Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OK - Disaster - Care and Disposition of Disaster Animals Act | 4 Okl. St. Ann. § 701 - 707 | These statutes compose the Care and Disposition of Disaster Animals Act of Oklahoma. The Act describes where animals who are rescued from a disaster area should be held, how long the animals should be held for their owners, and also restricts disaster animals from being removed from the state. The statute also describes the penalties for knowingly removing disaster animals from the state including a civil fine of up to One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per offense. | Statute | |
| ME - Hunting, Internet - § 12101. License to operate commercial shooting area | 12 M. R. S. A. § 12101 | Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 12, § 12101 | Subsection 1-C prohibits hunting via the Internet and the operation of Internet hunting services located within the state of Maine. A person who violates this section commits a Class E crime. | Statute |
| LA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | LSA-R.S. 3:2361 - 2367; LSA-R.S. 14:102 - .29 | These Louisiana statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty provisions. The term "cruel" is defined in the first section every act or failure to act whereby unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted. The crime of cruelty to animals is subdivided into simple cruelty or aggravated cruelty. Simple cruelty occurs when a person intentionally or with criminal negligence overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, or overworks, torments, cruelly beats, or unjustifiably injures, or, having charge, custody, or possession of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, unjustifiably fails to provide any living animal with proper food, proper drink, proper shelter, or proper veterinary care. | Statute | |
| State v. Brown | 771 N.W.2d 267 (N.D.,2009) | 2009 WL 2506287 (N.D.), 2009 ND 150 |
In this North Dakota case, the defendant appeals from a criminal judgment finding she violated the Cass County Animal Control Ordinance after her neighbors reported her barking dogs. In her first appeal ground, Brown contended that the Ordinance constituted an unconstitutional delegation of power. The court disagreed, finding that Cass County adopted a home rule charter and thus had the power to create criminal penalties for violations of ordinances. Brown next argued that the legislature “has statutorily prohibited the county from attempting to regulate dogs as public nuisances.” Since the state has defined certain “dog activities” that constitute a public nuisance, the county is precluded from declaring any other dog-related activity a public nuisance according to defendant. The court found that this broad interpretation would preclude action by the county if the state has exercised any authority and would virtually eliminate the county's authority granted by home-rule authority. The court also rejected Brown’s argument that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. The Ordinance provides that an animal that “barks ... in an excessive or continuous manner” is a public nuisance. The court held that its holding in Kilkenny, 2007 ND 44, ¶¶ 20-25, 729 N.W.2d 120, is controlling here, where the words excessive, continuous, or untimely have a common understanding and are not vague. |
Case |
| Bal Harbour Village v. Welsh | 879 So.2d 1265 (Fl. 2004) | 879 So.2d 1265 (Fl. 2004) |
Defendant owned four dogs prior to the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting municipality residents from owning more than two dogs in one household. The municipality brought suit against Defendant for failing to comply with the ordinance. The trial court denied the municipalities prayer for permanent injunctive relief, but the Court of Appeals overruled the decision holding the ordinance could constitutionally be enforced under the police power to abate nuisance. |
Case |
| CT - Cruelty, reporting - § 17a-100a. Reporting of neglected or cruelly treated animals. | C.G.S.A. § 17a-100a - § 17a-100c | Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-100a - § 17a-100c (West) | These Connecticut statutes require state employees who work with children and families to also report suspected animal harm, neglect, or cruelty. The statutes explain how the reporting should be completed and describes the implementation of training programs for employees to recognize animal abuse. The statutes also discuss the development of an annual report on actual or suspected instances of animal neglect or cruelty within the state. | Statute |
| Robinson v. Pezzat | 83 F.Supp.3d 258 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 1263143 | While executing a search warrant at the plaintiff’s home, a police officer shot and killed the plaintiff’s thirteen-year-old dog. Accounts differed as to whether the dog bit the officer before shooting or whether the bite was a result of the shooting. The plaintiff filed suit against the police officer and municipality and alleged, inter alia, violations of her constitutional rights, several common law torts, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court was not swayed by the plaintiff’s “uncorroborated version of events” and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the plaintiff had not met her burden to defeat either the individual police officer’s or the municipality’s immunity. This case is under appeal as of September 15, 2015. | Case |
| IA - Veterinary - Veterinary Practice Code | I. C. A. § 169.1 - 56 | IA ST § 169.1 - 56 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| Nutt v. Florio | 914 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. Ct. App., 2009) | 75 Mass.App.Ct. 482 (2009) |
This Massachusetts case involves an appeal of a summary judgment in favor of the landlord-defendant concerning an unprovoked dog attack. The dog, described as a pit bull terrier, was kept by a tenant of Florio's. The court found that, while the defendants cannot be held strictly liable by virtue the dog's breed, "knowledge of that breed and its propensities may properly be a factor to be considered in determining whether the defendants were negligent under common-law principles." Reviewing the record de novo, the court held that this question and the defendant's knowledge of the dog's propensities, created a genuine issue of material fact. The order of summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case was remanded. |
Case |
| In re: JACK D. STOWERS, DOING BUSINESS AS SUGAR CREEK KENNELS | 56 Agric. Dec. 279 (1996) | 1996 WL 881664 (U.S.D.A.) | Willfulness is not required for cease and desist orders or for monetary fines; it is only required for license revocation if agency has not given respondent written notice of violations and opportunity to come into compliance with regulations. (Chief Administrative Law Judge Victor W. Palmer imposed a civil penalty of $15,000.00, issued a cease and desist order, and revoked Respondent's license after finding that Respondent: failed to allow department officials to inspect its facility; failed to maintain complete and accurate records of the acquisition, disposition, and identification of dogs; failed to properly identify dogs; failed to hold dogs for the required period of time; offered dogs for transportation in enclosures that did not conform to structural strength and space requirements; failed to construct and maintain primary enclosures for dogs that protect the dogs from injury; failed to deliver health certificates for dogs transported interstate; failed to provide adequate veterinary care; and obtained random source dogs from individuals who had not bred and raised the dogs on their own premises.) | Case |