Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anderson v. Christopherson | 816 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2012) | 2012 WL 2913222 (Minn.) |
This appeal asks two questions: whether defendant-dog owners (Christophersons) were strictly liable under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 for plaintiff Anderson's injuries suffered when he attempted to break up a fight between defendants' and plaintiff's dogs; and (2) whether one of the defendants was an "owner" for purposes of this law. In the case at hand, the court found that the events leading to Anderson's injury could produce three reasonable alternative inferences such that summary judgment was inappropriate. The court found there was an issue whether the father Dennis Christopherson was "harboring" the dog at the home for purposes of the animal owner liability statute. |
Case |
| U.S. v. Proceeds from Sale of Approximately 15,538 Panulirus Argus Lobster Tails | 834 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Fla. 1993) |
This case arose out of the seizure of some 15,538 lobster tails of the species Panulirus argus, more commonly known as "spiny lobster," imported into the United States by the Claimant Lista Enterprises Seafood, Inc. from the Turks and Caicos Islands, a British territory in the Caribbean. The court held the government had probable cause to seize the lobster tails based on the weight criteria established under Turks and Caicos law. Under the Lacey Act, anyone who "knowingly" imports fish or wildlife taken in violation of foreign law may be assessed a penalty of $10,000 per violation, where "knowingly" refers to situations where the violator knew or should have known that the wildlife was taken in violation of law. |
Case | |
| Tighe v. N. Shore Animal League Am. | 36 N.Y.S.3d 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 142 A.D.3d 607, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05807 |
In this New York case, the defendant appeals denial of its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an action to recover damages for personal injuries after the dog she adopted from defendant-North Shore Animal League America bit plaintiff's face causing severe personal injuries. Plaintiff alleges causes of action that include negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and interposed a claim for punitive damages. After defendant opposed the filing, plaintiff submitted evidence that the dog previously had been returned to defendant animal shelter after biting another individual in the face. This court noted that, under long-standing rule, the owner of a domestic animal who knew or should have known of the animal's vicious propensities is liable for harm. However, here, even if defendant failed to disclose the dog's vicious propensities, that breach was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In fact, the dog showed aggressive behavior during the three-and-a-half months the plaintiff owned the dog (including a previous bite to plaintiff's hand). This, in effect, placed the plaintiff on notice of the dog's vicious propensities. The court found that the lower court erred by not granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. With regard to the reach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the court found that even if a transaction from an animal shelter is subject to the warranty, the plaintiff failed to notify defendant of the "nonconformity of the goods" (to wit, the dog) within a reasonable period of time. The order was reversed. |
Case |
| Template for Country topical intro | Template for country topical introductions. | Policy | ||
| Map of Veterinary Reporting Laws for Animal Cruelty | This map links to laws related to reporting of animal cruelty by veterinarians (note that other animal care professionals and government employees may also have duties to report suspected cruelty). As of 2023, the majority of U.S. states have laws that either mandate or allow reporting (permissive reporting) of suspected animal cruelty by veterinary professionals OR have standalone laws that provide immunity for reporting of suspected cruelty. In most states with a mandatory or voluntary reporting law, a companion immunity provision is also provided. Such an immunity statute protects a veterinarian from any civil liability (and sometimes criminal) arising from the reporting of the abuse. About 23 states have MANDATORY reporting by veterinarians or veterinary professionals (note that some states are mandatory only for animal fighting or aggravated cruelty and Pennsylvania's regulation only applies to reporting abuse by other licensed veterinarians). Approximately 12 states have NO LAWS that deal with veterinary reporting of cruelty or immunity for reporting suspected cruelty. | State map | ||
| Justice by and through Mosiman v. Vercher | 518 P.3d 131 (2022), review denied, 370 Or. 789, 524 P.3d 964 (2023) | 321 Or.App. 439 (Or.App., 2022) | The Oregon Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a horse has the legal capacity to sue in an Oregon court. The Executive Director of Sound Equine Options (SEO), Kim Mosiman, filed a complaint naming a horse (“Justice”)as plaintiff with the Mosiman acting as his guardian, and claiming negligence against his former owner. In the instant appeal, Mosiman challenges the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. In 2017, defendant's neighbor persuaded defendant to seek veterinary care for her horse. The veterinarian found the horse to be about 300 pounds underweight with significant walking difficulties and other maladies. The horse was voluntarily surrendered to Mosiman who eventually nursed the animal back to good health. In 2018, Mosiman filed a complaint on Justice's behalf for a single claim of negligence per se, alleging that defendant violated the Oregon anti-cruelty statute ORS 167.330(1) by failing to provide minimum care. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a horse lacks the legal capacity to sue and the court granted dismissal. Specifically, the trial court expressed concern over the "profound implications" of allowing a non-human animal to sue and stated that an appellate court could come to a different conclusion by "wad[ing] into the public policy debate involving the evolution of animal rights." Here, the appellate court first found no statutory authority for a court to appoint a guardian for an animal because "a horse inherently lacks self-determination and the ability to express its wishes in a manner the legal system would recognize." The animal has a "distinctive incapacity" that sets it apart from humans with legal disabilities that require appointment of a legal guardian. The court reaffirmed the law's treatment of animals as personal property and found no support in the precedent for permitting an animal to vindicate its own legal rights. While Oregon's animal welfare laws recognize animals as beings capable of feeling pain, this makes them a special type of property and imposes duties on the human owners rather than rights to the animal victims. The court held that only human beings and legislatively-created legal entities are persons with the capacity to sue under Oregon common law. The court emphasized that this holding does not prevent Oregon laws from ever recognizing an animal as a legal person, but the courts are not the appropriate vehicle to do that. Accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice. | Case |
| Shively v. Dye Creek Cattle Co. | 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 (Cal.App.3.Dist.) | 29 Cal.App.4th 1620 (Cal.App.3.Dist.) |
This California case concerned a personal injury action arising from a collision between the plaintiff's car and defendant's black Angus bull, which was lying on the highway at night. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In reversing this decision, the Court of Appeal held that the open range law does not itself define the duty owners of cattle owe nor does it exempt them from the duty of ordinary care. |
Case |
| Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard | 325 F.3d 412 (C.A.3 (Pa.),2003) | 175 Ed. Law Rep. 93 |
Public school student circulated a petition during class and recess that opposed a school field trip to the circus. School officials prevented her from circulating the petition, and she complained of a violation of her First Amendment right to free speech. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the school, holding that the student's rights had not been violated because a school may regulate the times and circumstances a petition may be circulated when it interferes with educational goals or the rights of other students. |
Case |
| FL - Domestic Violence - 741.30. Domestic violence; injunction; powers | West's F. S. A. § 741.30 | FL ST § 741.30 | This Florida law allows petitioners to file injunctions for protection against domestic violence. Among the described incidents of domestic violence from which the petitioner may obtain protection is where the respondent has "intentionally injured or killed a family pet." The court may considers this as a factor when determining whether there is reasonable cause to believe the petitioner is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence. In 2020, Florida added this provision to (5)(a)(4): "Awarding to the petitioner the temporary exclusive care, possession, or control of an animal that is owned, possessed, harbored, kept, or held by the petitioner, the respondent, or a minor child residing in the residence or household of the petitioner or respondent. The court may order the respondent to temporarily have no contact with the animal and prohibit the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal. This subparagraph does not apply to an animal owned primarily for a bona fide agricultural purpose, as defined under s. 193.461, or to a service animal, as defined under s. 413.08, if the respondent is the service animal's handler." | Statute |
| Lee v. State | 973 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind.App. 2012) | 2012 WL 3775862 (Ind.App. 2012) |
An attendant of a dog fight was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor under section 35-46-3-4 of the Indiana Code. On appeal, the defendant-appellant argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and that the statute invited arbitrary law enforcement, which violated the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution. Though the appeals court found the defendant-appellant had waived her constitutional claims by not filing a motion at the bench trial, the appeals court found her claims lacked merit. The defendant-appellant’s conviction was therefore upheld. |
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