditions. This appeal followed. The Defendant asserted that the Court erred by finding that he had in fact violated the statute that he was found guilty of and that his convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence. The Defendant argued that he did not qualify as the type or class of persons subject to criminal liability merely as an owner. The Court noted that the trial court did not impose liability due to his status as the dogs’ owner, but rather due to this having served as the two dogs’ confiner, custodian, or caretaker when they developed fly strike and should have been but were not properly treated. As for the second assignment of error, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to find that the Defendant had violated the statute. The Defendant had admitted that he knew that the two dogs had fly strike “two or three weeks before he left town for the weekend.” The dogs were not treated before he left town. The Court ultimately affirmed both convictions. | Case |
| Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. | 228 Cal.Rptr. 101 Cal.App. (2 Dist.,1986) | 183 Cal.App.3d 372 (1986) |
In this case, the owners of dog petitioned for writ of mandamus requesting vacation of destruction order and declaration that ordinances under which the dog was seized were unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal held that due process required that owners have hearing prior to seizure of or destruction of dog (a property interest) and that a "courtesy hearing" did not satisfy due process requirements. Further, the court concluded that the ordinances here were unconstitutional for failing to provide for notice and a hearing either before or after the seizure of an uncontrollable biting or vicious dog. |
Case |
| VT - Education - § 912. Student's right of refusal; animal dissection | 16 V.S.A. § 912 | This Vermont law gives a student in a public elementary or secondary school (or approved independent school) a right to be excused from lessons requiring a student to dissect, vivisect, or otherwise destroy an animal, or observe any of these activities. Each school district must establish procedures for a student to exercise this right and alternatives methods of learning the material covered. School districts must also adopt a statement that no student shall be discriminated against based on his or her decision to exercise the right to be excused afforded by this section. | Statute |