Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MA - Hunting, Internet - § 65A. Online Shooting or Spearing | M.G.L.A. 131 § 65A | Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 131, § 65A (West) | This statute prohibits hunting via the Internet and the operation of online hunting businesses within the state of Massachusetts. Violation is punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 2 1/2 years or by a fine of not more than $2,500, or by both a fine and imprisonment. | Statute | |
| LA - Dog Dangerous - Chapter 1. Criminal Code. | LA R.S. 14:102.14 | This Louisiana statute defines a "dangerous dog" as any dog which when unprovoked, on two separate occasions within the prior thirty-six-month period, engages in any behavior that requires a defensive action by any person to prevent bodily injury when the person and the dog are off the property of the owner of the dog; or any dog which, when unprovoked, bites a person causing an injury; or any dog which, when unprovoked, on two separate occasions within the prior thirty-six-month period, has killed, seriously bitten, inflicted injury, or otherwise caused injury to a domestic animal off the property of the owner of the dog. It is unlawful for any person to own a dangerous dog without properly restraining or confining the dog. | Statute | ||
| Southall v. Gabel | 277 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio App. 1971) | 28 Ohio App.2d 295 (1971) |
This case resulted from the alleged negligent transport of a horse that resulted in a drastic change in the horse's temperament (to a "killer horse"), which ultimately led to its destruction by its owner. Before trial, defendant demurred to plaintiff's petition on the ground that the action was barred under R.C. s 2305.11, the act being 'malpractice' and therefore required to be brought within one year after the termination of treatment. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's decision overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's petition was correct, 'the petitioner is based on negligence for the transporting rather than malpractice.' Further, the Court held that until the Supreme Court speaks, veterinarians are not included in the definition of malpractice (reversed and remanded - See , 293 N.E.2d 891 (Ohio, Mun.,1972). |
Case | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States Department of Agriculture | 2016 WL 7235624 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2016) |
Foie gras is a food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. To create it, the duck or goose is force-fed a special mix of food which causes a large buildup of fat in the bird's liver. This gives the product its signature taste. Plaintiffs, Animal Legal Defense Fund, comprised of four animal rights organizations and three individuals. The Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture, comprised of the Food Safety and Inspection Services (FSIS), and two individuals. Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund asked Defendant (FSIS) to initiate rulemaking under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) “to exclude Foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased product.” They argued that the force-feeding process could cause infections and illnesses for the animals and the consumption of the birds could trigger the onset of illness and disease in humans. FSIS denied the petition to ban the food product. The Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund then filed this action for judicial review. Defendant FSIS argued that the Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that the PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and that in any event, FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. The United States District Court, C.D. California concluded that the Plaintiff, Animal Legal Defense Fund had standing to bring this action and that their interests fell within the “zone” of interests protected by the PPIA. However, the Court also held that Defendants, United States Department of Agriculture, did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the petition. Accordingly, the Court Granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. |
Case | ||
| Romero v. Bexar County | 993 F.Supp.2d 658 (W.D. Tex. 2014) | Several reports to the police were made that a man had threatened several individuals with a firearm. In responding to the calls, the police identified the plaintiff pet owner as the allegedly armed man. Officers then proceeded to the plaintiff’s home and acknowledged that they saw a “Beware of Dogs” sign, but still entered the fenced-in premises. Upon entering the yard, four dogs approached and one of the officers shot and killed one of the dogs. The plaintiff brought suit against the officer and municipality and alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In evaluating the officer’s claim of qualified immunity, the court held that the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable, considering he had reason to believe the plaintiff may be armed and dangerous and claimed “several large dogs ran out aggressively charging, barking and growling.” The officer’s relation of events was backed up by his fellow officer on the scene. | Case | ||
| IA - Ordinances - 331.381. Duties relating to services | I. C. A. § 331.381 | IA ST § 331.381 | This Iowa statute states that the county board shall provide for the seizure, impoundment, and disposition of dogs in accordance with chapter 351. | Statute | |
| FL - Wildlife - Chapter 68A-1. General: Ownership, Short Title, Severability and Definitions | Fla. Admin. Code r. 68A-1.001 - 1.004 | 68 FL ADC 68A-1.001 to 1.004 | This chapter of the Administrative Code provides the definitions for the remaining chapters of the Code, and includes a declaration of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission's authority to regulate all wild animal life within the state. | Administrative | |
| Re Wildlife Protection Association of Australia Inc. and Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts | [2004] AATA 1383 |
The Minister for the Environment approved plans for the 'harvesting' of Kangaroos in South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland. The Tribunal found that the killing of joeys, where the mother was also killed, was sanctioned by the Model Code relating to kangaroos and that any licences issued under the plans authorised those killings. The Tribunal found that the likelihood of compliance with the code, which stipulated the manner of killing of kangaroos, would be in the range of 95-99%. The Tribunal approved each of the plans but made a recommendation that future plans should involve a greater element of public consultation. |
Case | ||
| White v Diocese of Buffalo, N.Y | 138 A.D.3d 1470 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 2016 WL 1710974 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | Plaintiff, Rosemary White brought action against the Defendant, Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she was bitten by a priests’ dog, at premises owned by the church. White brought the action claiming negligent supervision and retention of the priest who owned dog. The church moved to dismiss, and White moved for summary judgment. The New York Supreme Court, Erie County, granted the church's motion for dismissal, and denied White’s motion. White appealed and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the church was not liable for negligent supervision or retention of the priest. The Appellate Division, reasoned that the Supreme Court, Erie County, properly granted the church’s motion to dismiss White’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The Court stated that to the extent White alleged a theory of negligent supervision and retention of the priest in her bill of particulars, the “purpose of the bill of particulars is to amplify the pleadings . . . , and [it] may not be used to supply allegations essential to a cause of action that was not pleaded in the complaint.” Therefore, the order from the Supreme Court was affirmed. | Case | |
| KY - Lien, veterinary - 376.470 Veterinarian's lien | KRS § 376.470 | KY ST § 376.470 | This Kentucky law states that any licensed veterinarian who performs professional services for an animal, by contract with, or by the written consent of, the owner or authorized agent shall have a lien on the animal to secure the cost of the service provided. The priority for the liens filed under this law is based upon when the first lien was filed. | Statute |